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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL: TAKING
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SERIOUSLY
Tracey Maclint
INTRODUCTION

"A dangerous, humiliating, sometimes fatal encounter with the
police is almost a rite of passage for a black man in the United
States."' Even a black man who becomes a Justice on the United
States Supreme Court can recall such an encounter. For Thurgood
Marshall, the incident occurred at a train station in a small Mississippi town during the early 1940s. As Justice Marshall tells the
story,.pangs of hunger and a long wait for the next train encouraged
him to visit a local restaurant next to the station. While considering
the thought,
"[a] white man came up beside me in plain clothes with a great big
pistol on his hip. And he said, 'Nigger boy, what are you doing
here?' And I said, 'Well, I'm waiting for the train to Shreveport.'
And he said, 'There's only one more train comes through here,
and that's the 4 o'clock, and you'd better be on it because the sun
is never going down on a live nigger in this town.' I wasn't hungry
2
anymore."
While no absolute conclusions about Justice Marshall's judicial philosophy should be drawn from a single episode, this story reveals
much about his perception of the effect police actions have on individual lives.
Life experiences and personal perspective often influence how
one envisions the substance and function of the Constitution and
t Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A. 1980, Tufts University; J.D. 1983,
Columbia University. The author thanks Yale Kamisar and Joe Singer for reading and
commenting on an earlier draft of this Article. He would also like to thank his colleagues at the Boston University School of Law for their suggestions and comments.
The author thanks Paul Wonsowicz for his research assistance.
1 Don Wycliff, Blacks and Blue Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1987, at A22.
2 Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, in EIGrr MEN AND A LADY 125 (1990). For a
slightly different version of this incident, see RicHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 224

(1976):
In one account of a Southern trip, [Marshall] told how he had stopped off

at a small Mississippi town and was contemplating an overnight stay: "I
was out there on the train platform, trying to look small, when this coldeyed man with a gun on his hip comes up. 'Nigguh,' he said, 'I thought
you oughta know the sun ain't nevah set on a live nigguh in this town.'
So I wrapped my constitutional rights in cellophane, tucked 'em in my hip
pocket ... and caught the next train out of there."
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the Bill of Rights. 3 Constitutional criminal procedure, in particular,
is an area of the law in which one's experiences and point of view
regarding governmental power play an important role. General
trust in governmental power or deference to governmental decisions may lead one to minimize constitutional liberties or view them
as tools for efficient law enforcement. Many consider deference to
government authority necessary for effective governance of a complex and violent society, 4 and evaluate police procedures for their
ability to further law enforcement needs. Under this approach, the
3

See Williams, supra note 2, at 141-42:
At times [Justice Marshall] becomes terribly frustrated about failing to
change his colleagues' minds. "I mean, I didn't persuade them on affirmative action, did I?" I didn't persuade them in [Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1.978)]. And he is constantly aware of [his colleagues'] innocence. "What do they know about Negroes?" he says. "You
can't name one member of this court who knows anything about Negroes
before he came to this court. Name me one. Sure, they went to school
with one Negro in the class. Name me one who lives in a neighborhood
with Negroes. They've got to get over that problem, and the only way
they can do it is the person himself. What you have to do-white or
black-you have to recognize that you have certain feelings about the
other race, good or bad. And then get rid of them. But you can't get rid
of them until you recognize them."
See also Owen Fiss, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARv. L. REv. 49, 53-54
(1991), noting thatJustice Marshall's response to the majority's ruling in United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), requiring a $50 filing fee as a condition for a voluntary
discharge in bankruptcy, did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the fee
could be repaid for an amount that was "less than the price of a movie and a little more
than the cost of a pack or two of cigarettes." 409 U.S. at 449. Justice Marshall retorted:
A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for [the poor], not a routine purchase
but a luxury indulged in only rarely. The desperately poor almost never
go to see a movie, which the majority seems to believe is an almost weekly
activity ....
It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the
Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the
Constitution to be premised on unfounded assumptions about how people live.
409 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4 Efforts to effectively regulate and restrain law enforcement methods have always
been slow to succeed. Traditionally many express alarm at any effort to regulate police
practices considered necessary to fight crime. For example, some have justified police
methods for obtaining confessions--even confessions secured under questionable conditions-as necessary without paying much attention to constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958) (police efforts to continue questioning
suspect despite repeated requests to see a lawyer does not violate due process; a contrary rule would have "devastating effect" on law enforcement because "it would effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused was afforded
opportunity to call his attorney."). See generally Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation-APractical Necessity, 52J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. ScI. 16 (1961) (arguing that effective
police interrogation requires methods that might be seen as unethical in noncriminal,
everyday situations).
At one time, some even urged that society turn a blind eye to third degree tactics.
"Bad as the third degree is, we should be very cautious about disrupting the police
department and the courts in the hope of abolishing it." Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Remedies
for the Third Degree, ATLAnrc MoNTHLY, Nov. 1931, at 621, 625-26, 630. See also Yale
Kamisar, A Dissentfrom the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the 'New' Fifth Amendment and
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central purpose of the criminal justice process is to separate the
guilty from the innocent 5 with little concern for whether the "suspect was accorded his full Miranda warnings at precisely the appropriate time or whether he received the assistance of counsel as he
6
stood in a lineup."
Alternatively, if one has witnessed and lived with the oppression of governmental power or experienced the impact of governmental authority on individual liberty, one may view constitutional
rights as substantive safeguards designed to check the government
as well as to advance personal liberties. The Bill of Rights helps, but
fails to provide a completely even playing field between the citizen
and the government. Where the typical police-citizen encounter is
inherently unequal, the safeguards of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments, as articulated by the judiciary, 7 guarantee rights that
the executive and legislative branches of government, if left to their
own devices, are not likely to respect or enforce. In other words,
the Old 'Voluntariness' Test, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 63 (Yale Kamisar
ed., 1980).
For a lively debate about this "bygone" era, compare Joseph D. Grano, Introduction-The Changed And Changing World of ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure: The Contributionof
the Department ofJustice's Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 395 (1989), with Yale
Kamisar, Remembering the 'Old World' of CriminalProcedure:A Reply to ProfessorGrano, 23 U.
MICH.J.L. REF. 537 (1990) [hereinafter Kamisar, Remembering the 'Old World]. Although
"third degree" police tactics are generally associated with a past era, evidence occasionally surfaces that the police have not forgotten how to use such tactics. See Alex
Kotlowitz, Drug War's Emphasis On Law Enforcement Takes a Toll on Police, WALL ST. J.,Jan.
11, 1991, at Al ("While interrogating a young man suspected of dealing crack cocaine,
[a Dayton, Ohio police officer] grabbed a hot iron off the nightstand and repeatedly
touched it to the bare skin of the handcuffed prisoner.").
5
This model of criminal procedure, often marched under the banner of "truthfinding" or the "search for truth," is generally associated with conservative critics of the
Warren Court and has generated considerable attention. See Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Law of PretrialInterrogation: Truth in CriminalJustice Report
No. 1, 22 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 437 (1989). Of course, notwithstanding the suggestigns of
those who champion the "truth-finding" model, one should note that this doctrine is
"nowhere mentioned in the constitutional text and never articulated in the legislative
history, as a guide to constitutional adjudication." Donald S. Dripps, Beyond the Warren
Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure,
23 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 591, 593 (1990). An emphasis on "truth-finding" does, however,
allow conservative critics of the Warren Court to minimize or ignore those values that are
mentioned in the constitutional text. For instance, the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure, the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself, and the right to
the assistance of counsel.
6 H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL xiv (1988).
7 Cf. Dripps, supra note 5, at 603 ("What most of us have accepted, what most of us
invoke when we claim the protection of the Constitution, is not the instrument interpreted historically, but the instrument interpreted judicially."). See also Yale Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "PrincipledBasis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition," 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 592 (1983) ("The courts, after all, are the
specific addresses of the constitutional command that 'no Warrants shall issue, but
upon' certain prescribed conditions.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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constitutional liberties embody substantive values that transcend
concerns with efficient police procedure.
In my view, the life and career of Thurgood Marshall-both on
and off the Supreme Court-epitomize what the Bill of Rights and
the Supreme Court mean to the politically weak and socially vulnerable members of society. Thurgood Marshall's experiences and tri-

umphs as a civil rights lawyer are well known.8 Those experiences
undoubtedly influenced his views on the meaning of individual freedom and equality. However, another side ofJustice Marshall's life is
less well known.
Thurgood Marshall "cut his teeth" as a lawyer "in backwater
southern towns, overwhelmed bat not overmatched by a twisted
white justice wrought by judges and sheriffs who had few second
thoughts about beating in black heads." 9 Marshall's experiences as
a young lawyer confronting police officials and representing black

defendants probably account for some of his views on the -death
penalty,10 the relevance of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to police interrogation practices, I I and the impor8 See KLUGER, supra note 2 (1976); A Tribute toJustice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HIv.
L. REv. 23 (1991); Tributes: "In Honor ofJustice Thurgood Marshall," 26 VAL. U. L. Rv.
xxxvii (1991).
9 Williams, supra note 2, at 114-15.
10 Shortly after gradutating from law school, Marshall helped to defend a black
man, George Crawford, charged with murdering a white man in Loudoun County, Virginia. Crawford was convicted and given a life sentence. Marshall viewed the disposition as a victory: "We won it.... If you got a Negro charged with killing a white person
in Virginia and you got life imprisonment, then you've won. Normally they were hanging them in those days." Williams, supra note 2, at 122.
While on the Court,Justice Marshall consistently advocated the position that capital
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusal punishment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231-41 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 315-71 (1972). One author attributes Marshall's current views on the death
penalty to his early experiences as a lawyer representing capital defendants. Williams,
supra note 2, at 124 ("[Marshall's] repeated contact with black defendants accused of
capital crimes helped convince him that his fellow man should not be given the power to
condemn others to death. He remembers many stories about lives that could easily have
been snuffed out by the capriciousness of the white man's law.").
I I As an attorney, Marshall was well acquainted with coercive police interrogation
methods. During his testimony to the SenateJudiciary Committee considering his nomination to the Supreme Court, Senator Ervin peppered Marshall with questions about
the meaning of the word "compelled" in the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Marshall probably convinced the Senators that he knew what an "involuntary" confession was when he noted that he had "tried a case in Oklahoma where the
man 'voluntarily' confessed after he was beaten up for 6 days." HearingsBefore The Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1967). Marshall was
probably referring to Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944), which he argued before
the Court. He was also responsible for writing the petitioners' brief in Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), another case involving constitutionally dubious police interrogation methods.
As member of the Court, Justice Marshall was a strong defender of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and he opposed the efforts of the Burger and Rehnquist

1992]

THURGOOD MARSHALL

727

tance of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective counsel in
12
criminal cases.
Justice Marshall's train station encounter may also offer insight
into his views on how police behavior impacts individual liberty and
personal security. Most police confrontations implicate the protections delineated in the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees a citizen's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 3
Justice Marshall's views on Fourth Amendment questions have been
very consistent. Some officials have described his views as "anti-police," 1 4 a simplistic, yet unsurprising criticism. In our current politCourts to cut back on the rationale supporting Miranda. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz,
110 S. Ct. 2638, 2654 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(dissenting from plurality's recognition of a "routine booking exception" to Miranda);
Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (dissenting
from a mjority's recognition of an exception to Miranda that applies when an undercover officer posing as an inmate asks questions that may elicit an incriminating response). One notable exception isJustice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Berkemer
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (roadside questioning of a motorist detained for a routine traffic stop is not considered custodial interrogation and does not require Miranda
warnings). In McCarty, Justice Marshall concluded that traffic stops did not exert pressures upon detained motorists that would- sufficiently impair the free exercise of their
Fifth Amendment privilege. The bases for this conclusion-a motorist who sees a police
officer's flashing lights behind him expects "that he will be obliged to spend a short
period of time answering questions," id- at 437, and the "circumstances associated with
the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the
police," id. at 438-seem a bit strained. For criticism of McCarty, see George E. Dix,
Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 85 DuKE LJ. 849, 931 (1985).
12
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1031 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("Any reasonable standard of professionalism governing the
conduct of a capital defense must impose upon the attorney, at a minimum, the obligation to explore the aspects of his client's character that might persuade the sentencer to
spare his life."); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting):
The majority contends that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a
manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by a manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree. Every defendant is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and
conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer.
13 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
14
Philip Caruso, head of New York City's 20,000 member Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association, stated that Justice Marshall's resignation from the Supreme Court "is welcomed by police officers." Cameron Barr, Supreme Court Shift Favors Police, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONrrOR, July 18, 1991, at 15. Caruso claimed that Justice Marshall "had more

concern for criminals than for the rights of decent citizens and police officers." Id. Another police official, Ernest Curtsinger, chief of police in St. Petersburg, Florida, added
that "Marshall's departure and almost anyone's replacement is going to be a benefit for
the [police] profession as a whole." Id.
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ical climate, anyone who expresses concern about constitutional
safeguards is labelled as "soft" on criminals and "against" law
enforcement.15
15 Professor Kamisar recently explained the origins of the "'public['s] perception'
that many guilty criminals are being released on 'mere technicalities.'" Kamisar, Remembering the 'Old World', supra note 4, at 551 (footnote omitted). According to Kamisar:
For decades police officials and prosecutors have been telling the public
this. So have many politicians (who assume, probably correctly, that their
chances of getting reelected .are enhanced if they attack the courts for
being "soft" on crime). So have many members of the press (who too
often cannot resist oversimplifying or sensationalizing the crime
problem).
Of course, a significant change of direction has occurred-at least at the level of the
Supreme Court. The Court is now inclined to sacrifice constitutional rights in the name
of law enforcement. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2631 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (commenting that the "hydraulic pressure of public opinion ... has played a
role not only in the Court's decision to hear this case ....
but even in its resolution of
the constitutional issue involved") (citation and footnotes omitted).
State supreme courts and lower federal courts used to be considered "too close to
the 'war on crime' and too suspectible to public influence to be counted on when the
chips are down" to uphold constitutional claims of the criminally accused. Wayne R.
LaFave, PinguitudinousPolice, PachydermatousPrey: Whence FourthAmendment 'Seizures'?, 1991
U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 763. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, was viewed as "the
ultimate bulwark of the protections in the Bill of Rights." Id. Now, however, it appears
that the Court has undertaken a role-reversal with the state and lower federal courts.
Over the past two terms, a majority of the Court has clearly supported Fourth
Amendment claims in only two cases. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990) (holding
that the exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that permits use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach a defendant does not extend to impeachment of
other witnesses); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that an overnight
guest has an expectation of privacy in the home of a third-party).
In a third case, Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990), a unanimous Court affirmed the
Florida Supreme Court's decision to suppress narcotics discovered in a closed container
during an inventory search of an automobile because "the Florida Highway Patrol had
no policy whatever with respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during
an inventory search." Id. A five Justice majority, however, went on to declare that the
state court erred in ruling that the Court's Fourth Amendment precedents require a
policy either mandating or barring the inventory of closed containers. It noted that: "A
police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular
container should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself." Id.
Consequently, with the exception ofJames and Olson, the Court has spent the past
two terms rejecting Fourth Amendment claims that were upheld by either a state or
lower federal court. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), rev'k Buie v. State, 314
Md. 151 (1988); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), rev k 856 F.2d
1214 (9th Cir. 1988); Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990), rev'k
Sitz v. State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110
S. Ct. 2793 (1990), rev'" 177 Ill. App. 3d 1154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Alabama v. White,
110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), revg White v. State, 550 So. 2d 1074 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989);
New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990), rev k People v. Harris, 72 N.Y.2d 614 (N.Y.
1988); California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991), revg 216 Cal. App. 3d 586; Florida
v.Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991), revu 564 So. 2d 1083; California v. Hodari D., Ill S.
Ct. 1574 (1991), rev k 265 Cal. Rptr. 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Florida v. Bostick, I11 S.
Ct. 2382 (1991), rev'k 554 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1989); Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct.
1661 (1991), rev'k 888 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Justice Marshall, however, was not against the police; he was
simply in favor of enforcing the Fourth Amendment. A review of his
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates his belief in a liberal application of the provision and his disapproval of a narrow interpretation that jeopardizes the liberty and privacy of all
individuals, not just criminals. In deciding whether to apply the
Fourth Amendment to challenged governmental intrusions, he
urged his colleagues to be realistic about the power of government.
Justice Marshall opposed uncontrolled police intrusions. He recognized that the reach of the Fourth Amendment defines the relationship between government and citizen, and shapes the society we live
in.
Justice Marshall was also a strong proponent of the "warrant
preference" rule. He believed that warrantless searches and
seizures were unconstitutional unless the government could demonstrate the impracticality of obtaining a warrant. He vigorously opposed the view that the Fourth Amendment only requires police
actions to be "reasonable." Justice Marshall argued, instead, that
the Court had no commission to either "balance" the interests involved, or decide whether the government interests in effective law
enforcement justify the abrogation of an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights.
Finally, Justice Marshall had an acute awareness of the realities
of police confrontations and a general distrust of police authority
when directed at persons on the street. He recognized that policecitizen encounters are usually one-sided affairs where the police
have the upper-hand. Ignoring this fact is troublesome-especially
considering that the police often disregard or push constitutional

safeguards to the limit.' 6
Disregarding this police advantage is counter-intuitive for another reason. The Fourth Amendment specifically, and the Bill of
t7
Rights generally, were designed to be anti-government provisiohs.
As Professor Kamisar has observed, implicit in the Fourth Amendment is "a 'judicial veto' of the police."' 8 Like Justices of an earlier

16 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and seizure without
warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves and will push to
the limit.").
17 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 353 (1974).
18
Kamisar, supra note 7, at 593.
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generation, including Louis Brandeis, 19 Felix Frankfurter2 ° and
Robert Jackson, 2 1 Justice Marshall viewed the protections of the
Fourth Amendment as a recognition that the government could not
cast aside indispensable human values for government needs, regardless of whether those needs are special, practical, or necessary
to effectuate law enforcement concerns.
Despite his many years on the Court, Justice Marshall's Fourth
Amendment views have had little impact on the current Court's position and are unlikely to significantly influence it in the foreseeable
future. His views, however, have greatly influenced my perspective
of the Fourth Amendment.
Should Americans applaud the retirement of another "liberal"
Justice who had a progressive view of the Fourth Amendment? I
think not. With Justice Marshall's resignation, the Fourth Amendment loses a powerful supporter. Justice Marshall labored to make
his colleagues see that privacy is not an "all-or-nothing" concept.
He tried to open the Court's eyes to the reality of street encounters
with the police. He believed that it was unfair for the police not to
inform citizens of their right to refuse a police request to search
their luggage or automobiles. His opinions spoke for the Fourth
Amendment rights of all Americans. His voice and understanding
of Fourth Amendment values will be deeply missed.
19 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting)
overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
20
See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
21
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(the rights embodied in the Fourth Amendment "are not mere second-class rights but
belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms.").
Some might argue that Justices Frankfurter and Jackson were not strong proponents of the Fourth Amendment in light of their opposition to applying the exclusionary
rule to the states. In Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court held-withJustice
Frankfurter writing for a majority that included Justice Jackson-that, in a state prosecution, the due process of the Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In essence, Wolfdecided that
states could determine for themselves how they would enforce the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Neither Justice Frankfurter nor Justice Jackson saw any "inconsistency" between
Wolfand Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), which held that, in federal criminal cases, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible. See
Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28 (Weeks "has been frequently applied and we stoutly adhere to it.");
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 181 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (The "inconsistency" between Weeks
and Wolf "does not disturb me, for local excesses or invasions of liberty are more amenable to political correction, the Amendment was directed only against the new and
centralized government, and any really dangerous threat to the general liberties of the
people can come only from this source."). See generally Kamisar, Remembering the 'Old
World', supra note 4, at 539, 540 n.14; Kamisar, supra note 7, at 610, 616 nn.269-70, 296.
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My goal in this Article is to examine the legacy and merits of
Justice Marshall's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, I
will discuss why the current Court ignores or rejects Justice Marshall's conception of the Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence. Finally,
I will demonstrate that all citizens should mourn the loss ofJustice
Marshall's contributions in this area.
I
WHEN DOES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECT Us FROM
GOVERNMENT INTRUSION?

A. Justice Marshall's View on the Scope and Function of the
Fourth Amendment
Defining the reach of the Fourth Amendment has always been
an arduous and controversial task for the Court. Several years ago,
Professor Amsterdam wrote that the Court had yet to articulate "a
basic conception as to what the Fourth Amendment protects or protects against." 22 Although this problem continues to plague the
Court, the public often perceives this concern as one attributable to
the "technical" and arcane nature of search and seizure law. 23 This
is unfortunate because the Fourth Amendment serves as "the center24
piece of a free, democratic society."
The Fourth Amendment marks the boundaries of the government's power to search and seize. Where the Court sets those
boundaries is important to a free society. 25 "Uncontrolled search
and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arse22

Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 386.
Professor Grano argues that the application of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to the states, announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), is largely
responsible for the public perception "that the criminal justice system releases defendants on 'technicalities,'... and converted search and seizure law into an arcane subject
that consumes half of the standard criminal procedure course in many law schbols."
Grano, supra note 4, at 395-96 n.3. I agree with Professor Kamisar that the application
of the exclusionary rule to the states had nothing to do with making the Fourth Amendment a troublesome area of constitutional law. "The exclusionary rule did not mahe the
law complicated and difficult-it did not, to use Grano's language, 'convert search and
seizure law into an arcane subject.' The rule only made a difficult and complex body of
law relevant." Kamisar, Remembering the 'Old World', supra note 4, at 557.
24 Yale Kamisar, The FourthAmendment And Its ExclusionaryRule, THE CHAMPION, Aug.
1991 at 2.
25 One cannot... imagine a free society without some protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. By definition, a society that permits
its police to search or arrest whenever or whomever they please is not a
free society....
The fourth amendment, therefore, should be viewed along with a
few other safeguards, such as the first amendment's protection of political speech, as a bulwark of civil liberty and of freedom itself.
Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply To The Critics of Illinois v.
23

Gates, 17 U. MIcH.J.L. REF. 465, 519-20 (1984).
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nal of every arbitrary government." 2 6 To say that "few issues [are]
more important to a society than the amount of power that it permits its police to use without effective control by law is no exaggeration." 27 As Professor Kamisar asks: "What good is freedom of
speech or freedom of religion or any other freedom if law enforcement officers have unfettered power to violate a person's privacy
and liberty when he sits in his home or drives his car or walks the
28
streets?"
Justice Marshall understood this point well. He urged his colleagues to consider the ramifications of uncontrolled police intrusions. Marshall consistently adopted a broad view of the Fourth
Amendment's reach, believing that a narrow view, in effect, would
mean police could act without restraint in a myriad of police-citizen
encounters. Once the Court decides that a challenged police activity does not constitute a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, then constitutional restraints are never
triggered. 29 Police officials are free to conduct the challenged activity anytime, and against anyone they wish-by sending an undercover agent into our homes or offices, flying over our backyards,
trespassing onto our farmlands, subpoenaing our bank records,
26
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, j., dissenting). As
Justice Frankfurter warned. Society often forgets that
the Bill of Rights reflects experience with police excesses. It is not only
under Nazi Rule that police excesses are inimical to freedom. It is easy to
make light of insistence on scrupulous regard for the safeguards of civil
liberties when invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History
bears testimony that by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, heedlessly at first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurther, J., dissenting).
27 Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 377.
28 Kamisar, supra note 24, at 2. See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 163
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("How can there be freedom of thought or freedom
of speech or freedom of religion, if the police can, without warrant, search your home
and mine from garret to cellar merely because they are executing a warrant of arrest?");
Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, in POLICE POWER AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 87, 97 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962):
The basic.., problem of a free society is the problem of controlling the
public monopoly of force. All the other freedoms, freedom of speech, of
assembly, of religion, of political action, pre-suppose that arbitrary and
capricious police action has been restrained. Security in one's home and
person is the fundamental without which there can be no liberty.
29 Of course, it is theoretically possible to raise a due process challenge to an investigative procedure that "shocks the conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172 (1952). In Rochin, police forcibly entered a suspect's home without warrant. After
the suspect placed capsules in his mouth, police "jumped upon" him in an attempt to
remove the capsules. Unsuccessful in their attempt to retrieve the capsules, the police
escorted the handcuffed suspect to hospital and ordered his stomach pumped, which
induced vomiting and produced the two capsules that contained morphine. Id. at 166.
Rochin's "shocks the conscience" standard, however, has been confined to cases of "coercion, violence or brutality to the person." Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133
(1954) (plurality opinion).
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searching our garbage, recording the phone numbers we dial, or
accosting us on the streets to ask for identification.3 0
In sum, in defining the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the
3
Court goes a long way toward defining the type of society live in. '
The scope of the Amendment determines whether society "want[s]
to govern our police instead of being governed by them,"3 2 and
greatly affects the amount of privacy and personal security we enjoy
in our everyday lives.3 3 Justice Marshall consistently favored a
broad reading of the protection against unieas6nable searches and
seizures because he believed that an "ungrudging application of the
Fourth Amendment is indispensable to preserving the liberties of a
democratic society." 4
1. Defining a "Search" Under the Fourth Amendment: The Problem
with "Risk Analysis"
One aspect of the debate over the Fourth Amendment's reach
has generated substantial criticism both on and off the Court. The
controversy involves the current method for defining a "search."
For the past two decades, the Court has used its definition of
"search" to narrow the Amendnient's coverage in a way that elimi-nates constitutional restraint on many police intrusions.
The Court has posited that the Fourth Amendment:
"does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even
30

As Professor Amsterdam has aptly noted, if challenged police activities are not

subject to constitutional review, then these activities "may be as unreasonable as the
police please to make them." Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 388.
31 See Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 403:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if the
particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go
unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent
with the aims of a free and open society[;]
see also BrianJ. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Modelfor Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 595, 624 (1989).
32 Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 380.
33 Of course, one should always remember that no matter what the Court says-in
the final analysis-police officers ultimately will decide whether the rules established by
the judiciary and legislative branches of government will actually be applied to the person in the street.
If and when the police deny legal protection to individuals, abridge due
process, or employ distinctions of race and class, it is patrolmen who do
so. In short, patrolmen are profoundly involved with the most significant
questions facing any political order, those pertaining to justice, order,
and equity. They necessarily trade in the recurring moral antinomies that
accompany political choice, and through the exercise of discretion patrolmen define and redefine the meaning ofjustice.
MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET 6-7 (1988).
34
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 121 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

734

CORNELL LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:723

if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
'3 5
third party will not be betrayed."

This view of the Fourth Amendment's protection, sometimes called
risk analysis, reflects the Court's belief that individuals "assume the
risk" when they place themselves in a position that permits third
parties to glean incriminating information.3 6 When the government
subsequently obtains that information, the Fourth Amendment is
not implicated because those individuals have assumed the risk.
Under risk analysis, the Fourth Amendment does not protect these
individuals because society, the Court tells us, does not consider
37
their interests "objectively reasonable."
Justices favoring a broad reading of the Fourth Amendment
have characterized risk analysis as a legal abstraction. Justice Marshall believed that risk analysis misses the point of the Fourth
Amendment. If the point of the Amendment is "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the
privacy and personal security of individuals," 3 8 then attention
should center on whether the challenged government conduct poses
the potential for arbitrary and oppressive invasions.3 9 An analysis
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion):
[O]ne contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their
trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has,
the risk is his.
37 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (while conceding
that Greenwood held a subjective expectation that the contents of his garbage, which
were wrapped in closed containers, would remain unexposed to the public, the Court
stated that this expectation was not one which society was prepared to accept as
reasonable).
38 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
39 Arbitrary and unjustified government intrusions have been the focus of the
Fourth Amendment because, as Professor Amsterdam has explained, they expose the
citizenry to "indiscriminate" searches and seizures. Indiscriminate intrusions are condemned for two reasons:
The first is that they expose people and their possessions to interferences
by government when there is no good reason to do so. The concern here
is against unjustified searches and seizures: it rests upon the principle that
every citizen is entitled to security of his person and property unless and
until an adequate justification for disturbing that security is shown. The
second is that indiscriminate searches and seizures are conducted at the
discretion of executive officials, who may act despotically and capriciously
in the exercise of the power to search and seize. This latter concern runs
against arbitrarysearches and seizures: it condemns the petty tyranny of
unregulated rummagers.
Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 411; see also Kamisar, supra note 7, at 593 ("The 'central
objectionable feature' of both the general warrant and the writs of assistance was that
'they provided no judicial check' on the discretion of executing officials.") (footnote
omitted); Serr, supra note 31, at 594 n.60 (the proper underlying assumption of the
35

36
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that focuses on the risks that a person has or has not assumed never
reaches this central concern.
Moreover, risk analysis imposes an "all-or-nothing" approach
to defining the reach of the Fourth Amendment. For Justice Marshall, "[p]rivacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely
or not at all." 40 The partial disclosure of information to an isolated
third party, whether intentionally or by necessity, is not the
equivalent of giving police officials carte blanche access to that same
I
4
information.
Justice Marshall believed that investigatory activities which
compromise individual privacy and security interests are subject to
prior judicial review. Of course, simply stating that government intrusions require adherence to judicial processes only begs the question of what constitutes a government intrusion. Justice Marshall's
response to this vexing question emphasized two elements. First,
the pervasive nature of the challenged government conduct should
be closely examined. 4 2 The Court must carefully consider whether
police officials should have absolute, unreviewable power to engage
in a particular investigatory activity. Second, the Court should consider the impact this conduct would have on Fourth Amendment
-interests if left unregulated.
For example, should the Fourth Amendment restrict police efforts to infiltrate our homes with undercover agents on fishing expeditions? Should the police be free to send paid informants,
equipped with electronic surveillance devices, into our homes for
the purpose of determining who is or is not a criminal? If risk analysis is employed, a person has no Fourth Amendment protection
against this type of secret police intrusion. After all, when we invite
someone into our homes, even for innocent purposes, we run the
risk of that person seeing evidence of criminality and then revealing
it to the authorities. "[O]ne contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. ' 43
Fourth Amendment is that government officials cannot be trusted to use power
responsibly).
40 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41

See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without A Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.

REv. 1, 103 (1991) (The Court's risk analysis "is based on a dangerous premise: that we
should egcpect no privacy from the government when we do not expect it from others.")
(footnote omitted).
42 Smith, 442 U.S. at 751 (The judiciary "must evaluate the 'intrinsic character' of
in investigative practices with reference to the basic values underlying the Fourth
Amendment" when defining its coverage).
43

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion). Professor

Serr has noted that "the Court's [risk] analysis has no stopping point. If the mere possibility of public observance or intrusion renders subjective privacy expectations illegitimate, the Fourth Amendment will not protect even the home, unless its occupants take
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Justice Marshall believed that Fourth Amendment protection
should not depend on this legal fiction. 4 4 When we hire a chauffeur,
repairperson, housekeeper, or babysitter, or invite a neighbor or
salesperson into our homes, we do not expect or assume that the
person is a government agent sent on a secret spy mission. The risk
analysis model of the Fourth Amendment is unconvincing. The
Court's attempt to cast the issue as involving only risks assumed by
"criminals" is intellectually dishonest. When the Court allows infiltration of our homes by undercover agents without prior judicial
approval and without any individual suspicion, "then the government may unleash its spies on any of us, criminals or not; and talk
about 'criminals' assuming the risks means that we all assume the
risks."'4 5 Fortunately, most of us are not so distrustful of govern46
ment that we think the way a majority of the Court claims we do.
Under Justice Marshall's view of the Fourth Amendment, this
type of secret police undercover activity would be subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. If the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in
this context, then nothing restrains the government from sending
disguised agents into any person's home, even where no basis exists
to suspect criminality. In other words, the police can engage in covert investigations at any time, against any target, and for any reason,
whether good or bad-the archetype of arbitrary and oppressive intrusion. If the point of the Fourth Amendment is to prohibit these
government invasions, then Justice Marshall believed it should be
47
interpreted to produce this result.
The impact of unregulated police conduct on Fourth Amendment interests should also be considered when deciding whether an
intrusion has occurred. Fourth Amendment protection extends be48
yond the assumptions and expectations of the average person.
Even if one could argue that the average person assumes everyone
she invites into her home is a government agent, the Fourth Amendment, as a textual and normative proposition, provides substantive
steps to ensure that no other member of the public ever enters." Ser, supra note 31, at
619 (emphasis added).
44 See Baldwin v. United States, 450 U.S. 1045 (1981) (MarshallJ., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). In Baldwin, an undercover police officer, as part of a general investigation, sought a position as Baldwin's repairperson and chauffeur. The agent was
hired for a six month period and lived in Baldwin's home. During this time, unbeknownst to Baldwin, the officer discovered and retrieved evidence of cocaine.
45 Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 470 n.492.
46
Cf Slobogin, supra note 41, at 104 (uncontrolled undercover activity by government agents jeopardizes state's interest in "maintaining allegiance of its citizenry and its
objective of nurturing an open, democratic society.").
47
See, e.g., Baldwin, 450 U.S. 1049 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
48
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 384.
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protection for her interests (including the home)4 9 apart from the
ordinary assumptions and expectations of the average person.
Warrantless entries into the home are supposed to be per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances. 50 Under risk
analysis, however, this principle is ignored. 5' Justice Marshall did
not believe the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home should
rest on such untenable grounds. Imagine a regime where, when the
doorbell rings, a homeowner must guard against the young student
soliciting funds for a public interest environmental group or the
person requesting to read the water meter, because both may be
government agents. Is this state of affairs really one which our society finds "objectively reasonable"? Do we really wish to live in such
52
a regime? Justice Marshall thought not.

Skeptics might argue that neither society nor individuals are
well-served by a reflexive response that subjects all police intrusions
to the warrant and probable cause requirements. Not all government intrusions into a home advance traditional law enforcement
activities. 53 Sometimes the government demands access to the
home for benign reasons. In such cases, skeptics argue that the
Fourth Amendment plays no role. In Wyman v. James,5 the Court
49 "The right of the people to be secure in their... houses... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONs-r. amend. IV.
50 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
51 See White, 401 U.S. at 745 (plurality opinion); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 171 n.7 (1974).
52 See Baldwin v. United States, 450 U.S. 1045, 1049 (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari):

If the decision of the Memphis police to place an undercover agent in
petitioner's home for a 6-month period, during which the agent rifled
through his belongings in the search for incriminating evidence, does not
implicate the [Fourth Amendment], it is hard to imagine what sort of undercover activity would. Indeed, under the [lower court's reasoning], the
Government need never satisfy the probable-cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment if, by disguising its officrs as repairmen,
babysitters, neighbors, maids, and the like, it is able to gain entry into an
individual's home by ruse rather than force in order to conduct a search.
(footnote omitted).
53 See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) ("Unlike the
search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the [administrative] inspection programs at
issue here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards
for private property."); but cf. Phyliss T. Bookspan, Reworhing the Warrant Requirement:
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 507 n.178 (1991):
[I]t seems rather apparent that administrative searches were the violations with which the Framers [of the Fourth Amendment] were intimately
familiar and primarily concerned at the time of the drafting. Intrusions
by King George's roving patrols, authorized by writs of assistance to look
for administrative violations of the tax and customs rules, were the very
searches against which the colonists were reacting. It is, thus, most ironic
that modern interpretation reduces Fourth Amendment protections in
just the situation that we most clearly can trace back to its origin.
54 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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appeared to agree, suggesting that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply when welfare recipients refuse mandatory warrantless entries
by social workers. 55
Justice Marshall, on the other hand, had no doubt that the
Fourth Amendment should govern these "home visits." He stated
that" '[t]he Constitution protects the privacy of the home against all
unreasonable intrusion of whatever character.' "56 A home visit is a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. First, while it is true that caseworkers are interested in the
physical and psychological well being of the recipients, they are "required to be sleuths" as well. 57 In other words, "the welfare visit is

not some sort of purely benevolent inspection."58s
Second, the intrusion on the recipients' privacy and dignity is
neither diminished by the purposes of the visit nor by the degree of
sanction imposed for refusal to allow home visits. No logic exists
"in the view that the ambit of the Fourth Amendment depends not
on the character of the governmental intrusion but on the size of the
club that the State wields against a resisting citizen." 59 A contrary
view ignores the realities of welfare recipients and trivializes the
value of the home.
Unlike the majority of the Court, Justice Marshall understood
that constitutional protection of the home is just as important to the
55 Id. According to the majority, James did not involve a Fourth Amendment
"search" for two reasons. First, a home visit by a caseworker was not the typical investigative search normally "equated with a search in the traditional criminal law context."
Id. at 317. Second, one could not characterize the home visit as forced or compelled,
because no visit would occur if the recipient refused. Justice Blackmun explained that
the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and that the beneficiary's denial of permission is not a criminal act. If consent to the visitation
is withheld, no visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or
merely ceases, as the case may be. There is no entry of the home and
there is no search.
Id. at 317-18. See also Robert A. Burt, The Burger Court and the Family, in THE BURGER
COURT 92, 94-95 (V. Blasi ed., 1983) (noting that theJames Court construed the beneficiary's "supplicant posture as a general waiver of the [beneficiary's] ordinary claims to
personal or family privacy"). Although the Court inJames was unable (or unwilling) to
see the coercion that a home visit forces upon a welfare recipient, in Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the Court had no trouble recognizing coercion of
a property holder.
Nollan held that requiring a landowner to grant a public easement across a beachfront section of private property as a condition for building a home on the property was
a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted even if the state agency's
plan were a "good idea," coastal residents could not "be compelled to contribute to its
realization" without payment. Id. at 841-42.
56 James, 400 U.S. at 339, quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 550-51 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 339 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58 Id.
59
Id. at 340- 41.
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poor as it is to the wealthy. Focusing on whether the welfare recipient can exclude the caseworker, though partially correct, falls short
of the analysis demanded by the Fourth Amendment. While our
homes are important because we can exclude unwanted persons,6°
homes serve other equally important interests as well. In our
homes, we are secure even when unwanted persons are not seeking
entry. We can watch any television program, regardless of its intellectual value, and we can listen to any type of music, whether it be
country and western or rap. In our homes, we can walk around naked, leave month-old newspapers lying around, or sit on ragged
chairs.
A home not only furnishes security and privacy, it embodies our
independence.6 ' Surely, this quality of independence is part of the
"ancient concept that a man's home is his castle."6 2 An individual is
sovereign in his or her home. The Court inJames overlooks this aspect of the Fourth Amendment when it suggests that a home visit is
not a search. Justice Marshall, however, understood that these interests in the home, while important to the wealthy, are no less im63
portant to recipients of government assistance.
Smith v. Maryland° 4 exemplifies Justice Marshall's opposition tO
a narrow definition of the Fourth Amendment. In Smith, the Court
concluded that people cannot claim any privacy interest in the numbers dialed on their telephones. Because the telephone company
receives these numbers, the caller assumes the risk that the police
might have access to this information. The Court ruled that the
Government's installation and use of a mechanical device which
60
Compare Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 190 (1984) (a legitimate expectation of privacy is implicit in property owner's right to exclude) with Minnesota v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990) (absence of an absolute right to exclude is not inconsistent
with overnight guests' expectation of privacy in the home of their host).
61
Cf. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 192 n.15 (Marshall,J., dissenting); MargaretJ. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (stating that a home is personal, not
fungible).
62 James, 400 U.S. at 339 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Professor Lasson has noted,
the maxim, "a man's house is his castle," was not an invention of English
jurisprudence. Even in ancient times there were evidences of that same
concept in custom and law, partly as a result of the natural desire for
privacy, partly an outgrowth, in all probability, of the emphasis placed by
the ancients upon the home as a place of hospitality, shelter, and
protection.
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTrrUTION 13
63
Mrs.James' constitutional

(1937).

claims were not minimized simply because, as the majority suggests, the home visit is for the recipient's benefit. As Justice Marshall noted,
such a "paternalistic notion that a complaining citizen's constitutional rights can be violated so long as the State is somehow helping him is alien to our Nation's philosophy."
James, 400 U.S. at 343.
64 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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records the numbers dialed on a particular phone does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 65
From Justice Marshall's perspective, the Court's analysis reflected a truncated view of Fourth Amendment protections in modern society. The reach of the Amendment should not turn on an
analysis that has no limiting principle to prevent the government
from eliminating all subjective expectations of privacy. 66 The
Fourth Amendment, Justice Marshall believed, required the judiciary to exercise "some prescriptive responsibility" in articulating
protected interests. 67 Risk analysis does not fulfill this responsibility
because it is out of touch with the circumstances under which most
Americans live.
Does the Court really believe that we have no sense of privacy
in the telephone numbers we dial from our homes or in the financial
records we deposit in the bank? 68 Justice Marshall is correct in characterizing this view of privacy as insufficient.6 9 How would you feel
if, during your drive to work, the radio station began broadcasting
the telephone numbers you had dialed over the last month? Or if,
while reading the morning newspaper, you saw copies of all the
checks you had written during the past year? Better yet, how would
you feel if, while watching television, you saw your name and a list of
the movies you had rented over the last six months from the local
video store? The outrage and indignation most people would feel
in such situations belies the Court's contrary findings that people
70
have no "actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial,"
65 The Court concluded that installation of a pen register, "a mechanical device
that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses
caused when the dial on the telephone is released," Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1 (quoting
United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)), does not implicate
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Pen registers do not acquire the contents of telephone
user's communications, and telephone users "realize that they must 'convey' phone
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching
equipment that their calls are completed." Id. at 742. Therefore, according to the
Court, Smith "assumed the risk" that the telephone company would reveal these numbers to the police. Id. at 744.
66 [T]o make risk analysis dispositive in assessing the reasonableness of privacy expectations would allow the government to define the scope of
Fourth Amendment protections.... Yet, although acknowledging this
implication of [risk] analysis, the Court is willing to concede only that, in
some circumstances, a further "normative inquiry would be proper." No
meaningful effort is made to explain what those circumstances might be,
or why this case is not among them.
Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
67 Id. at 750.
68 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no expectation of privacy in
financial information turned over to bank; Fourth Amendment not implicated by subpoena to bank officials to disclose this information to the government).
69 Smith, 442 U.S. at 750-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
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or "legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information
kept in bank records."'' T Risk analysis is fundamentally flawed because "[i]mplicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion
of choice." 72 In cases like these, the individual has no realistic opportunity to prevent government surveillance of the telephone numbers he dials, or access to his banking records, unless he is
"prepared to'forgo use of what for many has become a personal or
professional necessity." ' 73
Moreover, risk analysis is a thin reed on ihich to rest Fourth
Amendment principles because privacy is not an "all-or-nothing"
concept. When we rent movies from the corner video store, the
partial disclosure to the store owner of our taste in movies is not an
open invitation to the police or anyone else to learn this preference.
The constitutional interests of privacy and personal security deserve
better, treatment than this.
B.

How Does the Current Court Define the Scope of the
Fourth Amendment?
Justice Marshall's way of defining the reach of the Fourth
Amendment-focusing on the pervasive character of the govern'-ment conduct and its impact on Fourth Amendment interests if left
uncontrolled-stands in sharp contrast to the model employed by
the Court today. Currently, the needs and interests of law enforcement are paramount despite the use of suspicionless and oppressive
intrusions to further these interests. The Court acknowledges indi74
vidual interests-only to dismiss them summarily. Floridav. Riley,
Californiav. Greenwood,75 and Californiav. Hodari D.76 are recent examples of the Court's handiwork.
1.

When is a Search Not a Search? When the Police Target the
"Right" People

In Floridav. Riley, the Court ruled that police may, at any time,

conduct planned aerial surveillance in a helicopter four hundred
feet above a targeted greenhouse adjacent to a home. 77 Californiav.
Greenwood held that the police could seize and examine opaque,
sealed garbage bags left for collection at the curb of a home without
78
justification.
71
72

73
74
75
76
77
78

Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
Smith. 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 750.
488 U.S. 445 (1989).
486 U.S. 35 (1988).
111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
Riley, 488 U.S. at 449.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39-42.
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Writing for the Court in both cases, Justice White conceded
that Riley and Greenwood entertained subjective expectations that
no one would invade their property. 79 Despite this concession, Justice White concluded that these subjective expectations of privacy
were not sufficient to merit Fourth Amendment scrutiny of the challenged police procedures. Put simply, the Court concluded that
Riley and Greenwood were "puddingheads." "Because the sides
and roof of his greenhouse were left partially open," Riley should
have known that the police-without probable cause or a warrantwould twice fly over his residence in an attempt to discover what was
inside his greenhouse.8 0 Riley had no cause to complain because he
should have known that federal regulations permit helicopters to fly
below the minimum limits of navigable airspace for fixed-wing
81
aircraft.
Similarly, Greenwood should have known better than to leave
his garbage at the curb.8 2 "It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of
the public." 8 3 Greenwood also should have known that by exposing
his garbage in this manner, he invited the trash collector to reveal its
contents to any member of the public, including the police.84 Certainly Greenwood could not expect the police to divert their eyes
from such a find.8 5
In Riley and Greenwood, the Court does not consider the pervasive nature of the government intrusion nor does it assess the impact of this intrusion on the everyday lives of individuals. 8 6 If the
Fourth Amendment bars arbitraryintrusions by government officials,
then little logic supports a ruling that permits the police, at their
whim, to fly over someone's residence and take pictures of the
ground below or seize and sort through the " 'intimate activity asso79

See id. at 39 ("It may well be that respondents did not expect that the contents of

their garbage bags would become known to the police or other members of the public."); Riley, 488 U.S. at 450 ("Riley no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse
would not be open to public inspection, and the precautions he took protected against
ground-level observation.").
80
Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
81
Id. at 450-51.
82
Despite Justice White's suggestion that Greenwood had only himself to blame
for the police search and seizure of his garbage, Justice Brennan's dissent pointed out
the lack of choice confronting Greenwood regarding the placement of his garbage.
"Greenwood can hardly be faulted for leaving trash on his curb when a county ordinance commanded him to do so." Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 54-55 (citing ORANGE CoUmT
CODE § 4-3-45(a) (1986)).
83
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (citations omitted).
84 Id. at 40.
85 Id. at 41.
86 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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dated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life' "87
often revealed by the content of one's garbage. 8
These rulings exemplify a risk analysis supported only by the
Court's own value judgments about what the Fourth Amendment
should protect. For example, what supports the conclusion that
Riley "could not reasonably have expected the contents of his
greenhouse to be immune from examination"89 by a police officer
flying in navigable airspace? Although private and commercial
flight by airplanes and helicopters is commonplace, the average person would not consider a planned, focused police surveillance of
their backyard "routine." 9 0
The only substantive or empirical support for the Court's con-

clusion that Riley's expectation of privacy is unreasonable is a reference to the fact that "[mlore than 10,000 helicopters" are registered
in the nation, and "an estimated 31,697 helicopter pilots" live
here. 9 ' But how do these figures advance the analysis? With several
million automobiles registered in the United States, and even more
licensed drivers, does this mean that the Fourth Amendment has
nothing to say about around-the-clock police surveillance of one's
home? Further, does this permit-the police to follow me wherever I
go without triggering constitutional concerns? 9 2 I should hope not.
87
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
88 It is no response to the Fourth Amendment positions of Riley and Greenwood to
argue that the challenged government activity in their cases disclosed "no intimate deRiley, 488 U.S. at 452. Such an assertion
tails connected with the use of the home ....
is patently false regarding the seizure and search of one's household garbage. Indeed,
though Justice White made such an argument in Riley, he did not attempt to make a
similar claim in Greenwood. But as Justice Brennan's dissent aptly noted, one has to wonder why it is necessary for Riley to prove that the intrusive police conduct exposed intimate facts about his life. Certainly the Fourth Amendment does not impose any such
threshold requirement before its protections are triggered. Only judicial activism and
"language stretching," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967) (Black, JL, dissenting), by judges bent on achieving certain political results would seem tojustify this
type of reasoning.
89 Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
90 See Tracey Maclin, ConstructingFourthAmendment PrinciplesFrom The Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 669, 698-700 (1988). Imagine, while reading this Article, you looked out the window of your home or office and
saw a police helicopter taking pictures of you. Would you consider this a routine event?
91 Riley, 488 U.S. at 450 n.2.
1 must admit that I am not particularly sanguine about my constitutional claims if
92
the FBI were to start following me around in light of the treatment (and lack of public
outrage) accorded Felix Bloc. See The Felix Bloc Affair, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., May 13, 1990, at
28 (State Department official publically called a suspected spy. FBI agents conducted
round-the-clock survelliance of Bloc for six months). Cf. "Arguments Before The Court"
56 U.S.L.W. 3599, 3600 (Chief Justice Rehnquist remarking in the oral argument of
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988), "that our cases hold that a police [sic] can
'follow' a person on the public street all day long without implicating the Fourth
Amendment.").

744

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:723

Similarly, what supports the Court's conclusion that society is
unwilling to recognize as reasonable Greenwood's subjective expectation that the police would not target his garbage for seizure and
search? Apparently, the prevalence of scavengers in our societywhether human or otherwise-is important to this conclusion. But
why is this pertinent to whether a police seizure and search of someone's garbage constitutes a Fourth Amendment search? Comparing
police activities with "animals, children, scavengers [and] snoops"
does little to further discussion. 93 Not only is collecting and examining "another's trash... contrary to commonly accepted notions of
civilized behavior," 9 4 but most of us "do not, and should not, expect
the Government to be the scavenger." 95 As Professor Amsterdam
has pointed out, no reason exists for ruling that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated if the police break into a car or pay drug
junkies to break into it, merely because people generally run the risk
96
that a junkie may take such action.
Further, the Court's arguments in Riley and Greenwood defy common sense. Both cases involved whether a "search" occurred within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. When the police made arrangements to collect and separate Greenwood's garbage "without
mixing [it] with garbage from other houses," and then "searched
97
through the rubbish and found items indicative of narcotics use,"
what were the police doing if not "searching" Greenwood's garbage? When an investigating officer twice circled over Riley's
greenhouse and "was able to see through the openings in the roof
...
[and] to identify what he thought was marijuana growing in the
structure," 9 8 what was the officer doing if not "searching" the
greenhouse? "To most lay people, looking for evidence of crime is
a 'search,' regardless of what [the Court says] that term may mean
under the Fourth Amendment." 99
On the other hand, the Court pays scant attention to the Fourth
Amendment interests of the individual. In Greenwood, the Court offers only the bald statement that Greenwood's placement of his
trash at the curb subjected him to the risk that someone "might"
sort through the trash and turn its contents over to the police.' 0 0
The Court never considers the pervasive threat of police officers
seizing and examining the trash of individuals without restraint.
93

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).

94
95

Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Trashing Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1988, at A30.
See Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 407.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37-38 (emphasis added).
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989) (emphasis added).
Slobogin, supra note 41, at 22 n.65.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-
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Not one word addresses the impact of this intrusion on the privacy
concerns of individuals. A model of the Fourth Amendment that is
more sensitive to individual interests might have approached the
question differently.
Realistically, the Court would probably acknowledge, if pushed,
that police conduct in Riley and Greenwood does constitute govern-

ment intrusion that threatens legitimate privacy interests. What explains the results in these cases? The Court assumes that these
intrusions will happen only to individuals like Riley and Greenwood.
Thus, a majority of the Court trusts the police to target the "right"
people. The Court also assumes that the police will not take advantage of these rulings and begin conducting pervasive searches of
everyone's backyards or sealed garbage bags. This confidence in
the police, however, is misplaced. The police subject many innocent
people to such intrusions. Yet the problem lies in the fact that the
Court seldom, if ever, reviews such cases when deciding search and
seizure issues.
2.

Non-Seizure on the Street: By Walking on the Streets, Do People
"Assume the Risk" of Arbitrary Displays of Police Authority?

Californiav. HodariD.'0 1 also exemplifies the Court's use of tenuous arguments in an effort to disguise its police-minded reasoning.
Hodari ruled that a police show of authority directed at a particular
individual does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment unless, and until, the individual yields to or is physically restrained by the police.10 2 To reach this result, the Court employs an
amalgam of legal arguments, none of which addresses the matter at
101

111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
Id at 1551. Hodari involved the following facts. While standing next to a car,
several black, male youths apparently saw an unmarked police patrol car approaching
them. Inside the patrol car were Officers McColgin and Pertoso. Both officers(wore
jackets with the word "Police" written on both the front and back. When the youths,
including Hodari, saw the police vehicle, they took flight. Id at 1549.
After the youths left the scene, the police gave chase. Officer Pertoso left the police
car and headed down the back of the street where several of the youths had run. As
Pertoso "approached from the rear, he saw [Hodari] running toward him while looking
back over his shoulder as he ran. When Officer Pertoso and [Hodari] were about I1 feet
apart, [Hodari] turned forward, saw the officer, and looked startled." Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae2, California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991). After
seeing the officer, Hodari tossed away what appeared to be a small rock. "A moment
later, Pertoso tackled Hodari, handcuffed him, and radioed for assistance. Hodari was
found to be carrying $130 in cash and a pager;, and the rock he had discarded was found
to be crack cocaine." Hodari, 111 S. Ct. 1549.
The Court "accept~ed] as true for purposes of this decision," Hodari's contention
that Pertoso's chase and confrontation "qualifed as a 'show of authority' calling upon
Hodari to halt." Id at 1550. If Pertoso's actions were not a "show of authority" intended for Hodari to halt, one has to wonder how the Court would characterize
Pertoso's conduct.
102
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hand: Should the police be free, without any cause for suspicion, to
direct a show of authority against an individual?
Speaking for the Court, Justice Scalia saw no reason to apply
the Fourth Amendment in this context because its text "does not
remotely apply... to the prospect of a policeman yelling 'Stop, in
the name of the law!' at a fleeing form that continues to flee. That is
no seizure." 10 3 Neither did Justice Scalia see any reason to conclude
that a show of authority by the police, standing alone, constitutes an
"'arrest" within the meaning of the common law. An arrest requires
application of physical force or "where that is absent, submission to
the assertion of authority."' 1 4 Public policy does not justify imposition of constitutional restraints in this context because "[s]treet pursuits always place the public at some risk, and compliance with
police orders to stop should therefore be encouraged."' 0 5
Finally, we discover that the traditional test for determining
whether the police have seized a person-"Would a reasonable person believe that he was not free to leave the police presence?"-was
not really the constitutional standard after all. 10 6 According to the
Court, this reasonable person test is only a partial declaration of
Id. at 1550 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1551.
Id Of courseJustice Scalia did not explain why-if policy arguments are to partially determine this constitutional question-he places the burden on the individual,
rather than the police. After all, police officers have no constitutional right to accost and
question persons. Individuals, however, do have the right (at least, as the Court stated
in the past) to avoid and resist a police inquiry. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 49798 (1983) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted):
The person approached [by a police officer], however, need not answer
any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions
at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily
without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to
listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.
It is possible, of course, that the Court has never given any credence to its earlier
pronouncements that persons on the street have a constitutional right to avoid an approaching officer when the officer has no objective justification for detaining the person.
If it did, cases like Hodari and Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (no Fourth
Amendment seizure when police patrol car chases a person down the street), would have
been decided differently. See Rachel A. Vane Cleave, Michigan v. Chesternut and Investigative Pursuits: Is There No End to the War Between the Constitution and Common Sense?, 40
HASTINGS LJ. 203, 216 (1988). What really explains these decisions is the Court's unstated premise that the police do have the right to accost, stop, and question citizens,
even in situations where they have no objective basis for doing so. See Tracey Maclin,
The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258, 1265-77 (1990).
106
The traditional test for determining whether a person has been seized was established in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality opinion). Thatftest
stated: "A person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only
if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave." Id. at 554.
103
104
105
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what triggers constitutional review.1 0 7 In other words, just because
a person gets the message that the police do not intend for him to
leave their presence does not mean that the Constitution has been
10 8
triggered.
One can say several things about Hodari.'0 9 The reasoning underlying the Court's assessment of the issue of seizure-considering, inter alia, the common law meaning of an arrest or determining
whether public policy is served by encouraging persons always to
submit to arbitrary demonstrations of police authority-is unconvincing. 1 0 My focus here, however, is on whether the Fourth
107
According to Hodari, this standard "says that a person has been seized 'only if,'
not that he has been seized 'whenever'; it states a necessary, but not a sufficient condition
for seizure-or more precisely, for seizure effected through a 'show of authority.'" California v. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991).
108 'Professor Kamisar summarized the significance of Hodari this way: "A 'seizure'
comprises two basic elements: (1) actualrestraint (terminating an individual's freedom of
movement or otherwise acquiring physical control over him) as well as (2) police conduct
(whether physical force or a show of authority) that brings about the restraint." Yale
Kamisar, Arrest, Search and Seizure, Remarks of Yale Kamisar at the U.S. Law Week's
13th Annual Constitutional Law Conference, 31 (Sept. 6, 1991) (on file with the author).
Professor Kamisar further explains that, in his view, "under Hodari restraint or submission [in the presence of the police] without more does not constitute a 'seizure,' just as
coercive police conduct [which conveys to the reasonable person a lack of freedom to
leave] without more does not [constitute a seizure either]." Id. at 33.
l09 Professor LaFave provides an excellent critique of the case. He notes, for example, that many of the reasons given by the Court for its ruling are "flawed and sometimes largely irrelevant, while the others simply do not suffice alone to support the
Court's result." LaFave, supra note 15, at 755. For other critical commentary on Hodari,
see Bruce A. Green, "Power, Not Reason'" JusticeMarshall's Valedictoryand the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court's 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REv. 373, 400-04 (1992); Thomas K.
Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 AM.
CriM. L. REv. 799 (1991); L. Anita Richardson, Seizure, Police Pursuits,and You The Meaning and Implicationsof California v. Hodari D., 18 SEARCH & SEIzuRE L. REP. 137 (ulyAug. 1991); cf Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by DisregardingDoctrine: How Illinois v.
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the
Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REv. 1, 65 n.263 (1991), under Hodari,
the Court's view is that an officer does not have to have cause when he
leaps at a citizen, although the Court does not dispute that the officer is
required to have cause the instant he lands on the citizen. It seems to me
Hodari gives insufficient weight to the principle (of physics, not law) that
whoever leaps must come down.
1 10 For example, Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority never explains why the
Court should look to common law definitions for "arrest" to define the meaning of
..seizure" in today's world. As Justice Stevens' dissent in Hodari aptly noted, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1967) and Terry v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 1, 16 (1968),
"unequivocally reject the notion that the common law of arrest defines the limits of the
term 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment." Hodari, 111 S. Ct. at 1556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, Justice Scalia's assertion that "public policy" did not require constitutional restraints in this context because "[s]treet pursuits always place the public at some
risk, and compliance with police orders to stop should therefore be encouraged," id at
1551, is supported only by his own value judgments, not constitutional principles. See
supra note 105. But even if Justice Scalia is correct to rely on "public policy" in this
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Amendment principles articulated by Justice Marshall offer a better
context, his vision of the proper public policy may be considered skewed by some members of the public.
Consider, for example, Justice Scalia's gratuitous suggestion that the prosecution
was mistaken in conceding that no reasonable suspicion existed to seize Hodari who ran
when he saw a patrol car. Justice Scalia intimated-that it is reasonable to detain young
men who "scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police." Hodari, Il1 S. Ct. at
1549 n.l. For Scalia, the prosecution's concession contradicted proverbial common
sense, whereupon he noted that "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." Id. (quoting
Proverbs 28:1).
From a police perspective, Justice Scalia's remarks may make sense. "Flight from an
approaching patrol car implies guilt; an innocent person, patrolmen reason, would have
nothing to fear from the police and would not [run] away." BROWN, supra note 33, at
175. Of course, this viewpoint never considers that Hodari, a black youth, may have had
alternative reasons for wanting to avoid the police. Cf. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a
Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DuKE LJ. 39, 80-82. Professor Culp notes that some judges
believe that race is irrelevant-even when it is crucial to understanding
the context that gives rise to a case. The law seems to take this colorblind approach most often when a color-conscious approach would lend
perspective to the situation of a black participant in the legal process....
Judges do not always tell us when and for what purpose a fact is important, but the absence of race considerations in general is no accident; it
reflects the view that race is irrelevant to .understanding the circumstances surrounding an incident despite the fact that, in reality; race colors most situations in which whites and blacks interact.
Id. Justice Scalia never pauses to consider that many persons who have never committed
a crime might have ambivalent or negative attitudes about the police. The Wall Street
Journal recently reported on the fear and anger in the black community of Dayton,
Ohio, caused by the tactics of an anti-drug police task force. See Kotlowitz, supra note 4,
at A2 ("Black leaders complained that innocent people were picked up in the drug
sweeps.... Some teenagers were so scared of the task force they ran even if they
weren't selling drugs.").
Perhaps a youth like Hodari flees at the sight of police because he does not wish to
drop his pants-as many black youths in Boston have been forced to do--simply because
the police suspect he belongs to a gang or is selling drugs. See REPORT OF THE ArrORNEY
GENERAL'S CIVIL RIGHTS DIvIsION ON BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT PRACTICES 36-46, 60
(1990)
We do not credit all of the allegations of all of the complainants. However, these allegations are widespread, common in nature, in some cases
supported by witnesses, and consistent with other information we have
received. Although we cannot say with precision how widespread this illegal conduct was, we believe that it was sufficiently common to justify
changes in certain Department practices.
Id. at 60.
Maybe a black youth has had an older sibling or parent roughed-up by the police,
and does not wish to undergo a similar experience with the approaching officers. Maybe
Hodari, like other blacks, was taught to avoid the police. See DAVID H. BAYLEY & HAROLD
MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE 120 (1969) ("Our data have shown that minority people carry into contacts with the police more negative expectations than do
[whites]. One important result of these attitudes is the generation of a strong disposition to avoid the police.").
Or, perhaps Hodari has seen the videotape of the Los Angeles police beating and
kicking Rodney King, see Seth Mydans, Tape of Beating by Police Revives Charges of Racism,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at A18, or the NBC video of Don Jackson-a former police
officer himself-being pushed through a store window by Long Beach, California, police
officers for no reason. See Bill Girdner, Charge of racism by Calif.police is latest in long line,
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method to resolve the issue in Hodari."I I believe Justice Marshall
would resolve the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment should
apply to a police officer's display of force directed at an individual
by assessing the nature of the police conduct and the impact it
would have on Fourth Amendment interests if left unregulated.
When one analyzes Hodari in this manner, the issue is easily resolved. Hodari allows a police officer to direct a show of force at a
person without any suspicion of criminality. Until the individual receiving this arbitrary display of police power submits to the officer's
authority, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. Police officers,
in effect, may roam the streets threatening and intimidating persons
free of constitutional check. This curious state of affairs seems incompatible with a free society. It is an absolutely terrifying situation
for those (I do not mean criminals) who have reason to fear police
2
power."1
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1989,

19, 1989; Don Jackson, Police Embody Racism to My People, N.Y.
at A25. Justice Scalia may think that an approaching officer only
wants to ask "What's going on here?" A black youth, however, may have had a different
experience on the street and may believe that the approaching officer is out to administer a little "street justice" of the type receiitly documented in Boston and Los Angeles.
As California Assemblyman Curtis Tucker said, "When black people in Los Angeles see
a police car approaching, 'They don't know whetherjustice will be meted out or whether
judge, jury and executioner is pulling up behind them."' Richard W. Stevenson, Los
Angeles Chief Taunted at Hearing: U.S. Plans Wide Inquiry on Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1991, at A16. Regrettably, Justice Scalia's "public policy" analysis never considers
these points.
On the other hand, some benefit might exist for individuals who heed Justice
Scalia's warning not to flee from arbitrary displays of police authority. Indeed, if the
attitudes of Los.Angeles, California, police officers are representative of police officers
across the country, then all of us would do well not to flee from approaching police
officers. The "Christopher Commission," established in the wake of the Rodney King
police brutality case in Los Angeles, found that some Los Angeles police officers "relish
the excitement of a pursuit, and some view a pursuit as an opportunity for violence
against the running suspect." REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEP'T 53 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION]. I doubit that
Justice Scalia had these concerns in mind when he authored the Hodari opinion, but his
warnings about the dangers inherent in street pursuits by the police remind us that police officers on the street are not always there to "serve and protect."
III In another forum, I have explored whether Hodari's race should have been a
factor in the Court's analysis of whether a seizure occurred under the Fourth Amendment. See Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters" Some Preliminary Thoughts About
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 423 (1991).
112 See, e.g., John Van Maanen, Street Justice, in POLICE BEHAVIOR 297-98 (Richard
Lundman ed., 1980):
Certainly, a policeman's past experience with an individual or with a recognizable group will influence his street behavior. For example, a rookie
soon discovers (as a direct consequence of his initiation into a department) that blacks, students, Mexicans, reporters, lawyers, welfare workers, researchers, prostitutes, and gang members are not to be trusted, are
unpredictable, and are usually "out-to-get-the-police." He may even sort
these "outsiders" into various categories indicative of the risk he believes
they present to him or the implied contrast they have with his own life-
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Any target of police power can attest to its unsettling nature. 13
Indeed, such a frightening experience can permanently affect how
one envisions government authority generally, and police power
specifically. In a head-on chase similar to Hodari's, a reasonable
person would not feel free to ignore the police officer.11 4 The
whole point of such a confrontation is to restrain the freedom of the
person being chased.' 15
The Court in Hodari fails to appreciate the fear engendered
when police officers direct their power at individuals. Not a word is
said about the likely effect upon an ordinary citizen of an arbitrary
show of police authority. Nor does Hodari discuss the liberty interests of citizens. In fact, the Court never pauses to ask why police
officers, in the absence of any evidence of criminal conduct, have
unfettered discretion to direct their power and authority at citizens.
Do people "assume the risk" of unregulated displays of official force
simply by walking the streets?
The Hodari Court sent several very clear messages.' 16 To police
officers the ruling means that they are free to direct their power and
authority toward any person, regardless of cause, until it produces
physical restraint or submission. Thus, officers may draw their
weapons, activate the sirens on their patrol cars, or fire warning
shots over a person's head without constitutional limitation as long
as the person continues to flee. 1 7 Though living in a society that
style and beliefs. Yet, without question, these categories will never be
exhaustive-although the absolute size of what patrolmen call their "shit
lists" may grow over the years.
113 "There is absolutely nothing flattering or reassuring about receiving the unsolicited attention of the police." JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 260 (1973). "[E]ach
individual [encounter] is personally unsettling and disrupting." Id. "[Persons approached by a police officer] have no choice but to remain until he has finished with

them. They cannot say to him, 'Excuse me, Officer, but we really don't have the time
for this right now,' and walk off. If they tried it, he would probably arrest them." ld, at

262.

114
Kathryn R. Urbonya, The Constitutionalityof High-Speed Pursuits Under the Fourth and
FourteenthAmendments, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205, 234 (1991) ("Pursuit experts agree that

police officers, when deciding to pursue an individual, exert psychological force.").
115

See LaFave, supra note 15, at 758.

116

One of the messages signaled by Hodari, as noted by Professor LaFave, is that
when police are acting merely on a hunch, a slow chase is better than a
fast one, for if the cop in that case had caught up with the youth and
grabbed him by the scruff of the neck before the cocaine was ditched, there

would have been an illegal seizure requiring suppression of the subsequently discovered drugs.
LaFave, supra note 15, at 731 (footnote omitted).
117 See California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1547, 1559 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissent-

ing) (noting that under the Court's reasoning, "the timing of the seizure is governed by
the citizen's reaction rather than by the officer's conduct"); see also Maclin, supra note
105, at 1312-14 (predicting that the Fourth Amendment analysis ofJustices Scalia and
Kennedy, see Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 577 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring,
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gives the police such discretion may not disturb a majority of the
Court, liberty will not flourish under such conditions. The message
sent to citizens is clear: the Constitution offers no shield against
arbitrary police force unless and until one submits to that force. Responsible persons should comply with a police show of authority;
those who refuse to submit will surrender constitutional protection.
What is the significance of this result? For one, the police
rather than the individual is now sovereign on the streets of
America. Supreme Court precedent certainly dia not preordain this
result. In fact, Hodari did not even undertake a straightforward review of precedents. Instead, the Court manipulates earlier holdings" 1 8 and ignores other relevant decisions" 19 to reach a result that

joined by Scalia, J.,), would lead to a rule that a seizure does not occur until the police
presence has a restraining effect over the citizen).
118 Justice Scalia found that Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), and Hester
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), "were quite relevant" for deciding whether Hodari
had been seized. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. at 1552.'Browerruled that a complaint of unreasonable seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is stated if the complainant alleges intentional government conduct that causes the termination of one's freedom of movement. Brower,
489 U.S. at 599 ("It was enough here, therefore, that, according to the allegations of the
complaint, Brower was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblockand that he was so stopped."). Unlike the case in Hodari, in Brower there was no doubt
that the police had intentionally terminated Brower's flight once his vehicle ran into an
18 foot tractor trailer placed in the path of his flight. Other than in dicta that was not
necessary for its result, Brower provides no support for Hodari's "no restraint, no
seizure" rule. Professor LaFave has made a similar observation. See LaFave, supra note
15, at 757.
Nor does the reasoning of Hester support a "no restraint, no seizure" rule. In Hester,
the Court merely ruled that securing "abandoned bottles was not itself a seizure, and
there is no discussion in that very brief (two paragraphs) opinion of the then-nascent
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine by which the abandonment could have been
claimed to be a fruit of a prior seizure-by-chase of the defendants." LaFave, supra note
15, at 757. For a critical review of the analysis employed by the Court before Hodari, see
Ronald J. Bacigal, In Pursuit of the Elusive Fourth Amendment: The Police Chase Cases, 58
TENN. L. REV. 73 (1990).
119 Interestingly, Justice Scalia "never cite[s]" several decisions which would have
aided the Court's discussion of what the Fourth Amendment protects in the context of
police pursuits. Urbonya, supra note 114, at 278. Those cases-Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 523 n.3 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (seizure occurs when "by means of
physical force or show of authority," a person's freedom of movement is restrained); and
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (Fourth Amendment guarantees "freedom from
police interference" with "personal security and privacy"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
n.16 (1968) (show of authority conveys a message such that a reasonable person would
believe that he was not free to leave)-"are instructive as to precisely what it is that the
Fourth Amendment guarantee regarding 'seizures' protects: 'liberty'; 'freedom of movement'; 'personal security.'" LaFave, supra note 15, at 758.
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fits its view of a correct social policy. This is, as Justice Marshall
20
observed in a different context, not his vision of America.
II
WHEN ARE GOVERNMENT INTRUSIONS "REASONABLE"
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?

A. Justice Marshall as an Advocate for Fourth Amendment
Safeguards
Another essential component of Justice Marshall's search and
seizure jurisprudencewas adherence to the safeguards of the Fourth
Amendment-prior judicial review and the existence of probable
cause to justify a police intrusion. Although many bemoan the technical and arcane quality of search and seizure law, Justice Marshall
advocated a straightforward and traditional approach.' 2 ' Regarding
searches, "[i]n the vast majority of cases, the determination of when
the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is
120 Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (1991) (Marshall,J., dissenting) quoting
United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
While the result in Hodari is unsettling, the decision is not surprising. See Maclin,
supra note 105, at 1312-14. Indeed, the result in Hodariwas a forgone conclusion after
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988). In Chesternut, Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice Scalia, pressed the view that a seizure only occurs when a person remains in the
control of police officials. Justice Kennedy argued that, regardless of whether a police
presence conveys an intent to seize, no Fourth Amendment interests are at stake "until
[the police action] achieves a restraining effect." Id. at 577.
Justice Kennedy's "no restraint, no seizure" rule resurfaced, albeit in dicta, in
Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), authored by Justice Scalia. While the
Brower Court unanimously held that placing a roadblock across both lanes of a two-lane
highway on which the defendant was driving to stop his car constituted a seizure, Justice
Scalia saw the occasion as a chance to outline his views on the meaning of a seizure. He
argued that no seizure occurs under the Fourth Amendment unless the police undertake
intentional conduct that physically restrains their target.
In light ofJustices Scalia's and Kennedy's opinions in Chesternut and Brower, the result in Hodari comes as no surprise. Hodari proves just how easily "a hint becomes a
suggestion, is loosely turned into dictum and finally elevated to a decision." United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
121 By "traditional" I mean that Justice Marshall's reading of the Fourth Amendment was consistent with the interpretation of the Amendment favored by the Framers.
Justice Marshall, like the Framers, "focused on, and placed [his] trust in, the warrant
procedure." Kamisar, supra note 7, at 578.
Some commentators have stated that "our constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about overreaching warrants." TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969); cf WilliamJ. Stuntz,
Warrants and FourthAmendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881, 897-98 (1991) ("It is entirely
possible that warrants do not make sense, and that search and seizure law would be
better off without them. That would certainly fit with the Fourth Amendment's somewhat tortured history."); Gerald Bradley, Present at the Creation? A Critical Guide to Weeks
v. United States And Its Progeny, 30 ST. Louis UNIv. L. J. 1031, 1041-46 (1986) (suggesting that warrantless searches did not trouble the Framers). Yet even accepting this
view without challenge, Justice Marshall's focus on the requirements of the Warrant
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required to be made by a neutral judicial officer before the search is
conducted." 12 2 Regarding routine arrests, Justice Marshall believed
23
that, because an arrest in many ways is more intrusive than a search,
it is just as important to have a warrant for an arrest, as it is for a
24
search.'
1.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Why were the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment so important to Justice Marshall? Like many of his colleagues, Marshall believed that the Warrant Clause should provide a neutral buffer
between law enforcement officials and the public. He often quoted
Justice Jackson's classic lines from Johnson v. United States,' 25 which,
until recently, have served as the guiding light for a half century of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 26 The crux ofJustice Jackson's
Clause would remain consistent with the vision held by the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment.
The Framers primarily directed their anger at the writs of assistance. "The obnoxious feature of writs of assistance was their character as permanent search warrants
placed in the hands of customs officials: they might be used with unlimited discretion
and were valid for the duration of the life of the sovereign." JACOB W. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 31 (1966). If the Framers opposed
searches authorized by writs of assistance and general warrants because they allowed
customs officials to conduct arbitrary and unjustified intrusions, see Amsterdam, supra
note 17, at 411, "[clan there be any doubt that the [Framers] would have vigorously
opposed warrantless searches exhibiting the same characteristics as general warrants and
writs and thus impairing privacy and freedom to the same degree?" Kamisar, supra note
7, at 575.

In addition, it is helpful to note that when the Court upheld warrantless automobile
searches with Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (permissible to conduct warrandess search of automobile stopped on the open road where officers have probable
cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of crime), it acknowledged
a preference for the warrant procedure. Id. at 156 ("In cases where securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used."); see also Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 73
(Frankfurter,J., dissenting) ("Even as to moving vehicles, this Court did not lay down an
absolute rule dispensing with a search warrant.").
122
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 242 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring):
Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and
seizures, and since an arrest, the taking hold of one's person, is quintessentially a seizure, it would seem that the constitutional provision should
impose the same limitations upon arrests that it does upon searches. Indeed, as an abstract matter an argument can be made that the restrictions
upon arrest perhaps should be greater[;]
cf. Dripps, supra note 5, at 612 (Some "methods of criminal investigation are punitive in
effect. Consider an arrest: the person in custody is as effectively imprisoned as he would
be in a penitentiary, and frequently under circumstances even less congenial.").
124
Watson, 423 U.S. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125
333 U.S. 10 (1948).
126 In Johnson, Justice Jackson wrote:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
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observation was that the requirements of the Amendment help to
check police discretion and preserve our freedoms.
Justice Marshall believed that the requirements of priorjudicial
review and probable cause embodied substantive, as well as procedural, protections for the individual. Requiring police officials to
seek a magistrate's review before intrusive activity occurs "limits the
concentration of power held by executive officers over the individual, and prevents some overbroad or unjustified searches from occurring at all."' 27 The Fourth Amendment reflects a substantive
norm accepted by society that the police should not decide for
28
themselves when to invade the privacy and dignity of individuals.'
Prior judicial review also "prevent[s] 'hindsight from coloring the
evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure,' and reassures the public that- the orderly process of law has been
respected."'129 Illustrative of this last point is Justice Marshall's dissent in New York v. Harris.'8 0
In Harris, police officers, with probable cause for an arrest but
without a warrant, forcibly entered the defendant's home. Although
the arrest was illegal,' 8 ' the Court ruled that, "where the police
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination
to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the
people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.... The
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern,
not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
id at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
127 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 829 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (Police
officials
should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive
means in pursuing their tasks. The historicaljudgment, which the Fourth
Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield
too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook
potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.).
Justice Jackson has made the same point, although he stated it more bluntly: "Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of
every arbitrary government." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
129 Ross, 456 U.S. at 829 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976)).
130 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
181
The arrest was illegal because it violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against a warrantless, nonconsensual entry to make a routine felony arrest, a rule announced in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). During and after this illegal
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have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does
not bar the State's use of a statement made by the defendant outside
of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made
in the home in violation of [the Fourth Amendment.]"'13 2 The
Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment is "designed to protect
the physical integrity of the home; it was not intended to grant criminal suspects, like Harris, protection for statements made outside
their premises where the police have probable cause to arrest the
suspect for committing a crime."' 3 3
Believing that the Fourth Amendment was primarily meant to
protect individuals, not just the bricks and mortar that form the
home, Justice Marshall rejected this "cramped understanding" of
Fourth Amendment values.' 3 4 In his view,
[a] person who is forcibly separated from his family and home in
the dark of night after uniformed officers have broken down his
door, handcuffed him, and forced him at gunpoint to accompany
them to a police station does not suddenly breathe a sigh of relief
at the moment he is dragged across his doorstep. Rather, the suspect is likely to be so frightened and rattled that he will say something incriminating. These effects, of course, extend far beyond
the moment the physical occupation of the home ends.' 3 5
This position most faithfully reflects the substantive values embodied in the Fourth Amendment. The police conduct permitted in
Harris conflicts with the norm that "the interposition of a magistrate's neutral judgment reassures the public that the orderly process of law has been respected."' 3 6 In Harris, the police did not
s7
merely ignore legal process but deliberately subverted it.1
arrest, Harris made incriminating statements after being informed of his Mirandarights.
495 U.S. at 16. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that one of Harris's statements,
made at the police station, was the fruit of the illegal arrest, and thus inadmissible at his
trial. A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed with this reasoning, and ruled that the
confession was admissible. Id at 21.
132

133
134
135
136
137

Id at 21.
l at 17.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 829 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
A de facto policy apparently exists in the New York Police Department not to
follow the dictates announced in Payton. In Harris, the New York Court of Appeals
found that
[the police] made no attempt to obtain a warrant although five days had
elapsed between the killing and the arrest and they had developed evidence of probable cause early in their investigation. Indeed, one of the
officers testified that it was department policy not to get warrants before
making arrests in the home. From this statement a reasonable inference
can be drawn ... that the department's policy was a device used to avoid
restrictions on questioning a suspect until after the police had strengthened their case with a confession.
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Harris, moreover, discounts another substantive value: the
right to privacy in the home. Our constitutional conscience includes
this value because it has significance for many people. The safeguards of the Fourth Amendment add force to this basic view, not
because we wish to subject police officers to infinite technical procedures, but because in our legal system we have firmly rejected the
notion that police officers should decide for themselves when to invade a person's home.1 3 8 When police carry out a warrantless arrest
of an individual in his home, they not only jeopardize the security of
the home, but also flaunt society's values and the rule of law.
It has been aptly stated that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." 13 9 The values embodied in the Amendment,
despite Harris, go beyond protecting "the physical integrity of the
home." 14 0 These values also protect and symbolize the individuals
who live in those homes. 14 1 Though a majority of the Court in Harris obviously disagreed, Justice Marshall noted: "The Court's saying
14 2
it may make it law, but it does not make it true."'
Finally, Justice Marshall vigorously opposed the Court's steady
and continuing drift toward a general rule of "reasonableness" for
deciding Fourth Amendment cases. While Justice Marshall understood that the Court could not decide search and seizure issues by
knee-jerk analysis, 143 he strongly opposed the Court's current systematic evisceration of the Fourth Amendment's traditional safeguards. For example, Justice Marshall never supported the view
that the probable cause and warrant requirements could be ignored
in the name of "special needs." In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
People v. Harris, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 1233-34 (N.Y. 1988). See also UVILLER, supra note 6,
at 114-15 ("[P]rosecutors are reluctant to indict before arrest, since the accusation deprives the police of an opportunity to converse with the mirandized suspect in the absence of an attorney.").
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("The right of officers to
138
thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.").
139
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
140
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990).
141
Cf. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972):
[Tihe dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false
one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to
enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to
speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "personal" right, whether the
"property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account.
In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right
to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning
without the other.
142
Harris, 495 U.S. at 29.
143 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238-39 (1973) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (recognizing the need in some situations for a case-by-case analysis of Fourth
Amendment issues).
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Ass'n, 14 4 the Court invoked its emerging "special needs" doctrine to
uphold the constitutionality of federal regulations requiring blood
and urine tests of railroad employees involved in train accidents.
Skinner permits warrantless and suspicionless searches " 'when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." ' ".145
Justice Marshall questioned the judicial basis of the Court's
"special needs" analysis: "The process by which a constitutional
'requirement' can be dispensed with as 'impracticable' is an elusive
one to me."' 4 6 In his view, by substituting a general reasonableness
test for the traditional safeguards of the Warrant Clause, the Fourth
Amendment "lies virtually devoid of meaning, subject to whatever
content shifting judicial majorities, concerned about the problems
of the day, choose to give to that supple term."14 7 In a remark that
should not have been lost on those who espoused strict construction
of constitutional text, Justice Marshall noted: "Constitutional requirements like probable cause are not fair-weather friends, present
when advantageous, conveniently absent when 'special needs' make
1 48
them seem not."
More generally, Justice Marshall believed that a reasonableness
,model of the Fourth Amendment did not advance the institutional
values of the Court. Under the '"special needs" rule, for instance,
"the clarity of Fourth Amendment doctrine has been badly distorted."' 14 9 Ajudicial analysis that merely asks whether government
intrusions satisfy an amorphous standard of reasonableness does
more than disregard the literal requirements of the Constitution. It
imposes the Court's vision of a correct social policy masquerading
as constitutional analysis. ' °
144

489 U.S. 602 (1989).

Id. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)) (quoting New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)).
146 Id at 637 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147 Id. See also Davies, supra note 109, at 52-53, stating that a generalized reasonableness interpretation rejects the warrant preference rule and the requirement of probable
cause:
145

[a] generalized reasonableness reading allows for a flexible, colloquial interpretation of "reasonableness" under which any police conduct that is
"understandable" in the circumstances according to common sense
should be judged "reasonable" for purposes of assessing the constitutionality of police intrusions. In effect, this reading treats the Fourth
Amendment more as a "regulatory canon" than as a statement of a citizen's enforceable right.
(footnotes omitted).
148 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 637 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 639.
150

See id at 641:
The fact is that the malleable 'special needs' balancing approach can be
justified only on the basis of the policy results it allows the majority to
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Justice Marshall declared in Skinner that "no drug exception to
the Constitution" exists.' 5 1 Despite the political clamor to wage a
"War on Drugs," Justice Marshall believed that if the Court is to
balance the interests of the government to undertake intrusive techniques against the interests of the individual to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, the Fourth Amendment itself provides
152
the essential weights to place on the judicial scales.
B.

Examples ofJustice Marshall's Adherence to the Safeguards
of the Fourth Amendment: The Liberty Interests of
the Individual

While it is easy to endorse Justice Marshall's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as straightforward and faithful to the traditional
safeguards of the Amendment, this assertion only begs the question
of the legal and political prudence of the positions articulated in
many of Justice Marshall's opinions. Indeed, in today's climate of
rising drug offenses and the general deterioration of many inter-city
areas due to criminal behavior, some have questioned whether we
can afford the type of constitutional jurisprudence espoused by justice Marshall.' 5 3
reach. The majority's concern with the railroad safety problems caused
by drug and alcohol abuse is laudable; its cavalier disregard for the text of
the Constitution is not.
151
Id at 641. Many scholars and criminal defense lawyers might disagree. See
Kamisar, supra note 24, at 20 (many scholars of the Court's constitutional criminal procedure cases might respond to Justice Marshall's declaration that "[t]here is now.");
Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987). Jeffrey Weiner, who worked on the appeal in Florida v. Bostick,
111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991), discussed infra notes 368-402 and accompanying text, offered
the following observations about the bus raids conducted by Broward County Sheriff
Nick Navarro:
'I really worry about the "drug exception" to the Fourth Amendment....
If [a case] has anything to do with drugs, rest assured the court is going to
find not "error" but "harmless error." I don't think "police state" is too
strong a phrase to describe what happens then. Inmy opinion, what Nick
Navarro has done up in Broward County is an insult to all freedom-loving
Americans.'
Joseph P. Kahn, The Right To Be Secure, THE BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Apr. 7, 1991, at 18,36:
152
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 637 ("As this Court has long recognized, the Framers intended the provisions of [the Warrant] Clause--a warrant and probable cause--to 'provide the yardstick against which official searches and seizures are to be measured.' ")
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 359-60 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
153
See, e.g., Jerry Thomas, Police Sweep of Gangs Deemed a Success, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
May 21, 1989, at 40, a high-ranking Boston Police Department official was quoted as
saying that
[The police] are not indiscriminately going to pat down people, only
known drug dealers and gang members. I'm conscious of people's rights.
But it's about time we start caring for the rights of good citizens, and not
the criminals. They have harassed the community long enough. Now it's
time for them to be harassed.
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The best response to these charges requires a look at concrete
examples and a comparison of the Fourth Amendment views articulated by Justice Marshall with the current Court's jurisprudence.
Three categories of cases-individual liberty; Fourth Amendment
protection for personal property; and the scope of "exceptions" to
the warrant requirements-permit consideration of the contrasting
views on the Fourth Amendment's role in today's society. Should
the Fourth Amendment stand as the constitutional bulwark against
discretionary police actions that invade the privacy, security, and
dignity interests of the citizenry, as Justice Marshall believed? Or,
should the Fourth Amendment merely require that police activity be
reasonable, as the current Court often suggests?IM
1. Individual Liberty
American citizens have long enjoyed the right to come and go
as we please, free of official interference. The right to be left alone
while on the street is one of the "cherished liberties that distinguish
this nation from so many others."' 55 Because Justice Marshall recognized the importance of liberty, 56 he believed that the safeguards
of the Fourth Amendment-a warrant authorized by a neutral magistrate based upon probable cause-must precede any routine felony arrest. Similarly, Justice Marshall rejected the view that a
subpoena requiring a person to provide voice or handwriting exemplars for a grand jury investigation was outside the purview of
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Each of these situations represented a
threat to the liberty interests of the individual. A majority of the
Court, however, disagreed.

See also Anthony Lewis, Thornburgh Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1991, at Al5 ("The public, stressed by crime, is impatient with the idea of rights for the accused.").
See Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to
154
Meaningful Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 HASTINGs LJ. 285 (1991) Professor
Strossen has elaborated on some of the analytical themes that run through the current
Court's constitutional rulings regarding individual rights. She has noted that "the Court
exercises more judicial restraint in reviewing decisions by government officials, largely
deferring to such decisions." Id at 285. In Strossen's view, the Court has "imported
into the personal rights realm the minimal level ofjudicial review that it heretofore reserved for regulations affecting property rights." Id. at 288.
155 Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 143-44 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
156 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 446 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[A]n unjustified arrest that forces the individual temporarily to forfeit his right to control his person and movements and interrupts the course of his daily business may be
more intrusive than an unjustified search.").
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In United States v. Watson 157 and United States v. Dionisio,15 8 the
Court found, inter alia, that history justified relaxed constitutional
scrutiny of the police seizures at issue. In Watson, the Court noted
that both the common law and the Second Congress had authorized
warrantless arrests based on probable cause. 159 In Dionisio, the
Court emphasized the "historically grounded obligation of every
0
person to appear and give his evidence before the grand jury."16
For Justice Marshall, neither history nor traditional common
law practices justified disregarding constitutional requirements. 1 6 1
Such an approach was dangerous to constitutional liberties,
for it is well settled that the mere existence of statutes or practice,
even of long standing, is no defense to an unconstitutional practice. "[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of
the Constitution by lohg use, even when that span of time covers
6
our entire national existence and indeed predates it."1 2
Claims that governmental preference and convenience outweighed the individual's liberty interest did not impress Justice Marshall. In Watson, the Court found that deference to Congressional
and state statutes justified overlooking the requirements of the Warrant Clause in the case of routine felony arrests. According to the
Court, the Fourth Amendment provides only a right to be free from
unreasonablesearches and seizures; it does not require that a warrant
authorize every search or seizure. 163 The relevant test, then, "is not
157

423 U.S. 411 (1976).

410 U.S. 1 (1973). In a companion case, United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19
(1973), the Court held that a grand jury subpoena to furnish handwriting exemplars did
not implicate any Fourth Amendment interest.
158

159

160

Watson, 423 U.S. at 418-20.

Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 9-10.
161
See Watson, 423 U.S. at 438 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he longstanding existence of a Government practice does not immunize the practice from scrutiny under the
mandate of our Constitution.").
162
Id at 443 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
678 (1970)).
163 Justice Scalia has recently endorsed this view: "The Fourth Amendment does
not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits
searches and seizures that are 'unreasonable.' What it explicitly states regarding warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than requirement of their use."
California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1992 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Interestingly, Justice Scalia's support for this claim is neither Supreme Court precedent, nor a
specific reference to the Framer's debate regarding the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but is Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 318 (Pa. 1814).
Even more enlightening, however, is Justice Scalia's apparent conception of the intended role of the Warrant Clause. He states:
[Tihe warrant was a means of insulating officials from personal liability
assessed by colonial juries. An officer who searched or seized without a
warrant did so at his own risk; he would be liable for trespass, including
exemplary damages, unless the jury found that his action was 'reason-
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whether it is reasonable to procure a search [or arrest] warrant, but
whether the search [or seizure] was reasonable."' 1 64
Not only does this position "prove[ ] too much,"' 6 5 but it is at
odds with a bedrock principle of the Fourth Amendment. This view
suggests that searches of persons, homes, and effects are equally valid
absent judicial authorization. Watson's reasoning contradicts the
principle that "searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."' 6 6 If we accept this "cardinal"
rule of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 16 7 then both the language of this provision and logic require constitutional condemnation of warranfless arrests as well. 16 8 The Court, however, never
addresses these difficult questions in Watson. The suggestion that
the safeguards of the Warrant Clause have only marginal relevance
in determining the reasonableness of a substantial intrusion flies in
the face of the historical record, 69 and overlooks the protection afable.' ... By restricting the issuance of warrants, the Framers endeavored to preserve the jury's*role in regulating searches and seizures.
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992 (citations omitted).
Evidently, Justice Scalia believes that proponents of the Fourth Amendment and
-the Warrant Clause were primarily concerned with the law and economics of tort liability
for customs officials. Not all scholars of the Fourth Amendment share Justice Scalia's
crabbed view of the history and purpose behind the Warrant Clause. LAssoN, supra note
62, at 75 (noting that the original petition of the colonists to King George II protested
that "officers of customs are empowered to break open and enter houses, without the
authority of a civil magistrate, founded on legal information); Abraham S. Goldstein, The
Search Warrant, The Magistrate,andJudicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1178 (1987)
("The magistrate, and the concept of probable cause, are the first line of defense against
the risk that the police will be unduly zealous in concluding that they have an adequate
basis to conduct a search.").
Justice Scalia also conveniently ignores several United States Supreme Court declarations which take a sharply different view on the meaning and role of the Warrant
Clause. His view flies in the face of a half century of Court declarations stating that the
central purpose of the Warrant Clause was to interpose a neutral referee between government officials and the public so that "inferences [of probable cause could] be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
164
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
165
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480 (1971) (plurality opinion).
166
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
167
See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
168
Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and
seizures, and since an arrest, the taking hold of one's person, is quintessentially a seizure, it would seem that the constitutional provision should
impose the same limitations upon arrests that it does upon searches. Indeed, as an abstract matter an argument can be made that the restrictions
upon arrest perhaps should be greater.
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
169
It comes as no surprise that Justice White, the author of Watson, saw little connection between the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment, as his dissents in Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 770 (1969), Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510
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forded personal security and privacy by a warrant requirement for
170
felony arrests.
(1971), and Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 610 (1980), demonstrate. Justice White'
position, however, has not gone unchallenged. See, e.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 121, at
43-44:
It seems certain that the Fourth Amendment made no provision for the
warrantless search any more than it did for the general search warrant ....

It would be strange, to say the least, for the amendment to

specifiy stringent warrant requirements, after having in effect negated
these by authorizing judicially unsupervised 'reasonable' searches without warrant. To detach the first clause from the second is to run the risk
of making the second virtually useless[;]
Martin Grayson, The Warrant Clause in Historical Context, 14 AM. J.CRIM. L. 107, 114
(1987) ("[I]t is unlikely that the drafters envisioned a search which could be both reasonable and without a warrant.").
Moreover, it makes little sense to interpret a provision- intended to prohibit unfettered executive and legislative power to search and seize-in a manner that turns a blind
eye toward, and in some cases actually encourages, police discretion to search and seize.
IfJustice White's dissents in Payton, Chimel, and Coolidge, had been majority rulings, police officers would be free to effect a nonconsensual, warrantless entry into a person's
home to make an arrest (Payton), search the entire house incident to that arrest (Chimel),
and then go out and seize and search the arrestee's automobile (Coolidge). In theory,
officers would utilize their discretion only when they decide probable cause exists to support their conduct, and a judge would agree, after the fact, with that determination.
The problem with this conception of search and seizure law is that no stopping
point exists. Giving police officers substantial discretion only encourages them to expand warrantless searches and seizures in the hope that some day some court will agree
that probable cause existed for their actions. In such a regime, why would an officer ever
bother to secure a warrant? Eventually, "any search or seizure could be carried out without a warrant, and we would have simply read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 480.
Justice White's model of the Fourth Amendment is ultimately flawed because he
forgets that the "Fourth Amendment contemplates a priorjudicialjudgment, not the risk
that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role accords with
our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through
a separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels
of government." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added). While Justice White is correct to note that "the
Framers were concerned about warrants," Payton, 445 U.S. at 610, the "warrants" the
framers hated were ones that authorized unfettered discretion to executive officials.
Warrants that narrowly confined the authority of customs officers were not opposed by
the opponents of the writs of assistance. See O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause
of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REvoLUrbON 48 (R. Morris ed., 1939)

(colonial judges and lawyers saw the writs of assistance as fundamentally different from
the established practice of common law courts and in direct conflict with English law
regarding the issuance of warrants)
Justice White does not acknowledge that the framers placed their trust in the judiciary to ensure that overbroad warrants would not be issued. "The courts, after all, are the
specific addressees of the constitutional command that 'no Warrants shall issue, but
upon certain prescribed conditions." Kamisar, supra note 24, at 592. See also Wilson v.
Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 396 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[The command of the
Fourth Amendment implies continuous supervision by the judiciary over law enforcement officers, quite different from the passive role which courts play in some spheres.").
170 Nor does Justice Powell, in my view, provide an adequate answer to his own
logical conclusion "that arrests [should] be subject to the warrant requirement at least to
the same extent as searches." Watson, 423 U.S. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
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Similarly, in United States v. Dionisio171 and United States v.
Mara,172 the Court found no Fourth Amendment interests that require judicial review before the issuance of a subpoena for a voice
exemplar or handwriting sample. Only by ignoring "common sense
and practical experience" could one believe that a summons to appear before a grand jury is a minor inconvenience and poses no
threat to liberty interests.' 73 Imagine that you receive a hand-delivered document from a representative of the local federal prosecutor
requesting that you appear at the federal courthouse to provide a
voice exemplar or specimen of your handwriting. You might have
several responses. "What does this mean?" "Will I be arrested?"
"Why does a grand jury want to see my handwriting?" "Why am I
being investigated?" "Should I consult with an attorney?" "What
will happen if I don't appear?" "What rights do I have?" When
confronted with a subpoena, you are unlikely to view the document
as a minor formality. The order to appear before a grand jury is
more than a mere inconvenience; rather, it will probably arouse considerable fear and anxiety. Yet, the majority in Dionisio and Mara

-Powell contended that there was "no historical evidence that the Framers or proponents
of the Fourth Amendment, outspokenly opposed to the infamous general warrants and
writs of assistance, were at all concerned about warrantless arrests by local constables
and other peace officers." Id. at 429. A similar lack of interest among the Founding
Fathers might also have existed about eavesdropping, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 364-74 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); the use of deadly force by the police to effectuate felony arrests, see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); and footlockers carried in public, see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977), but the absence of interest in 1787 hardly provides a legitimate excuse for not
confronting and resolving difficult constitutional questions posed in today's society.
Justice Powell also worried that requiring a warrant for routine felony arrests
"could severely hamper law enforcement." Watson, 423 U.S. at 431. Besides the lack of
any support for this naked assertion, Justice Powell did not bother to consider the fact
that it was "'the standard practice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to present its
evidence to the United States Attorney, and to obtain a warrant, before making an
arrest.'" Id. at 448 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for United States 26 n. 15).
Justice Powell's additional concerns about the need for warrantless arrests in exigent
conditions and stale warrants, id at 431-32, were easily answered by Justice Marshall, see
id. at 449-53 (If "exigent circumstances develop that demand an immediate arrest, the
arrest may be made without fear of unconstitutionality, so long as the exigency was unanticipated and not used to avoid the arrest warrant requirement." Id at 450. "(I]t is
virtually impossible for probable cause to become stale between procurement [of a warrant] and arrest." (citations omitted). Id. at 451.).
171
410 U.S. 1 (1973).
172 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
173 Dionisio,410 U.S. at 43 (Marshall,J., dissenting). The Dionisio majority suggested
that the average person would not be troubled by the compulsion associated with a subpoena to appear before a grand jury. 410 U.S. at 10 (citing United States v. Doe
(Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895, 898 (1972) (contrasting physical seizure of a person with a
grand jury subpoena; the latter does not involve stigma, it is, at most, a minor
inconvenience)).
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were unable (or unwilling) to contemplate these natural human
responses.
The Court saw no reason to impose any Fourth Amendment
scrutiny on this process. Subpoenas can be issued without prior judicial review or without any showing of cause justifying this assertion of governmental power over the individual. Justice Marshall,
however, saw the Court's decision as a severe blow to individual liberty. If the Fourth Amendment is supposed to protect us from unfettered and potentially unwarranted impositions of government
power over the individual, then it is indeed "a strange hierarchy of
constitutional values" that personal property' 74 and private papers 175 are afforded "more protection from arbitrary governmental
17 6
intrusion than people."
2.

How Are Liberty Interests Perceived by the Current Court?

Justice Marshall's conception of the liberty interests protected
by the Fourth Amendment contrasts sharply with the approach
taken in two recent Supreme Court decisions, Riverside v. McLaughlin 177 and Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz.178 McLaughlin considered the question of how promptly a probable cause hearing must
occur after a warrantless arrest. Sitz resolved the constitutionality of
warrantless, suspicionless sobriety roadblocks. In both cases, the
Court curtailed the liberty interests of all persons.
McLaughlin concerned how quickly authorities must bring an individual arrested without a warrant before a neutral judge to determine whether the police have good grounds for detaining the
person. An earlier ruling, Gerstein v. Pugh, 179 had rejected the claim
that the Fourth Amendment did not grant a right to a judicial determination of probable cause prior to an extended restraint of liberty
174 See Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991) (statute authorizing prejudgment ex parte attachment of realty, without prior notice and hearing and absent exigent
circumstances, held violative of due process as applied in cases involving an assault
claim).
175 See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, reh'g denied 380 U.S. 926 (1965)
("Tihe constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly describe the 'things
to be seized' is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the 'things' are
books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain." (citation omitted)). For a discussion of the Court's treatment of personal papers under the Fourth
Amendment, see Craig Bradley, ConstitutionalProtectionfor PrivatePapers, 16 HAiRv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 461 (198 1);James A. McKenna, The ConstitutionalProtectionof Private Papers:
The Role of a HierarchicalFourth Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55 (1977); Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches And Seizures Of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869 (1985).
176
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 40 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177
111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991).
178
496 U.S. 444 (1990).
179 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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following arrest.18 0 Gerstein explained that states "must provide a
fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for
any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination
must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after
arrest."18'
In resolving what Gerstein meant by a "prompt" probable cause
hearing, the focus of McLaughlin was clear. Speaking for the Court,
Justice O'Connor emphasized the administrative problems faced by
state officials who seek to combine certain pretrial hearings. In essence, the majority treated this as a case about federalism. The intent of Gerstein, according to the McLaughlin Court, "was to make
clear that the Fourth Amendment requires every State to provide
prompt determinations of probable cause, but that the Constitution
182
does not impose on the States a rigid procedural framework."'
Individual states are free to decide how they will comply. The
Fourth Amendment does not require that a probable cause hearing
occur immediately after state officials complete the administrative
83
steps incident to arrest.'
What justifies the result in McLaughlin? Justice O'Connor wants
us to believe that the reasoning of Gerstein had already decided the
.question presented to the Court. She asserts that Gerstein "stopped
short of holding that jurisdictions were constitutionally compelled
to provide a probable cause hearing immediately upon taking a suspect into custody and completing booking procedures."' 8 4 This assertion is misleading at best, and, as a matter of law, it would be
wrong to say that Gerstein held that states need not provide an immediate hearing. In fact, Gerstein, held "that the Fourth Amendment
requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prequisite to
extended restraint of liberty following arrest."1 8 5 Gerstein had no
reason to reach the timing issue presented in McLaughlin because
the state had argued that no probable cause hearing was constitutionally necessary.' 8 6 Therefore, Justice O'Connor had no ju~tifi180 In Gerstein, the Court considered whether persons arrested without a warrant
could be held for 30 days or more without a judicial determination of probable cause.
The Court held "that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest." Gerstein,
420 U.S. at 114.
181
Id. at 125 (footnotes omitted). Gerstein held, however, that because a probable
cause hearing was not a "critical stage" in the prosecution, the Fourth Amendment does
not require a formal adversary hearing at this point. Id at 119-26.
182 Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1668 (1991).
183 Id.
184
Id
185 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
186 See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (No. 73-477)
("Preliminary probable cause hearings for defendants in state custody whether charged
with felonies or misdemeanors are not required by the United States Constitution.").
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able basis for her assertion that Gerstein either considered or
resolved the issue raised in McLaughlin.187 Although the majority in
McLaughlin suggests that Gerstein compels its decision, the real foundation underlying the Court's decision is its own "value laden[] 'balancing' of the competing demands of the individual and the
State."1 8 8 Judicial balancing and deference to state interests, of
course, are essential parts of constitutional doctrine when the Court
confronts equally compelling claims. However, a balancing analysis
with deference to state concerns seems less appropriate when a
state's asserted interests amount to nothing more than administrative convenience.
At issue in McLaughlin was whether state officials, after completing the administrative process incident to an arrest and arranging
for a magistrate's appearance, must provide an immediate judicial
hearing to determine whether good cause exists for holding an individual. Imagine the indignities associated with any arrest. The police forcibly seize you. They have thoroughly searched your body
and personal effects. They remove you from family, friends, and
job. They place you in an environment where no one represents
your legal interests. And, they may interrogate you. 189 If arrested
187
In fact, to the extent that Gerstein offers any dues as to its resolution of the issue,
the evidence suggests that the Court would reject Justice O'Connor's position in McLaughlin. As Justice Powell explained in Gerstein,
[o]nce the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate.... And, while the
State's reasons for taking summary action subside, the suspect's need for
a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The
consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest.... When the stakes are this high, the
detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty.
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
188 McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. at 1674 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189 This, of course, is what the Supreme Court has permitted state officials to do in
the abstract. Many times, however, the legal theory announced by the Court and the
reality of what occurs on the street and in police stations are worlds apart. We know, for
example, that the police have arrested innocent people. See William Glaberson, Trapped
in the Terror of New York's Holding Pens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1990, at Al. We also know
that the police arrest people for illegal reasons. See, e.g., Richard Emery, The Even Sadder
New York Police Saga, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1987, at A31 (police officers illegally arrested
Black, Hispanic and homeless persons in New York's subways in an effort to meet arrest
quotas). Further, the police severely beat and kill some of the people they arrest. See,
e.g., Andy Court, UnreasonableDoubt, THE AM. LAw., Apr. 1991, at 76 (jury acquits six
narcotics officers of civil rights charges in death of drug suspect). Citizens are often not
informed of the reasons for their arrest and sometimes state officials ignore the constitutional rights of citizens to remain silent and have a lawyer present during custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1991) (police continued
interrogation of arrested suspect despite his request for silence or an attorney; suspect
was interrogated for nearly 24 hours before he was allowed to see family or attorney).
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without a warrant, you obviously have compelling reasons to demand that a neutral official examine the grounds for your continued
detention. The nature of your seizure and detention demands no
less.
On the other hand, the state, according to McLaughlin, desires
the flexibility to combine certain pretrial hearings into a single proceeding. For example, the Court worries that requiring a probable
cause hearing immediately after completion of the administrative
procedure incident to arrest might mean that "[w]aiting even a few
hours so that a bail hearing or arraignment could take place at the
same time as the probable cause determination" is unconstitutional. 190 This interest in adminstrative convenience competes with
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests of liberty, privacy, and
personal security.
Is this really a matter of equally compelling claims that merit
judicial balancing? I think not. Consider the concerns raised by
Justice Marshall for those who are routinely arrested without judicial
approval: the loss of liberty, the possibility that force might be employed by police officials, the indignities of a police body and effects
search, the isolation of a police environment where no one is avail-able to represent your interests, and the important consequences
that accompany custodial interrogation. When these interests are
placed next to the state's interest in administrative convenience, the
latter interest pales in significance.
The McLaughlin Court, however, failed to make a fair assessment of the Fourth Amendment interests at stake. The Court does
not devote a single sentence to detailing the liberty, privacy, and
dignity interests involved in a routine arrest. The best that the
Court can do is remind the reader that Gerstein leaves it no choice. 191
The individuals involved in warrantless arrests and the Fourth
Amendment values that should protect them deserve better treatment than this, yet the McLaughlin opinion indicates no awareness of
the individual interests at stake. By this, I do not suggest, like some
Justices, that the Court accords the Fourth Amendment "second190

McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. at 1668.

Justice O'Connor noted that Gerstein stated that "prolonged detention based on
incorrect or unfounded suspicion may unjustly 'imperil [a] suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income, and impair his family relationships.'" Id at 1668 (quoting Gerstein,
420 U.S. at 114). She then argued that Gerstein "established a 'practical compromise'
between the rights of individuals and the realities of law enforcement." Id Later, she
explained that "Gerstein struck a balance between competing interests; a proper understanding of the decision is possible only if one takes into account both sides of the equation." Id. at 1669.
These references indicate that Justice O'Connor is aware that the interests of an
individual compete with the state's need for procedural convenience. Unfortunately,
nothing indicates that she understands the significance and scope of those interests.
191
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class" status.1 92 Rather, as Justice Marshall often reminded his colleagues, the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis should be realistic
about the impact of governmental power on individuals. McLaughlin
evidences no understanding that an arrest "is a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty or
innocent."1 9 3
Moreover, McLaughlin's balancing analysis is particularly inept
in light of the Court's earlier ruling in Watson, which permitted warrantless arrests even in cases where state officials had time to obtain
a warrant. Once Watson excused state officials from complying with
the Warrant Clause before arrest, delaying judicial scrutiny after the
arrest is inconsistent with Fourth Amendment values. 194 Why? Imagine that the police suspect a certain person-call him Uncle
Sam-has committed a crime. The police have no reason to believe

that Uncle Sam is about to flee, and Uncle Sam is not even aware
that he is suspected of wrongdoing. Even though the police have
plenty of time to present their suspicions to a neutral magistrate,
192
See, e.g., Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson,J., dissenting) ("We cannot give some constitutional rights a preferred position without relegating
others to a deferred position; we can establish no firsts without thereby establishing
seconds. Indications are not wanting that Fourth Amendment freedoms are tactily
marked as secondary rights, to be relegated to a deferred position."); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that a Fourth
Amendment question "may turn on whether one gives that Amendment a place second
to none in the Bill of Rights, or considers it on the whole a kind of nuisance, a serious
impediment in the war against crime").
193 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
Mireya Navarro, As Suspects Wait, the Fearof TuberculosisRises, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 30, 1992, at
BI (noting concern of health officials that persons arrested and held for arraignment
over one or two days in New York City jails could become infected with tuberculosis);
Glaberson, supra note 189, at Al, describing the detention cells where persons arrested
in New York City are held:
"There are no mattresses, no bedding, no clean clothing and no showers.
The toilets, where there are toilets at all, are open bowls along the walls
and often encrusted and overflowing. Meals usually consist of a single
slice of baloney and a single slice of American cheese on white bread.

194

"People who have been through the system say it is not easy to forget.
Some were threatened by other prisoners. Others were chained to people who were vomiting and stinking of the streets. With few phone privileges, many felt as if they were lost in a hellish labyrinth far from the lives
they had been plucked from."
See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114:
Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is
any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while
the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's
reasons for taking summary action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference
occasioned by arrest. (emphasis added).
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they arrest Uncle Sam at his place of employment in front of his
coworkers and supervisors.
Watson permits this scenario, clearly indicating that police officials have substantial authority and discretion to restrain the liberty
and invade the privacy of any person they suspect. If Justice Marshall's view of the Fourth Amendment had commanded a majority
of the Court in 1976, police officials could not arrest Uncle Sam
without a warrant unless some exigency justified his immediate
seizure. In 1991, however, the Court-worried that state officials
would lack the flexibility and convenience to combine pretrial proceedings-concludes that the Fourth Amendment allows the police
to keep Uncle Sam in jail for an additional 48 hours; two full days
after the police have completed the administrative steps surrounding the arrest. And the Court reaches this result in the name of
federalism.
Watson not only gave the state the power of warrantless arrests,
but also sanctioned a regime where administrative convenience denies individuals the immediate opportunity to have a neutral magistrate scrutinize police claims of probable cause. The McLaughlin
Court, which purported to balance the competing claims of official
-convenience against individual freedom, never considered the advantages already given the state under Watson.
Instead, the McLaughlin Court found that administrative convenience, by itself, is sufficient to override Fourth Amendment values. When the Court is oblivious to this power and permits meager
state interests to trump weighty and obvious Fourth Amendment interests, 9 5 it is questionable whether McLaughlin involved a fair and
sensitive balancing analysis as Justice O'Connor claimed 96 or simply further eroded Fourth Amendment principles.
Although McLaughlin is a disturbing decision, 19 7 it is not a surprising one, given the Court's fondness for balancing and its hostility towards applying the Fourth Amendment's substantive
safeguards to limit law enforcement activities. What, some might
195

See Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1677 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
While in recent years we have invented novel applications of the Fourth
Amendment to release the unquestionably guilty, we today repudiate one
of its core applications so that the presumptively innocent may be left in
jail. Hereafter a law-abiding citizen wrongfully arrested may be compelled to await the grace of a Dickensian bureaucratic machine, as it
chums its cycle for up to two days-never once given the opportunity to
show a judge that there is absolutely no reason to hold him, that a mistake has been made.

196

Id. at 1670.

Unlike many of the Court's Fourth Amendment rulings over the last few years,
McLaughlin received substantial attention in the popular media. See Tom Wicker, Dee
197

Brown and You, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1991, at.A27.
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ask, is wrong with balancing? What is so bad about using a rule of
reasonableness to assess police efforts to combat violent crime or
judge government programs aimed at reducing the use of alcohol by
railroad and airline employees? 9 8 After all, when law enforcement
activities cross the line of reasonableness, the citizenry will rise up
and politicians will act to rein in the police.
Several reasons exist for concern about the Court's balancing
model. First, judges who profess allegiance to the written text of
the Constitution should be concerned about a rule of reasonableness for resolving Fourth Amendment issues. Certainly, the first
clause of the Amendment grants only a right against "unreasonable" search and seizure. The addition of the Warrant Clause, however, indicates that the right embodied in the first clause went
beyond merely outlawing the evil associated with the writs of assistance. "The general right of security from unreasonable search and
seizure was given a sanction of its own and the amendment thus
intentionally given a broader scope."' 99
Put another way, "[u]nreasonable searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of the first clause of the Amendment." 2°° Even if one
20 1
disagrees with this construction of the Fourth Amendment's text,
a logical place to determine what the Framers meant by "unreasonable" searches and seizures is the Fourth Amendment itself. The
provision, intended to limit the power and excesses of government
officials, incorporates a preference for the requirements of probable
cause and neutral review by a magistrate as the best means to check

198 See Eric Weiner, Northwest Pilots Are Found Guilty of Drunken Flying, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 1990, at Al.
199 LASSON, supra note 62, at 103: see also Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 399 n.465;
Clark D. Cunningham, A LinguisticAnalysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Searchfor Common Sense, 73 IowA L. REv. 541, 551-52 (1988); Kamisar, supra note
7, at 574; cf. Bookspan, supra note 53, at 477:
Although the fourth amendment conveys to "the People [the right] to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," the reasonableness
approach focuses on the acts of the police instead of the rights of the
people. The question, then, becomes whether the police acted reasonably rather than whether a person's rights were violated. This approach
endores retrospective evaluations of police behavior rather than prospective protections.
(footnote omitted).
200
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurther, J., dissenting) ("[T]he framers said with all the clarity
of the gloss of history that a search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes it,
barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.").
201
See Payton, 445 U.S. at 610-11 (White, J., dissenting).
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the discretion of government officers. 20 2 Judges concerned about
vague standards and countless exceptions to constitutional rules
should appreciate an analytical model that defers to the constitutional text, rather than to their own personal values, for evaluating
20 3
governmental search and seizure activities.
Second, when balancing occurs, the government generally
wins-at least in search and seizure cases. Few cases exist in which
the government's interest in effective law enforcement is insubstantial. This fact raises the question of whether the Court ought to engage in "balancing" in the first place. 2° 4 Balancing analysis is a very
subjective process. The subjective nature of the process is exacer-

202
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) ("[Tube
definition of 'reasonableness' turns, at least inpart, on the more specific commands of
-the warrant clause.").
203
Of course, it could also be argued that a general rule of reasonableness flies in
the face of precedents established by both the Warren and Burger Courts, which look to
the safeguards of the Warrant Clause for assessing the constitutional validity of government search and seizure actions. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978):
The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and
seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that "searches conducted outside of
the judicial processs, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
However, stare decisis no longer carries the same weight it has in the recent past,
particularly when individual rights are at stake. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597,
2610 (1991) (Chief Justice Rehnquist explaining that stare decisis considerations are
heightened in cases involving "property and contract rights," but stare decisis is less important in cases concerning "procedural and evidentiary rules.") What the ChiefJustice
euphemistically calls "procedural and evidentiary rules" used to be known as "constitutional rights," "fundamental freedoms," and "civil liberties." It is evident that the
Court has more concern for the reliance expectations associated with private property
and business contracts than for the constitutional expectations the individual holds in
the Bill of Rights. See California v. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991), overruling Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991), overruling Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (admission into evidence of an involuntary
confession, regardless of its truth or falsity, constitutes per se due process violation for a
criminal defendant); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991), overruling Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), overruling Booth
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) & South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). See
generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in ConstitutionalDecisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68 (1991).
204
"How does one balance 'privacy' (or 'individual liberty' or 'personal dignity,' or
call it what you will) against the interest in surpressing crime (or 'law and order' or the
'general welfare,' or call it what you will)?" Kamisar, supra note 7, at 646.
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bated when the topic concerns law enforcement, 20 5 leaving us to
question what criteria the Court uses in such an analysis. 20 6
Third, the Court's balancing process is distorted because it generally sees only a guilty defendant on the other side of the scale.
Rarely does a Fourth Amendment case reach the Court where the
party urging a ruling in favor of Fourth Amendment rights is not
charged with a crime or some other civil misconduct. 20 7 When the
Court proffers its reasoning and conclusions for a particular result,
it rarely considers the effect on innocent persons subjected to the
police intrusion permitted by the Court. Foremost in the minds of
the Justices is the need for effective law enforcement. Thus, Fourth
Amendment rights are seldom considered positive rights. Rather,
the Court generally views them as restraints on law enforcement to
be acknowledged, but not taken seriously.
It is not surprising, then, that a balancing formula inevitably
favors the government. Is this a bad thing? No, not if the original
purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to favor or facilitate law enforcement investigatory techniques. However, the Framers
designed the Amendment to bar certain law enforcement activities
and to slow down others. Regrettably, the current Court not only
ignores this fact, but also disguises its disregard of Fourth Amendment values by intentionally fostering the view that those who favor
strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment's safeguards have an expansive concern for the rights of criminals and no interest in the
"rights" of the police and public. A balancing model, which looks
primarily to the general reasonableness of government conduct, is a
convenient tool for the Court's handiwork.
Consider, for example, the problem of drunk driving. Admittedly, drunk driving is a problem. But who will say that society
should not give police officials and policymakers the primary responsibility for devising the methods to detect those who drink and
drive? And how many politicians will campaign on a platform that
opposes sobriety roadblocks because of the threat they pose to
Fourth Amendment principles?
205
Cf. id at 649 (In Fourth Amendment cases "because the crime may be so heinous
and the relevance of the evidence so overwhelming, interest-balancing 'almost requires
the judge to intrude his individual values into the case.' ") (footnote omitted) (quoting
Harry Kalven, Jr. & Roscoe T. Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished Debate be-

tween Justice HarlanandJustice Black, 21 LAw IN TRANSMON 155, 178-79 (1961)).
206
"If the standard is not to be the fourth amendment-which embodies the judgment that securing all citizens 'in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures' 'outweighs' society's interest in apprehending and
convicting criminals-then what is it to be?" Kamisar, supra note 7, at 646-47 (footnote
omitted).
207
But cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (civil action challenging the constitutionality of government's "factory surveys").
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These questions, and their obvious answers, provide the support for ChiefJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Michigan Dep't
of State Police v. Sitz,20 which considered the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. Not surprisingly, the Chief Justice concluded
that states have a substantial interest in eradicating drunk driving. 20 9
State officials, not judges, are in the best position to chose among
reasonable alternative methods for apprehending drunk drivers; 2 10
therefore, judges should not question the effectiveness of sobriety
checkpoints in cases not involving "a complete ibsence of empirical
211
data."

Someone accustomed to living in a society that highly values
individual liberty and generally deplores official seizures lacking any
evidentiary basis might wonder how one can reconcile sobriety
checkpoints-which involve suspicionless and warrantless seizures
of mQtorists and their companions-with our constitutional framework. In effect, Sitz held that the Fourth Amendment has no relevance for a police decision 2 12 to establish a roadblock that seizes

every vehicle that passes through

it.213

No warrant is required. No

probable cause or suspicion is needed. No prior approval by a neu-

210

496 U.S. 444 (1990).
Id at 2485-86.
I& at 2487.

211

1&

- 208
209

Professor Strossen has cogently explained that the Michigan legislature had not
approved the roadblock program at issue in Sitz. Rather, the legislature considered and
rejected a proposal for such a program. Despite this rejection, the Director of the Michigan Department of State Police, an unelected official, implemented the challenged program. Thus, according to Professor Strossen, there was no "justification for deferring to
search and seizure decisions [made] by the appointed head of a state police agency.
Such decisions are made by a single, unelected official, not by a broadly representative
elected body." Strossen, supra note 154, at 294.
213 The ChiefJustice did note that Sitz only considered "the initial stop of each motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning arkd ob212

servation by checkpoint officers. Detention of particular motorists for more extensive

field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard."
Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485.
Those who care about Fourth Amendment freedoms should not take too much
comfort in the way the Chief Justice appears to frame narrowly the issue. The Chief
Justice wants motorists to believe that they have nothing to worry about at sobriety roadblocks. Motorists need not fear the initial seizure because all vehicles are seized and the
seizure itself "is slight," id- at 2486 (approximately 25 seconds). In addition, officers
supposedly follow "guidelines" with instructions on examining motorists for signs of
intoxication. Id. at 2488.
Although the ChiefJustice notes the length of the seizure, he fails to mention the
intensity of that seizure, or to acknowledge that officers have considerable discretion
when deciding which motorists will be subjected to further official detention and scrutiny. However, Professor Strossen noted that the scope of the initial seizure is far from
slight when one considers that it includes "looking at the driver's face and eyes to see
whether they were.., flushed or bloodshot; smelling the driver's breath to [detect the]
odor of alcohol; engaging the driver in conversation [to detect slurred speech]; and in-

I Ilk

I I'-k
.. UL/VL.L.L.,a
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tral magistrate is necessary. In other words, the Constitution turns
a blind eye towards a police tactic one might expect to see "in Rus'
sia or Hitler-occupied Germany. "214
Someone who values liberty might also worry about the subjective intrusion that occurs when the police detain and question a person at a night-time roadblock. A police seizure is seldom a pleasant
experience. The experience may be "distressing even when it
should not be terrifying, and what begins mildly may by happen2 15
stance turn severe."
In Sitz, the Court's response to these legitimate concerns was,
in essence, that "only the guilty need worry." This response is an
increasingly familiar tactic employed by the Court to constrain the
reach of Fourth Amendment protections. According to the Court,
only the fear and surprise engendered in "law abiding" motorists
are pertinent when assessing the subjective intrusion posed by so21 6
briety checkpoint seizures.
The strategic advantages in this approach are obvious. Most of
the public already associates the Fourth Amendment with criminals

specting the driver's shirt to see whether it was unbuttoned." Strossen, supra note 154,
at 295.
Moreover, the so-called "guidelines" that allegedly limit the officers' discretion,
provide no real protection against arbitrary and discriminatory police decisions to detain
motorists for further questioning. "The 'guidelines' in fact provided no meaningful guidance as to the circumstances under which a driver should be detained for more prolonged investigation. That determination was consigned to the discretion of individual
officers conducting the initial stops." Id at 295-96 (footnote omitted).
Finally, it is interesting that the ChiefJustice's reference to the "[d]etention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing" only states that this intensified seizure "may" require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard. Sitz, 110
S. Ct. at 2485. Apparently, the question whether secondary seizures at sobriety roadblocks must be justified by particularized suspicion of intoxication or other criminality
remains unanswered. Presumably, the ChiefJustice and the rest of the Sitz majority is
willing to consider an argument that such particularized suspicion is unnecessary tojustify such seizures. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-64 (1976) (no
reasonable suspicion needed to refer to motorist to secondary area at checkpoint near
border to detect illegal immigration); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 624 (1988) (upholding suspicionless blood, urine, and breath searches of railroad employees involved in train accidents and stating that "a showing of individualized
suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed
unreasonable.").
214
Strossen, supra note 154, at 291 n.21 (statement by state legislator that drunk
driving roadblocks are a police tactic he might expect to see "in Russia, or Hitleroccupied Germany.").
215
Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216 "The 'fear and surprise' to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has
been drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint, but, rather,
the fear and surprise engendered in law abiding motorists by the nature of the stop." Id.
at 2486.
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and their advocates. 217 The Fourth Amendment is only a technicality, used by shifty lawyers to help their clients avoid just punishment. Others, fueled by the rhetoric of politicians, believe that the
Amendment "handcuffs" legitimate law enforcement methods for
detecting and capturing criminals. When the Court characterizes
the competing choices as involving the rights of the "law abiding"
versus the interests of the "guilty,

' 21 8

the public easily identifies

with the former at the expense of the latter.
What is wrong with this sort of reasoning? First, the accuracy of
the Court's premise in Sitz is questionable. The fear and anxiety
that motorists experience regarding police checkpoints are not
"solely the lot of the guilty."'2 19 More importantly, however, this

approach diverts attention from the main task at hand: deciding
whether sobriety roadblocks are consistent with the central principles of the Fourth Amendment. Rather than ask straightforward
questions, the Court engages in a formless balancing analysis. Sitz,
for instance, never considers whether the safeguards of the Fourth
Amendment-probable cause and neutral review by a magistrate
ante-factum-have any relevance to the constitutional debate. The
Court simply assumes their irrelevance. This sleight-of-hand is pos-sible when the Court diverts its attention from the requirements of
the Warrant Clause. When analysis begins with the assumption that
government intrusions need only be reasonable, the end result is a
conclusory and unsurprising holding that sobriety checkpoints satisfy the Court's standard of reasonableness.
C. The Danger of the Reasonableness Rule: The Evolving
Government Convenience and Efficiency Rationale
The Fourth Amendment's protection extends not only to people, homes, and papers, but also protects "effects." Similarly, the
Warrant Clause "does not in terms distinguish between searches
conducted in private homes and other searches. ' 220 All searches
must adhere, at least presumptively, to its restrictions. Thus,
allegiance to the text of the Fourth Amendment suggests that personal effects should receive the same degree of protection against
warrantless searches as that received by "persons, houses, [and] papers." 221 But, as Justice Marshall noted in another context,
217 "One hears the complaint, nowadays, that the Fourth Amendment has become
constitutional law for the guilty; that it benefits the career criminal (through the exclusionary rule) often and directly, but the ordinary citizen remotely if at all." Riverside v.
McLaughlin, I11 S. Ct. 1661, 1677 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218
Maclin, supra note 105, at 1311 n.255.
219
See Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977).
221 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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"[c]onsistency. ..hardly has been a hallmark of the current Court's
Fourth Amendment campaigns." 22 2 The Court's cases concerning
closed containers found inside automobiles demonstrate why Justice
Marshall was correct when he warned that adopting a rule of reasonableness would inevitably lead to the evisceration of Fourth Amendment rights.
1. Private Containers Found Inside Automobiles: Why Aren't They
Protected?
In United States v. Ross, 2 23 the Court tried to clarify an area of
search and seizure law-searches of automobiles and containers
found therein-that has confronted and confused courts since Prohibition. Ross considered "the extent to which police officers-who
have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable
cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within itmay conduct a probing search of compartments and containers
within the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view."' 224 The
Court, speaking through Justice Stevens, held that police "may conduct a search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could
authorize in a warrant 'particularly describing the, place to be
searched.' "225
The reasoning of Ross can be summarized as follows: The socalled "automobile" exception 22 6 to the warrant requirement permits a warrantless search of a vehicle when probable cause supports
the search. The exception, however, does not allow a warrantless
search of a closed container found inside a car if the focus of prob22 7
able cause is the container itself and not the vehicle generally.
When police have probable cause to search the entire vehicle, the
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 700 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
Id. at 800.
Id.
In a series of cases, the Court has allowed law enforcement officials to search
automobiles where they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of crime. This rule is popularly known as the "automobile" exception to the warrant requirements. The origins of the exception stem from Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925). Professor Kamisar, however, has explained why this label is a misnomer and can be misleading. See Yale Kamisar, United States v. Ross: The Court Takes
Another Look at the Container-in-the-CarSituation, in THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-1982, at 74-75 (Jesse Choper et al. eds., 1983).
227 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (police had probable cause to believe
that particular item of luggage placed in the trunk of a taxi contained contraband; while
police may seize that luggage, they must obtain a warrant before searching it). In a
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger noted that "it was the luggage being transported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the automobile in which it was being
carried, that was the suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship between the
automobile and the contraband was purely coincidental .... Id. at 767 (Burger, CJ.,
concurring in judgment).
222
223
224
225
226
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scope of a warrantless search is "no narrower-and no broaderthan the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by
'2 28
probable cause."
What is the significance of Ross? For Justice Marshall, it was a
disaster. The reasoning of the Court "repeals the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement itself."' 22 9 Why would the Court equate
the authority of the police to conduct a warrantless search with an
authorization provided by a magistrate's warrant? In Justice Marshall's view, the only convincing explanation for Ross is "expediency: it assists police in conducting automobile searches, ensuring
that the private containers into which criminal suspects often place
goods will no longer be a Fourth Amendment shield."' 2" 0 What is
the impact of Ross for Fourth Amendment protection of dosed containers and other luggage? Justice Marshall predicted that Ross
marked "a first step toward an unprecedented 'probable cause' exception to the warrant requirement. ' 2 1 Hyperbole? I think not.
At first blush, the result in Ross seems logical. 23 2 If the Fourth
Amendment permits police officers to tear open the upholstery of
cars, 2 3 open concealed compartments,234 or otherwise search the
interior of automobiles stopped-on the highway, why would it re.quire police to obtain a warrant before opening a closed containerlike a suitcase or knapsack-found during the course of a general
search of a car? Justice Marshall's response to this question was
straightforward: exigencyjustifies a warrantless search of a automobile stopped on the highway. The police cannot easily secure
automobiles found on the open road because of their size and inherent mobility. No such exigency, however, applies to dosed contain2 35
ers that come under the control of the police.
Moreover, the reasoning of Ross cannot rest on a lack of privacy
associated with closed containers. The Fourth Amendment provides explicit protection of personal "effects," and no one argues
that individuals have no privacy expectations in their purses, attach6

bags, and zippered pouches. In fact, the Ross majority acknowlRoss, 456 U.S. at 823.
Id at 827 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
230
Id. at 841-42.
231
Id. at 828.
232 Cf 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARcH AND SEIZURE § 7.2(d), at 54-56 (2d ed. 1987)
(noting that the Ross majority "can be applauded for refusing to accept ... a distinction
between cars and containers therein.").
233
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (search of automobile and
seizure of liquor found therein do not violate Constitution if based upon probable
cause).
234
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (given probable cause police may
conduct a warrantless search of entire car).
235
Ross, 456 U.S. at 830-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
228
229
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edged the legitimate privacy expectations that surround such containers. 23 6 Furthermore, it is nonsensical to say that the Fourth
Amendment bars a warrantless search of a dosed container found
inside a car when the focus of probable cause is on the container
itself, but permits a warrantless search of a similar container when
the focus is on the entire car. Justice Marshall wondered, "[W]hy is
...a container [in the former case] more private, less difficult for
police to seize and store, or in any other relevant respect more
properly subject to the warrant requirement, than a container [in
the latter case] that police discover in a probable-cause search of an
23 7
entire automobile?"
But why not allow police to open dosed containers discovered
during the course of an extensive search of a car? Why not say that
the scope of a police search based on probable cause is no broader
than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by
probable cause? According to Justice Marshall, the critical function
of a magistrate is lost under that approach. Ross contains "the startling assumption that a policeman's determination of probable
cause is the functional equivalent of the determination of a neutral
and detached magistrate." 23 8 Not only does Ross assume "what has
never been the law," 23 9 but it reaches a result that is at odds with the
primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment, namely to prevent this
assumption-the equation of an officer's finding of probable cause
with a magistrate's determination-from ever becoming the law of
240
the land.
What, then, justifies Ross? The Ross Court simply balances the
competing interests of the police and the individual. The Court
thought that the police action in Ross was reasonable under the circumstances, notwithstanding the commands of the Warrant Clause.
"When a legitimate search is under way ....
nice distinctions between . . . glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and
wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the
236 Id at 822 (Stevens, J.) (rejecting distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy"
containers; "a traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper
bag or knotted scarf [may] claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official
inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attach6 case.") (footnote
omitted).
237
Id. at 839-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
238
Id. at 833.
239 Id.
240
The point of the Fourth Amendment ... is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947) (footnote omitted).
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interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at
hand. ' 241 Justice Marshall opposed this sort of value judgment by
the Court.
2.

Why Doesn't the Warrant Clause Apply to the Search of Personal
Possessions?

When the Court decided Ross, Justice Marshall believed that
"any movable container found within an automobile deserves precisely the same degree of Fourth Amendment warrant protection
that it would deserve if found at a location outside the automobile. ' 24 2 The Ross Court, of course, did not adopt this view. In his
dissent, however, Justice Marshall predicted that the reasoning of
2 43
Ross was a sign of future threats to Fourth Amendment rights.
Californiav. Acevedo 24 4 shows the prescience ofJustice Marshall's remarks and indicates how far the present Court is willing to, and
might yet further, undermine Fourth Amendment rights.
As framed by the Court, the central issue in Acevedo was whether
the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant to
open a closed container found inside a car simply because they lack
probable cause to search the entire car. Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, would have us believe that the focus of the Court
should be on the vehicle itself. Interestingly, the Court begins with
two concessions. First, it acknowledges the wisdom of Justice Marshall's dissent in Ross. Closed containers seized by the police,
whether "found after a general search of the automobile . . . [or]
found in a car after a limited search for the container are equally
easy for the police to store and for the suspect to hide or destroy." 2 45 Second, no reason exists to distinguish the privacy expectations of dosed containers based on whether the police had
probable cause to search the entire vehicle, or only to seek a specific
Ross, 456 U.S. at 821 (footnote omitted).
Ross, 456 U.S. at 834 (Marshall,J., dissenting). In fact,Justice Marshall believed
any warrantless search of an automobile or containers found therein was constitutionally
suspect if performed without either the consent of the owner or some reason to believe
that contraband or relevant evidence would be found inside. See Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 377 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (respondent's privacy interest in
closed containers discovered during inventory of vehicle outweighed government's interest in searching those containers); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 384
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (government's interest in preserving property should
not override individual's privacy interest in closed compartment of his vehicle).
243
Recall Justice Marshall's declaration that Ross "repeals the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement itself," and constitutes "a first step toward an unprecedented
'probable cause' exception to the warrant requirement." 456 U.S. at 827-28 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
244
111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
245
Id. at 1988.
241

242
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container.2 4 6 Thus, the dichotomy created in Ross, which allows a
warrantless search of a closed container discovered during the
course of a general search of a vehicle but disallows the exact same
search when probable cause exists only to search the container itself, is logically unsound. At this point, however, all agreement between the Court's and Justice Marshall's conception of the warrant
requirements ends.
Without any support, Acevedo states that the Court's prior cases
have provided "only minimal protection for privacy" and have "impeded effective law enforcement." 2 47 The Court intimates that separate rules for closed containers actually "disserve privacy
interests." 248 According to the Court, "[i]f the police know that
they may open a bag only if they are actually searching the entire
car, they may search morie extensively than they otherwise would in
' 24 9
order to establish the general probable cause required by Ross.
Further, the dichotomy created in Ross provided only minimal protection of privacy interests because once police officers obtain probable cause to seize property, "'a warrant will be routinely
forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of cases.' ",250
The Acevedo Court also insisted, again without proof, that separate treatment of containers confused courts and police officers. Reiterating views first voiced in his dissenting opinions in United States
v. Chadwick 251 and Arkansas v. Sanders,25 2 Justice Blackmun claims
that separate treatment of containers found in automobiles causes
" 'the perverse result of allowing fortuitous circumstances to control
the outcome' of various searches [and produces] 'inherent opaque2 55
ness' " in judicial doctrine.
To remedy this situation, Acevedo announces "one clear-cut
rule" 2 54 to govern automobile searches and eliminates the warrant
requirement for closed containers previously set forth by the Court
in Sanders.255 From now on, police "may search without a warrant if
Id.
Id
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id at 1989 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 770 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)).
251
433 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
252
442 U.S. at 771 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
253
Acevedo, 11 S. Ct. at 1990.
254
Id. at 1991.
255
In what most thought was "clear-cut" language, Sanders had held
that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile to the same degree it applies to
such luggage in other locations. Thus, insofar as the police are entitled
to search such luggage without a warrant, their actions must be justified
246
247
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their search is supported by probable cause." 2 56 When police have
probable cause to believe a container holds contraband, as they did
in Acevedo, " [t]hat probable cause now allows a warrantless search of
the [container]. ' 25 7 If the focus of probable cause is exclusively on
the container, a search of the rest of the automobile is unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. This "clear-cut" rule, according to
the Court, is consistent with Carrollv. United States2 58 and its progeny, and faithful to the "cardinal principle" that warranless
searches areperse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, sub2 59
ject to a few jealously guarded exceptions.
Acevedo is another example of the current Court's disregard for
the plain requirements of the Warrant Clause. The search in Acevedo
appears reasonable because the Court chose to focus on the location
of the search rather than on the item being searched. The Court
offers. several arguments to justify its ruling, none of which withstand scrutiny. The best explanation for the result in Acevedo,
although the Court does not state it explicitly, is that it simply does
not believe the Warrant Clause should apply to searches of personal
26
property. 0
Justice Frankfurter once wrote that on a journey of law, "the
place you reach depends on the direction you are taking. And so,
where one comes out on a case depends on where one goes in." 26 '
The result in Acevedo is predictable if one's analysis begins with the
automobile. Justice Blackmun correctly draws attention to a "curious" dichotomy between "the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that
under some exception to the warrant requirement other than that applicable to automobiles stopped on the highway.
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766; see also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 425 (1981) (plurality opinion) (opening of packages in a car by police without a search warrant violated
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments even though police had probable cause: "kChadwick and Sanders] made clear, if it was not clear before, that a closed piece of luggage
found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the same extent as are
closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else." IL).
256 Acevedo, Il1 S. Ct. at 1991.
257
Id.
258
259

267 U.S. 132 (1925).

Id.

Justice Blackmun gave us a preview of the Acevedo holding in his earlier dissents
in Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 19 ("I would... hold generally that a warrant is not required to
seize and search any movable property in the possession of a person properly arrested in
a public place."), and in Sanders, 442 U.S. at 772 ("[I]t would be better to adopt a clearcut rule to the effect that a warrant should not be required to seize and search any
personal property found in an automobile that may in turn be seized and searched without a warrant pursuant to Carroll and Chambers [v. Maroney]."). It was only a matter of
time until the Court's composition changed so that a majority would view the Fourth
Amendment in a similar manner.
261
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
260
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coincidentally turns up in an automobile." 2 62 However, this dichotomy is curious and opaque only if you focus on the location of the
containers. If, instead, one focuses on the container itself, the dichotomy disappears.
The Court never considers the real question in Acevedo:
whether the Warrant Clause should apply to personal property? To
me, the answer seems obvious. Because the Fourth Amendment
protects effects as well as persons, homes, and papers, and because
the Warrant Clause does not distinguish "between searches conducted in private homes and other searches," 2 63 warrantless
searches of closed containers 264 should be per se unreasonable, subject to a few carefully drawn exceptions.
As discussed above, Acevedo suggests that the Court's previous
rulings have provided only minimal protection for the privacy of
personal property placed inside automobiles. Justice Blackmun is
surely correct if he meant that the Court has offered a bankrupt
analysis to support "its claim that expectations of privacy are lower
in automobiles than in most other places. ' '2 65 However, the Acevedo
Court claims that separate treatment of closed containers under Ross
and Sanders might actually encourage more extensive searches by the
police. This argument is hard to take seriously. Police need probable cause before they begin a search. An otherwise illegal search
cannot be justified in order to validate a lesser intrusion. Just as "a
search [cannot] be made legal by what it turns up," 2 66 so too legal
grounds for a lesser intrusion cannot be demonstrated by a more
26 7
extensive search.
262 Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1991.
263 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977).
264 In the past, the Court rejected any distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers in allocating Fourth Amendment protections for "effects." The Fourth

Amendment allowed no such distinction, according to Ross, because
just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the

same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a
traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper
bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from
official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attach6
case.

Ross, 456 U.S. at 822 (footnote omitted).
265 Joseph Grano, PerplexingQuestions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment Issues: Fourth
Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, And The Warrant Requirement, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 425, 459 (1978).
266 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
267 See Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1999 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting prior cases
"unequivocally rejected this bootstrap justification for a search which was not lawful
when it commenced."). Moreover, the Court's decision in United States v. Johns, 469

U.S. 478 (1985) made clear that officers do not have to conduct an extensive search of a
car "in order to establish the general probable cause required by Ross." Acevedo, 111 S.
Ct. at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Johns, 469 U.S. at 483 ("The possibility that the
officers did not search the vehicles more extensively does not affect our conclusion that

1992]

THURGOOD MARSHALL

783

Several of the Justices, however, apparently believed that that
pre-Acevedo doctrine placed a premium on police ignorance. 2 68 Justice Scalia, for example, thought it strange to permit an officer to
search a container found in the car when he has probable cause to
believe that the car contained contraband "somewhere" but to preclude him from searching if his knowledge is more specific. 2 69
These concerns are misplaced. Nothing is strange about a rule that
a warrantless police intrusion must be "'strictly circumscribed by
the exigencies which justify its initiation.' "270 The potential mobility of a dosed container justifies a warrantless seizure. A warrantless
search, however, is not necessary because the container is "easy for
the police to store" and retains sufficient expectations of privacy to
warrant a magistrate's finding of probable cause before a search is

permitted. 27 1 Justice Scalia certainly knows there is nothing strange

about requiring police officers to obey the requirements of the Warrant Clause before undertaking a search of an object, even though
2 72
seizure of that same object is permissible without a warrant.
Moreover, condemning pre-Acevedo doctrine for its suppposed
premium on police ignorance misses the point. The point of the
Fourth Amendment and the war-rant requirements, as Justice Marshall pointed out, is not to assess the constitutionality of police
searches by asking what is permissible given a different set of circumstances, but rather to ask what police actions are permissible
without the authorization of a neutral magistrate. Justice Scalia correctly questions the wisdom of a rule that seems to reward limited
knowledge of the facts. However, his criticism of pre-Acevedo law
the packages were removed [and properly searched at a later time] pursuant to a vehicle
search.").
268 See Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1990 ("The Chadwick rule, as applied in Sanders, has
devolved into an anomaly such that the more likely the police are to discover drugs in a
container, the less authority they have to search it.").
269 Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992-94 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
270 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 393 (1978)).
271 Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1996 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This, ofcourse, is the precise
point Justice Marshall made in his dissent in Ross. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
832 (1982).
272 Cf. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326 (rejecting a claim that police should be free to search
an object in plain view on lesser grounds than would be permitted for a similar seizure).
Moreover, it is also hard to take seriously the Court's claim in Acevedo that "one
clear-cut" rule for automobile searches will eliminate the alleged confusion caused by
the dichotomy created in Ross.
Jf the police only have probable cause to search a specified container in a
vehicle, they no longer need a warrant to open that container, but they
stiil cannot search the entire vehicle. Thus the police still have to ascertain which kind of probable cause they have. For resolution of that issue
determines the scope of the warrantless search they may make.
Kamisar, supra note 108, at 55.
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only begs the larger question of whether police, as an initial matter
in the absence of exigency, should be free to conduct warrantless
2 73
searches of personal property.
An honest and straightforward reading of the Fourth Amendment and a distrust of post-hocjudicial evaluations of police decisions
suggest that the best way to protect personal property is to erect
strong barriers against warrantless searches instead of deferring to
such intrusions as permitted by Acevedo and Ross. 274 This would
place a premium on compliance with the warrant requirements,
rather than on police ignorance, which comports with the true intent of the Framers.
Similarly, arguing that Carroll and its progeny permit very extensive searches of automobiles does not bolster the reasoning of
Acevedo. Certainly, the search of the bag in Acevedo "intrude[d] far
less on individual privacy than [did] the incursion sanctioned long
ago in Carroll."27 5 But how does this point help resolve the underlying issue in Acevedo-should the Warrant Clause apply to personal
property?
The Carroll Court actually endorsed the warrant preference
rule, although based on the facts it found that the exigencies of the
moment justified an exception. 27 6 Carroll, of course, never reached
the question of whether the police could search closed containers
without a warrant. The Court simply assumed that once it was
proper to begin a search of a vehicle, a very broad search would be
permissible.
This sort of reliance on precedent can only create-mischief for
the Court. The issue in Acevedo was not whether the police could
tear up the seats or open the trunk of Acevedo's car, but whether
they could search a private container without a warrant even though
the container could easily be brought under their control unlike a
bulky car. Close adherence to the facts would have resulted in less
temptation to emphasize the ease and convenience for officers in
conducting warrantless searches. As Justice Blackmun has previously warned, members of the Court tread on thin judicial ice when
273
See Acevedo, III S. Ct. at 1992-93 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the dissent in Acevedo that "it is anomalous for a briefcase to be protected by the
.general requirement' of a prior warrant when it is being carried along the street, but for
that same briefcase to become unprotected as soon as it is carried into an automobile.").
274
See Lewis Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise of a PublicExemption to
the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 375, 405 (1986) ("There is absolutely
no greater reason to conduct a warrantless search of a container seized from an automobile than there is a container seized from any [other] location.").
275 Acevedo, Il1 S. Ct. at 1989.
276 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1925).
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their personal predilections control their constitutional reasoning
2 77
and divert them from the cold, hard facts of a particular case.
More attention to the facts and the specific issue at hand would
have served Fourth Amendment interests better. Those interests include the right of all persons to expect some modicum of security in
their personal items while traveling the nation's roads. After
Acevedo, however,
[a] closed paper bag, a tool box, a knapsack, asuitcase, and an
attache case can alike be searched without the protection of the
judgment of a neutral magistrate, based only on the rarely disturbed decision of a police officer that he has probable cause to
278
search for contraband in the vehicle.
Why should the public worry about warrantless searches of containers found inside of automobiles? Because the regime sanctioned in Acevedo stands at odds with a fundamental premise of the
Fourth Amendment: society should not trust police officers to decide for themselves when to invade personal property unless it is
impractical to obtain a warrant. Allowing officers to bypass this judicial process is dangerous because "the right to be secure against
searches and seizures is one of the most difficult to protect. Since
the officers are themselves the chief invaders, there is no enforce27 9
ment outside of court."
When reasonableness is the center of attention and someone
else's bags are the subject of the Oolice examination, the analysis
loses sight of this fundamental premise. The Court's facile reasoning, however, should not mislead the public. While it is hard to
sympathize with a drug-runner like Acevedo, remember that the police stop and suspect many individuals. Ignoring or discounting a
warrantless search against Acevedo is perilous. The search against
Acevedo today may be used against others--even ourselvestomorrow.28 0
Nor does it suffice to say that because" 'the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the property, [it is acceptable to]
assume that a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overIt seems to me that whenever, as here, courts fail to concentrate on the
facts of a case, these predilections inevitably surface, no longer held in
check by the "discipline" of the facts, and shape, more than they ever
should and even to an extent unknown to the judges themselves, any
legal standard that is then articulated.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 734 n.3 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
278
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 842 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
279 Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
280 "So a search against Brinegar's car must be regarded as a search of the car of
Everyman." Id.
277
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whelming majority of cases.' "281 Searches conducted without warrant have been universally condemned "'notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause ....
"282 Judicial authorization prior to a search of personal property upholds the values of
individual freedom and personal security over police authority to
search and seize without a warrant.
Justice Marshall believed in these values. Regrettably, the current Court's jurisprudence is out of step with his conception of the
Fourth Amendment. This new brand of constitutional theory, in its
unending march of "reasonableness," is likely to continue eroding
28 3
Fourth Amendment freedoms.
D.

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirements: Are They Really
"Jealously" 284 Guarded by the Court?

Not too long ago the Court declared that "it is a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' "285 Today, such pronouncements from the Court are meaningless. indeed, "the
'warrant requirement' ha[s] become so riddled with exceptions that
it [i]s basically unrecognizable." 2 8 6 How did this happen? Can anything prevent further erosion of Fourth Amendment principles?
281 Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1989 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 770
(1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
[A] warrant would be routinely forthcoming in the vast majority of situations where the property has been seized in conjunction with the valid
arrest of a person in a public place. I therefore doubt that requiring the
authorities to go through the formality of obtaining a warrant in this situation would have much practical effect in protecting Fourth Amendment
values. (footnote omitted)[;]
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 20 (1977).
282 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (quoting Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)).
283 See Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1994 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (urging
reversal:
not because a closed container carried inside a car becomes subject to the
.automobile' exception to the general warrant requirement, but because
the search of a closed container, outside a privately owned building, with
probable cause to believe that the container contains contraband ....
is
not one of those searches whose Fourth Amendment reasonableness depends upon a warrant. (emphasis added)).
284 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
285 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnotes omitted)).
286 Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). For a list of exceptions, see Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MicH. L. REv.
1468, 1473-74 (1985).
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And why does it matter that the Court no longer takes the warrant
requirements seriously?
Under the Court's reasonableness model, exceptions to the
Warrant Clause have swallowed the general rule. Justice Marshall
responded to this trend by reminding his colleagues that it "is the
role of the judiciary, not of police officers, to delimit the scope of
exceptions to the warrant requirement. ' 28 7 But why should the judiciary, and not the police, guarantee a narrow application of the
exceptions to the warrant requirements? Why should the average
person worry if the exceptions to the warrant requirement are further expanded? The best way to answer these questions, as Justice
Marshall remarked in a different context, is to examine "some
cases." 2 88
1. Justice Marshall and Terry v. Ohio: DidJustice Marshall Fail
to Protect the Fourth Amendment?
Justice Marshall has been correctly portrayed as a champion of
the Bill of Rights and civil rights law. 28 9 Although he disfavored
exceptions to the warrant requirements, 29 0 Justice Marshall's approval of the "stop and frisk" exception has always been intriguing.

The "stop and frisk" rule, inaugurated in Terry v.

Ohio, 2 9 '

created a

narrow exception to the requirement that the police have probable
cause before seizing and searching an individual. Terry ruled that
when a police officer confronts a person who he believes is armed
and dangerous, the officer is permitted to conduct a limited frisk of
that person in order to discover weapons that might be used against
him.

29 2

287 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
288 HearingsBefore The Comm. on theJudiciary United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First
Session on Nomination of ThurgoodMarshall, of New York, to be an AssociateJustice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 90th CONG., 1st Sess. 52 (1967).
f
289 See, e.g., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 6 HLv.BLACKLET R J. 1 (1989);
Dedicated to Mr.Justice Thurgood Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, 6 BLACK L.J. 1

(1978).
290 See Charles J. Ogletree, Justice Marshall's CriminalJusticeJurisprudence: 'The Right
Thing To Do, The Right Time To Do It, The Right Man and The Right Place,' 6 Ht- v. BLACKLErrERJ. 111, 113 (1989) (Marshall's fourth amendment opinions "focus upon the risk

of using... formal categories to create exceptions to the warrant requirement since he
believes that the exceptions chip away at the warrant requirement's fabric thus making it
ineffective in protecting individuals." (footnote omitted)).
291
392 U.S. 1 (1968).

292 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Despite its narrow holding, the Teny doctrine was subsequently applied in cases which had no connection with the reasoning that originally
prompted the Court to create the exception in the first place-namely, protecting police
officers who confront potentially dangerous persons. Indeed, the so-called Terry exception has been converted into a doctrinal tool to assess searches and seizures of people,
homes, and effects by "a balancing process in which the judicial thumb [is] planted
firmly on the law enforcement side of the scales." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
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When Terry was decided in 1968, Justice Marshall joined the
Court's opinion because he believed the Court was "not watering
down rights, but [was] hesitantly and cautiously striking a necessary
balance between the rights of American citizens to be free from government intrusion into their privacy and their government's urgent
need for a narrow exception to the warrant requirement[s]." 293 It
soon became clear, however, that the Court could not withstand the
pressure to widen the loophole created in Terry. Eventually, the
2 95 lugCourt sanctioned searches and seizures of people, 294 cars,
gage, 29 6 and homes 2 9 7 in contexts that had no nexus with the origi-

nal rationale of Terry: Justice Marshall generally opposed extension
of the Terry exception. In two cases, however, he joined the Court's
ruling upholding police intrusions that relied upon the reasoning
first articulated in Terry. 2 9 8 Justice Marshall's acceptance of the
Court's rationale in these cases is intriguing, given his otherwise
broad interpretation of Fourth Amendment freedoms.
In the first case, Floridav. Royer, 29 9 a plurality of the Court (including Justice Marshall) accepted the view that a person was not
seized under the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement agents
accosted him in an airport concourse and asked to see his identification and airline ticket. 30 0 This conclusion was accepted even in
cases where agents identify themselves as police officials 30 ' and do
not expressly inform a person of their right to decline coopera720 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Marshall did oppose extending
the Terry doctrine in subsequent cases, arguably he and the otherJustices who joined the
Court's ruling should have foreseen the great harm to Fourth Amendment freedom
caused by Terry and never yielded to the "hydraulic pressures" that caused the Court to
"give the police the upper hand." Terry, 392 U.S. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
293
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 161-62 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
294
See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.
221 (1985); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1 (1989).
295
See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
296
See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
297 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
298 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983).
299 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
300 460 U.S. at 497 (plurality opinion). It might be more accurate to say that a majority of the Justices accepted the notion that no seizure occurs when police officials approach a person and ask to see identification. In addition to the fourJustices who joined
Justice White's statement noted above, dissenting Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist,
O'Connor, and ChiefJustice Burger, expressed agreement with the plurality's "seizure"
standard. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 514 (Blackmun, J, dissenting); id. at 523 n.3 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). Only Justice Brennan opposed the plurality's seizure standard. See 460
U.S. at 511-512 (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
301 Royer, 460 U.S. at 497.
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tion.302 Royer also ruled that a person could be seized for investigation in situations that do not pose an immediate threat of danger,
provided there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.3 0 3 One
wonders why Justice Marshall would agree with either of these

positions.
On the first point, Justice Marshall was an unlikely believer in
the fictional quality of the Court's conclusion that a reasonable person would feel free to ignore or walk away from law enforcement
officials who approach and ask for identification 3 0 4 As Justice Marshall noted in a different context, Fourth Amendment questions are
best resolved when there is "a realistic assessment of the nature of
the interchange between citizens and the police."3 0 5 If the Court
had undertaken a "realistic assessment" of the dynamics surrounding the scene when an officer accosts and questions a person about
possible criminal behavior, it seems self-evident that no reasonable
306
person would feel free to disregard the police.
On the second issue in Royer-extending the Terry exception to
investigative detentions of individuals where the only government
302 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.. 544, 555 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("Our
conclusion that no seizure occurred is not affected by the fact that the respondent was
not expressly told by the agents that she was free to decline to cooperate with their
inquiry, for the voluntariness of her response does not depend upon her having been so
informed.").
303 460 U.S. at 498-99 (plurality opinion); id. at 513-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(police had reasonable suspicion to detain Royer; given the minimally intrusive nature of
the detention, probable cause was not needed to support the seizure); id. at 523-25
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (agents had at least reasonable suspicion to detain Royer).
304 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Marshall, the Great Dissenter, N.Y. TiMEs, June 29, 1991,
at L23 ("What marked [his opinions] was a candor that cut through legal abstractions to
the social reality and human suffering underneath."); Glen M. Darbyshire, Clerkingfor
Justice Marshall, 77 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 48, 50. ("Marshall judged from an instinct
honed by his experience as a lawyer and not from an encyclopedic knowledge of legal
technicalities ....He never allowed academic theories to restrict his consideration of
bare facts, and his questions from the bench were often brutally blunt."); Kathlebn M.
Sullivan, The CandorofJustice Marshall, 6 HAtv. BLACMErR J. 83, 89 (1989):
Justice Marshall's candor about the 'world out there' has been one of the
many great features of his tenure on the Court. He has dared both to say
what 'everyone knows' but would rather forget, and to say what not everyone knows because of the partiality of their experience of the world.
(footnotes omitted, quotations omitted); Irving R. Kaufman, Thurgood MarshaIL-A Tribute
From A Former Colleague, 6 BLACK LJ. 23, 25 (1978):
As a judge he wrote for the people.... He possessed an instinct for the
critical fact, the gut issue, born of his exquisite sense of the practical. This
gift was often cloaked in a witty aside: "There's a very practical way to
find out whether a confession has been coerced: ask how big was the
cop?".
305 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 289 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
306 "[I]f the ultimate issue is perceived as being whether the suspect 'would feel free
to walk away,' then virtually all police-citizen encounters must in fact be deemed to involve a Fourth Amendment seizure." LAFAvE, supra note 232, at 411 (footnotes
omitted).

790

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:723

interest at stake is a generalized interest in law enforcement--one
would have thought that Justice Marshall would have opposed this
enlargement of the Terry exception. After all, the interest at stake in
Royer-the government's ordinary interest in investigating and detecting would-be criminals-was a far cry from the compelling concerns that moved the Court in Teny'. ° 7 While this interest is
obviously important, the Fourth Amendment was written and
designed to override this precise government interest unless certain
safeguards were satisfied. As Justice Marshall observed: The Justices have no commission "to restrike that balance because of their
own views of the needs of law enforcement.", 0 8 It is possible, however, that Justice Marshall's well-known distaste for drug pushers
caused him to back away in this particular case from his otherwise
staunch support of Fourth Amendment freedoms.
In the second case, Michigan v. Chesternut,30 9 Justice Marshall's
acceptance of the Court's opinion is even more baffling. ChIsternut
held that an "investigatory pursuit" of a person who runs at the
sight of a police car did not amount to a seizure.3 10 No seizure occurred, according to the Court, because no reasonable .person
would have believed that the police chase was "an attempt to cap3 11
ture or otherwise intrude upon [their] freedom of movement.
The Court's result in Chesternut is deeply disturbing.3 1 2 That a
majority of the Court would rule against Chesternut is not surpris307
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (investigative detention near border permissible in light of unique government need to stem flow of
illegal immigration and lack of practical enforcement alternatives); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972) (officer search of suspect for possible gun was intended to
protect officer's safety); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (protective frisk permissible to
protect safety of investigating officer). In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981),
the Court ruled that a warrant to search a home for contraband authorized the detention
of occupants of that home while a proper search is conducted. Unlike Terry, Williams,
and Brignoni-Ponce, there was no special government interest justifying this detention.
Justice Marshall joined Justice Stewart's dissent in Summers because the detention endorsed in Summers was "justified by no... special governmental interest or law enforcement need." 452 U.S. at 708 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
308 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
309
486 U.S. 567 (1988).
310
In Chesternut, four police officers in a marked patrol car observed Chesternut talking with another individual. When Chesternut saw the patrol car approaching, he ran.
The officers followed and after the "cruiser quickly caught up with [Chesternut] and
drove alongside him for a short distance," Chesternut discarded items that turned out to
be illegal narcotics. 486 U.S. at 569.
311 Id. at 575. The Court did concede that the police chase could be "somewhat
intimidating," but it "was not 'so intimidating' that [Chesternut] could reasonably have
believed that he was not so free to disregard the police presence and go about his business." Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 576 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)).
312
See Maclin, supra note 105, at 1307 ("Chesternut reflects the current Court's unwillingness or inability to empathize with those citizens who are subjected to police scru-
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ing.3 13 But why would Justice Marshall join this opinion? His acceptance of the result in Chesternut seems inconsistent with his
general views on the reach of the Fourth Amendment. One can only
speculate that Justice Marshall believed a favorable ruling for Chesternut would call into question whether police officers are free to
"follow" or monitor individuals on the street without triggering
Fourth Ameridment scrutiny.
2.

United States v. Robinson: Is Reasonabeness a Valid
Exception to the Warrant Requirements?

The Court's reasonableness model has always been adverse to
close scrutiny of searches that appear to be consistent with regular
police procedures. For example, in United States v. Robinson,31 4 the
Court refused to scrutinize the justifications for a full search of a
person arrested for a minor traffic violation. The police searched a
315
cigarette packet found during a search of Robinson's person.
The Court stated that the secondary search of the cigarette packet
was normal procedure, a mere variation of the traditional exception
allowing warrantless searches incident to arrest. The decision tQ
search was "a quick ad hocjudgment. ' 3 16 Because a custodial arrest
is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment, "a search
317
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."
Justice Marshall argued that the majority's aversion in scrutinizing police decisions to search was "inconsistent with the very function of the Amendment-to ensure that the quick ad hoc judgments
of police officers are subject to review and control by the judiciary."3 18 Even assuming the reasonableness of removing the cigarette package from Robinson's coat to search for a weapon, no
objective justification existed for a warrantless search of the package
tiny.... Perhaps the result in Chesternut is due to the fact that none of the Justices has
been recently chased down public streets by a police car.").
313 Cf. "Arguments Before The Court," 56 U.S.L.W. 3599, 3600 (Mar. 8, 1988):
Is "pursue" any different from "follow," Chief Justice Rehnquist inquired. The reason I ask, he said, is that our cases hold that a police [sic]
can "follow" a person on the public street all day long without implicating the Fourth Amendment.
314 414 U.S. 218 (1973). In Robinson, an officer pulled Robinson's car over and arrested him for a motor vehicle offense. After the arrest and in accordance with police
procedure, the officer conducted a full search of Robinson's person. During this search,
the officer felt an object in Robinson's pocket. The officer reached inside and removed a
"crumpled up cigarette package." The officer opened the package and found illegal
narcotics inside. I&. at 223.
315
316
317

Id

318

Id. at 242 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

I
Id.

at 235.
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itself.3 1 9 In fact, the only explanation for searching the package was
police curiosity about its contents.
Justice Marshall also disagreed with the Court's inference that
because the arrest was reasonable, a full search incident to that
arrest "requires no additional justification."3 20 The attractiveness
of Robinson's reasonableness formula fades after considering its potential application in the real world. How would a business traveler,
lawfully arrested for driving without a license, react if police opened
a wallet or purse, removed its contents, and examined them closely?
Better yet,
suppose a lawyer lawfully arrested for a traffic offense is found to
have a sealed envelope on his person. Would it be permissible for
the arresting officer to tear open the envelope in order to make
sure that it did not contain a clandestine weapon-perhaps a pin
3 21
or a razor blade?
The Robinson majority never addresses these concerns. It simply asserts that a full search of an arrestee "is not only an exception
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a
'reasonable' search under that Amendment." 3 22 The Court's reasoning may satisfy those who have full confidence that police officers
will not undertake the type of searches that troubled Justice Marshall. Robinson's naked assertion that authority to arrest justifies a
search of a private container that poses no danger to the officer, or
to the integrity of the arrest, is hard to square with traditional
Fourth Amendment principles.3 23 For those who thought the
Fourth Amendment provided a check against this sort of unfettered
police discretion, they can only hope that Justice Marshall's hypotheticals never come true for them.
3.

The Consent Exception: Has ConstitutionalPrinciple Been
Sacrificedfor Police Convenience?

Another traditional exception to the warrant requirements is a
search conducted pursuant to a person's consent. In Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte,32 4 the Court addressed the definition of consent under
the Fourth Amendment. It held that a warrantless search is valid
319
320
321
322
323

Id

at 255-56.

Id at 235.
Id. at 257-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Id. at 235.

See Davies, supra note 109, at 43 n. 169 ("Justice Rehnquist's rationale for Robinson is strange. Authority alone does not constitute reasonableness. If authority alone
can make a search constitutional, regardless of an evaluation of cause for the search,
then what is really being asserted is that the arrested person has lost any reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Katz formulation.").
324
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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where the state shows "consent was in fact voluntarily given, and
not the result of duress or coercion."3 25 The voluntariness of the
consent is "determined from all the circumstances, and while the
subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into
account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. 3' 26
Justice Marshall could never square the reasoning in Bustamonte
with constitutional principle nor common sense. In his view, Bustamonte was not a case about coercion, as the majority claimed, but
about consent, "a mechanism by which substantive requirements,
otherwise applicable, are avoided. '3 27 The substantive requirement
at stake was the rule that "searches be conducted only after evidence
justifying them has been submitted to an impartial magistrate for a
determination of probable cause."'3 28
Justice Marshall reminded the majority that consent searches
are not allowed because of exigent police interests.3 29 In fact, no
such compelling needs exist because consent searches usually involve an absence of probable cause. Instead, consent is a recognized exception allowing 'citizens "to choose whether or not they
wish to exercise their constitutional rights. 3 3 0
Bustamonte also defies common sense. Because a consent search
obviously constitutes relinquishment of a constitutional right, why
would an individual make a valid decision without knowledge of the
other available choices? "If consent to search means that a person
has chosen to forgo his right to exclude the police from the place
they seek to search, it follows that his consent cannot be considered
a meaningful choice unless he knew that he could in fact exclude the
33

police." '
Why did the majority reject Justice Marshall's straightforward
approach? First, the Court claimed that the requirement of a
"knowing" and "intelligent" waiver is only applicable to constitutional liberties that implicate the fairness of a criminal trial itself.332
The freedoms protected by the Fourth Amendment "have nothing
Idt at 248.
Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
Id at 282 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In fact, Bustamonte is another example of the
Court framing the issue to reach the result desired. As Professor LaFave has noted,
Bustamonte's assertion that the "precise question in this case... is what must the state
prove to demonstrate that a consent was 'voluntarily' given," id at 223, is "grossly misleading, and inevitably leads to only one conclusion." 3 LAFAvE, supra note 232,
§ 8.1(a). at 152.
328 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 282 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
329 I at 282-83.
330 Id. at 283.
331 Id. at 284-85.
332 It at 241-42.
325
326
327
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whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a
criminal trial." 33 3 In addition, the Court asserted-without proof-

that it was "thoroughly impractical" 3 3 4 to warn a person of his right
to refuse a police search.3 3 5 Apparently, such a warning undermines
what the Court described as the "legitimate need for [consent]
33 6
searches."
When the Court speaks about the "impracticality" of restricting
police intrusions or the "legitimate need" for police intrusions, it
inevitably subordinates Fourth Amendment freedoms to the reasonableness of the government's actions. In the context of consent
searches, the Court's concern amounts to no more than "the continued ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so
as to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by rely3 3s 7
ing only on the knowing xelinquishment of constitutional rights.
The majority's analysis is unfair to the average citizen. The
Court's crabbed definition of consent denies a person the knowl3 38
edge that he or she has a right to refuse a police officer's request.
The Court's analysis ignores the reality of a typical police confrontation. A police confrontation is unlike a "friendly chat" between two
neighbors. In most cases, "consent is ordinarily given as acquiescence in an implicit claim of authority to search."3 3 9 Those who
have observed interactions between the police and the citizenry
l at 242.
Id at 231. Justice Stewart argued that consent searches are "part of the standard
investigatory techniques of law enforcement." Ide at 232. The need for such searches
"may develop quickly." Id. Accordingly, consent searches "are a far cry from the structured atmosphere of a trial where, assisted by counsel if he chooses, a defendant is informed of his trial rights." Id. at 232.
35
It at 227-28 (explaining the benefits of consent searches: first, tangible evidence
may be revealed that could serve as the basis for a prosecution, thus providing assurance
that others, innocent of criminal conduct, will not be prosecuted; second, if a search is
undertaken and proves fruitless, it will save the need for an arrest).
336
Id. at 227.
337
Id at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
338
The Court presumably draws a distinction between a police "request" for permission to search and a "demand" that such a search be allowed. Cf. Marjorie E. Murphy, Encounters of a Brief Kind: On Arbitrarinessand Police Demandsfor Identification, 1986
ARIz. ST. L.J. 207, 217 n.86. To the person in the street, however, the distinction between a police "request" and "demand" is likely to be illusory. See Albert Reiss, Jr.,
333

334

"Police Brutality",in POLICE BEHAVIOR 292-93 (Richard Lundman ed., 1980):

339

Open defiance of police authority, however, is what the policeman defines as his authority, not necessarily "official" authority.... [I]t is still of
interest to know what a policeman sees as defiance. Often he seems
threatened by a simple refusal to acquiesce to his own authority. A policeman beat a handcuffed offender because, when told to sit, the offender did not sit down. One Negro woman was soundly slapped for her
refusal to approach the police car and identify herself.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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share Justice Marshall's assessment of the atmosphere surrounding
3 40
police-citizen encounters.
Bustamonte is also an unprincipled decision. It sacrifices Fourth
Amendment rights for an alleged, but unproven, need for law enforcement practicality and police convenience. If this result is the
product of a balancing analysis,3 41 the balance certainly seems distorted. As Justice Marshall retorted, "[t]he Framers of the Fourth
Amendment struck the balance against this sort of convenience and
in favor of certain basic civil rights. It is not for this Court to
restrike that balance because of its own views of the needs of law
'3 4 2
enforcement officers."
Today Justice Marshall's conception of the consent exception
stands even further removed from the Court's current applica-

340 See generally BROWN, supra note 33, at 176 (noting that in most field interrogations
the police were "easily convinced that nothing was wrong. The exception to this is when
the person challenges their authority, their right to stop and ask them questions. The
question, 'what right do you have to question me' is not construed as rightful indignation but as implicit guilt."); RuaINsrEN, supra note 113, at 269; id at 80-81 ("Commonly,
however, police invoke the myth of consent-the idea that a suspect waives his rights if
he doesn't actively assert them-to justify their exercise of authority over the liberty of
some person who is not independently motivated to cooperate.");JERoME H. SKOLNICK,
JUSTICE WrrHouT TRIAL 232-33 (1975):
Mhe policeman not only perceives possible criminality according to the
symbolic status of the suspect; he also develops a stake in organized patterns of enforcement. To the extent that a suspect is seen as interfering
with such arrangements, the policeman will respond negatively to him.
On the other hand, the 'cooperative' suspect, that is, one who contributes
to the smooth operation of the enforcement pattern, will be rewarded[;]
UVILLER, supra note 6, at 16 ("Police officers relish respect and, in many small ways,
insist on a show of deference from the ordinary folk among whom they work.... In
virtually every encounter I have witnessed, the response of the person approached was
docile, compliant, and respectful."):
When [an officer is] on patrol, people feel free to approach him for advice
or help, but if he approaches them, there are inevitably tensions and
unease that cannot be masked, even if the encounter is not marked by
displays of incivility. The person approached cannot know what the policeman wants of him, and the policeman, if he is suspicious of someone,
does not know whether his feelings are accurate. Every encounter the
policeman has in public, except when he is called to aid someone, must
begin with an abridgment of personal freedom.
341
"'Necessity,' real or apparent, seems to be the mother of interest-balancing."
Kamisar, supra note 7, at 651.
342 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tion.3 43 For example, in Illinois v. Rodriguez,3 44 the state argued that
the Fourth Amendment does not bar a warrantless entry into a
home when the police mistakenly believe that a third party has authority to permit their entry. The Court found this argument consistent with the consent exception. It held that a warrantless entry is
valid when police reasonably believe a third party possesses common authority over the premises, even though that party in fact has
s45
no such authority.
In explaining the Court's holding, Justice Scalia rejected Rodriguez' claim that allowing a reasonable belief of common authority to
permit a warrantless entry into a home would amount to a vicarious
waiver of Fourth Amendment riglts. Taking a cue from Bustamonte,
Justice Scalia distinguished between the "trial rights that derive"
from a Fourth Amendment violation and the "nature of" the constitutional guarantee itself.3 4 6 Under this dichotomy, Rodriguez' trial
rights are straightforward: "[N]o evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment will be introduced at his trial unless he
347
consents."
Justice Scalia defined the substantive nature of what the Fourth
Amendment guarantees Rodriguez more subtly. The Fourth
Amendment does not guarantee Rodriguez that "no,government
search of his house will occur unless he consents."3 48 It only ensures that if a search occurs, it will not be "unreasonable." 3 4 9 Mistaken reliance by police on a third party's authority to consent, if
reasonable, will pass constitutional muster. Assessing a person's authority to consent to a search of another's residence, "is the sort of
343

See, e.g., Florida v.Jimeno, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1805 (1991) (Marshall,J., dissenting):

Because an individual's expectation of privacy in a container is distinct
from, and far greater than, his expectation of privacy in the interior of his
car, it follows that an individual's consent to a search of the interior of his
car cannot necessarily be understood as extending to containers in the
car[;]
Zeigler v. Florida, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (request for police assistance immediately after a shooting on premises does not
constitute consent to unlimited 12 day search of the premises); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 456-58 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (where suspect is in police custody, government "must show that the suspect knew he was not obligated to consent to
the search"); cf David Levell W. v. California, 449 U.S. 1043, 1047 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Court would be "hard pressed" to find that parent
has the authority to waive her teenage child's right under the Fourth Amendment to be
free from unreasonable seizures by the police). For an excellent critique of the Court's
recent decision injimeno, see Green, supra note 109, at 378-86.
344 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
345 Id. at 2798-2800.
346 Id. at 2798.
347 Id. at 2799.
348 Id.
349 Id.
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recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must
be expected to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment
"
requires is that they answer it reasonably. "350
The Court's analysis in Rodriguez has many flaws. 3 5 ' First, if
traditional reasonableness is the touchstone for assessing the Fourth
Amendment, the Court's past pronouncements that warrantless
searches of a home are per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances should have some relevance when deciding the constitutionality of the search of Rodriguez' home. As Justice Marshall said:
"The baseline for the reasonableness of a search or seizure in the
home is the presence of a warrant. 3 5 2 In Rodriguez, the police had
no warrant, and exigent circumstances did not exist. Yet, the Court
still concluded that the intrusion in Rodriguez' home was
constitutional.
Moreover, the Court's construction of the consent exceptionwhatever search does occur must be reasonable-typifies what happens to Fourth Amendment analysis when a reasonableness theory
replaces the traditional requirements of the Warrant Clause. The
exceptions swallow the nile. Justice Scalia's opinion provides no
criteria for determining why the intrusion into Rodriguez' home was
-constitutional. He simply states that the police action was "reasonable," "responsible," and "understandable" under the circumstances.3 5 3 Thus, Rodriguez authorizes a warrantless police invasion
of a person's home without any requirement of probable cause or
emergency, based solely on the "seeming consent" of a third party.
When the Supreme Court takes such a meager view of Fourth
Amendment protection of the home, should we be surprised when
other members of the judiciary express open disenchantment with
the message that is coming from the High Court?3 54
Prior to the Court's return to the rule of reasonableness, the
established Fourth Amendment principle was that "no amount of
Id, at 2800.
Professor Davies has provided a powerful critique of Rodriguez. See Davies, supra
note 109.
352
Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2802 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
353
See Davies, supra note 109, at 64, (quoting Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2800).
354
See Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 196 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2014 (1991):
I am not as sanguine as Judge Trott about the recent curtailments of
fourth amendment rights. "Fine Tuning" is not in my view what has
been occurring. "Weakening," "eroding" or even "gutting" would be a
more accurate description. Nor do I agree that we need more debate
concerning the fourth amendment. What we need is a greater sense of
commitment to the fundamental constitutional principles it representsand a resolve not to sacrifice those principles in our eagerness to combat
illicit drugs, whether that eagerness stems from legitimate concerns or
merely from political expendiency.
350
351
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probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure [within a
home] absent 'exigent circumstances.' ,,355 Even in cases where an
officer had incontrovertible evidence that contraband was inside,
"plain view" of that evidence could not justify a warrantless entry.356 Why would the Court enforce such a rule? Because when
officers have time to seek a magistrate's approval for a search, the
Fourth Amendment cannot tolerate a planned intrusion into a
35 7
home.
Should similar reasoning apply where the police claim consent
from a third party for a search? Certainly Rodriguez' home is entitled to the same high degree of protection under the Constitution.
If "no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless"3 58 police
intrusion into a home under the plain view exception, why should
the police be free to conduct a warrantless search under the consent
exception where there is neither probable cause nor exigency justifying the search? Even assuming that the third party in Rodriguez
had the authority to consent to a search, 359 police reliance upon her
decision is "a sorry and wholly inadequate substitute for the protections which inhere in a judicially granted warrant. It is inconceivable that a search conducted without a warrant can give more
3' 6 °
authority than a search conducted with a warrant.
By ignoring the warrant requirements and emphasizing the reasonableness of police conduct, the Court distorts the Fourth
Amendment claims presented in Rodriguez. No one credibly argues
that the police must always be "factually correct" 3 6 ' for their actions
to be upheld under the Fourth Amendment. Yet the Court focuses
on this nonissue, drawing our attention away from the central purpose of the warrant requirements-to assure that a neutral magistrate determines before the entry that an adequate legal basis exists
for making a search, unless compelling reasons exist that prevent
obtaining such prior approval.
When the focus shifts from the aims of the Warrant Clause to a
general requirement of reasonableness, a malleable standard appears attractive.3 6 2 By following this model in Rodriguez, however,
the Court forgets that no magistrate authorized the entry and
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971) (plurality opinion).
Id. "Plain view" is another traditional exception to the warrant requirement. Id
357
Id (citations omitted).
358
Id.
359 Of course, the third party who lead the police to Rodriguez' home had no such
authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2798 (1990).
360
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 187 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
361
Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2799.
362
As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure,
determination of consent to enter must 'be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... war355

356
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search, no probable cause justified the intrusion, and no exigency
existed which required prompt police action. The only support for
the entry and search was the mistaken belief of the officers that a
third party had the authority to permit their entry. The Court's approach gives the consent exception more constitutional weight than
it can bear, and, once again, the theory of reasonableness has allowed another exception to the warrant requirements to be "en3 63
throned into the rule."
III
DISTRUST OF POLICE POWER

Many ofJustice Marshall's Fourth Amendment opinions show a
healthy distrust of police power and a realistic sense of the dynamics
involved in police-citizen confrontations. However, I doubt that
Justice Marshall has any inherent distrust or dislike for law enforcement officials. After all, he was once the chief litigator for the
United States before the Supreme Court, where he argued for the
government in a number of criminal procedure cases.3 64 Instead, I
suspect the source ofJustice Marshall's distrust of police power has
more subtle origins. In several of his opinions, Justice Marshall has
urged the Court to undertake "a realistic assessment of the nature
of the interchange between citizens and the police."3 65 What separated Justice Marshall from other members of the Court was his "citizen perspective." His Fourth Amendment opinions display a
"candor that cut through legal abstractions to the social reality" 3 66
that exists on the street. He scrutinizes police claims of necessity
and practicality, instead of assuming that the police are always a
"friend."
Police officials and their proponents have traditionally resisted
oversight and review of their discretionary actions. Because of this
resistance, politicians and citizens generally fail to closely examine
many police tactics, and many blindly trust the police. They claim
rant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the consenting party
had authority over the premises?
Rodrigrz, 110 S. Ct. at 2801 (quotations omitted).
363
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950) (Frankfirter, J., dissenting).
364
Williams, supra note 2, at 138. Justice Marshall also has two sons involved in law
enforcement, one a former prosecutor and the other a state trooper.
One commentator has said thatJustice Marshall's "criminal law opinions cannot be
properly described as either consistently liberal or conservative. Justice Marshall has
written opinions that can be characterized as both pro-government and pro-defendant.
Such titles, however, fail to describe adequately the broad and often conflicting prindplesJustice Marshall seeks to address in his criminal law opinions." Ogletree, supra note
290, at 1-12 (footnotes omitted).
365
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 289 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
366
Sullivan, supra note 304, at L23.
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that the demands of law enforcement require that the police not be
8 67
"handcuffed" by overly intrusive and technical rules.
The Fourth Amendment, however, stands for the principle that
official power that threatens liberty and personal security cannot be
left to the control of the police. When certain interests are implicated, the discretion of the police cannot be trusted. This is the
view espoused by Justice Marshall. It is not an "anti-police" position; it is a vision enshrined in the Constitution.
Florida v. Bostick 3 6 8 illustrates the diverse judicial perspectives
on police power andwhat role, if any, the Fourth Amendment plays
in checking that power. Bostick involved a police practice that some
state and federal judges have compared to the tactics employed by
fascist and totalitarian regimes of a bygone era-police randomly,
and without any suspicion, approaching passengers seated on a bus,
requesting to see their identification and tickets, and asking for consent to search their luggage. 6 9 The Bostick Court considered
whether this police practice-"working the buses"-constituted a
per se seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
370
Court held that it did not.

Bostick raised many troublesome questions,3 7 ' especially the issue of judicial trust of police authority. The result and reasoning in
Bostick illustrate the Court's excessive trust of police authority and
its indifference toward the dynamics of police-citizen encounters.
The Court's blind acceptance of police power produces distorted
standards, ignores the real world, and destroys Fourth Amendment
freedoms under the guise of law enforcement interests.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Bostick majority, begins by
confidently asserting that the Fourth Amendment would not have
been implicated if the police confrontation had occurred "before
367
See Barr, supra note 14 (statement of Phil Caruso that decisions of the Warren
Court had the effect of "handcuffing the police instead of turning them loose in the war
against drugs and against crime.").
368
111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
369
While the actual facts remain in dispute, the Court decided Bostick under the
following facts: Two police officers with badges and police insignia (one holding a recognizable gun pouch) boarded a bus bound from Miami to Atlanta during a stopover in
Fort Lauderdale. The officers, without any legitimate basis for doing so, approached
Bostick. They asked and received Bostick's ticket and identification. After these were
returned to him, the officers continued the confrontation and informed Bostick that they
were narcotics officers. They then requested consent to search his bags for drugs.
Although Bostick claimed that he was not informed of his right to refuse consent, and
stated that he did not consent to any search, the officers claimed otherwise. A search of
Bostick's luggage disclosed illegal narcotics. Id- at 2384-85.
370
Id. at 2389.
371
Professor LaFave has raised and discussed many of the problems in the Court's
reasoning. LaFave, supra note 15, at 743-53.
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Bostick boarded the bus or in the lobby of the bus terminal. 3' 7 2
Her certainty derives from the Court's previous declarations that
"th[is] sort of consensual" police confrontation in a public place implicates no Fourth Amendment interest. 373 Justice O'Connor then
argues that the Court's earlier pronouncements are just as applica3 74
ble even when the police confrontation takes place on a bus.
According to the Bostick Court, "the mere fact that Bostick did
not feel free to leave the bus" at the moment of the confrontation
did not mean that the police had seized him. 3 75 'Why not? Because
one cannot measure the substance of the Fourth Amendment right
in this context by asking whether Bostick was "free to leave." The
"free to leave" standard makes sense "[w]hen police attempt to
question a person who is walking down the street or through an airport lobby."'3 76 But for someone who is already seated on a bus and
"has no desire to leave, the degree to which a reasonable person
would feel that he or she could leave is not an accurate measure of
3' 7 7
the coercive effect of the encounter.
Although Bostick did not feel free to leave, the Court emphasized that his sensation was not due to the officers towering over
him. Rather, his feeling of confinement "was the natural result of
.his decision to take the bus; it says nothing about whether or not the
3 78
police conduct at issue was coercive."
The appropriate test for determining whether the police violated Bostick's Fourth Amendment rights is "whether a reasonable
person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter. '3 79 In other words, considering all the
facts surrounding the encounter, have the police communicated to a
reasonable person that he was "'not at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about his business?' ",380 This test, according to
the Court, is consistent with prior precedent and captures the essence of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits. The locus of the
confrontation is not determinative. Even persons seated on a' bus
38
may "decline an officer's request without fearing prosecution. " '
The fact that no reasonable person in Bostick's shoes would have
allowed the police to search his luggage containing illegal drugs is

378

Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386.
Id.
Id. at 2389.
Id. at 2387.
Id.
Id.
Id.

379

Id.

380
381

Id. (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)).
Il

372
373

374
375
376
377
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irrelevant. The so-called "reasonable person" the Court has in
3 8s2
mind "presupposes an innocent person.
Bostick shows how willing the Court is to subordinate Fourth
Amendment freedoms to the needs of police authority. Legal abstractions minimize coercive police tactics under the reasonableness
analysis. For example, the Court found it "particularly worth noting" that the officers "advised Bostick that he had the right to refuse
consent," and "at no time did the officers threaten Bostick with a
gun."3 8 3 The Court suggested that an officer carrying a zippered
pouch, recognizably containing a pistol, was the "equivalent of carrying a gun in a holster," and noted that no evidence indicated that
the gun was "ever removed from its pouch, pointed at Bostick, or
38 4
otherwise used in a threatening manner."
On the latter point--the issue of the officer carrying the gunthe Court's casual response is disturbing. As Justice Marshall notes
in his dissent, this sort of "display" by an officer "exerts significant
coercive pressure on the confronted citizen."3 8 5 The Court intimates that carrying a gun in this manner is no different from seeing
a holstered gun.3 8 6 But according to whom? Justice O'Connor?
Bostick? The average "reasonable person"?
Most persons are unaccustomed to seeing police officers handle
guns in this manner. Certainly a police officer gripping a loaded
weapon seldom confronts the average person in settings similar to
the cramped space inside a bus aisle. The Court's suggestion that
this sort of police confrontation is "a sufficiently routine part of
modern life"3 8 7 and that a targeted person will feel free to go about
his business as if nothing unusual is happening strains credibility.
Only a Court ready and willing to yield to the power of the police
could make such a claim.
382
383
384
385
386

Id. at 2388.
Id. at 2385.
Id.

Id. at 2393.
Of course, the record is unclear about the manner in which the officer, Detective
Joesph Nutt, was handling the gun pouch. The officers stated that Nutt's gun was carried
in a pouch in his hand. Bostick stated that
during part of the encounter Nutt had his hand on the gun, inside the
unzipped pouch. Nutt testified that he usually kept the pouch zipped,
acknowledging though that there 'have been many times I had a hand on
the firearm.' He could not recall whether he had had his hand directly on
the weapon in this instance.
Brief of Respondent at 3, n.2, Florida v. Bostick, I11 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
387
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 453 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Riley,
Justice O'Connor argued that a person cannot assert an expectation of privacy against a
police intrusion that "is a sufficiently routine part of modern life." Apparently, she believes that police drug agents gripping loaded weapons are also a sufficiently routine
part of modern life for bus passengers that their appearance in the back of a bus is no
cause for alarm.
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Similarly, the Court's notation that the police "advised Bostick
that he had the right to refuse consent" 388 adds little to the analysis
and only diverts attention from the main issue. If the question of
seizure ultimately turns on whether Bostick felt free to decline the
police requests or to terminate the encounter, why should it matter
whether the police advised Bostick of his right to refuse consent for
a search of his luggage? The Court has confused itself; the issue of
whether a seizure occurred is distinct and separate from the issue of
whether Bostick consented to the search. As Justice Marshall noted,
"[1f [Bostick] was unlawfully seized when the officers approached
him and initiated questioning, the resulting search was likewise unlawful no matter how well advised [Bostick] was of his right to refuse
it."389

Moreover, if the Court was serious about discussing the relevance. of a police warning for someone in Bostick's situation, it
should have paid attention to the dynamics involved in this type of
encounter. The type of police warning pertinent to this issue is not
one that comes after the police have affected the target with their
powerful presence, but a warning that informs a person of his right
to pre-empt the police strike before he becomes a target.
If police officers were truly interested in reducing the coercive
atmosphere of bus raids, they would warn all passengers of their
right to terminate the encounter before the officers approach and begin to question individual travellers. If a traveller knows that the
police have informed his fellow passengers of their right to resist
interrogation and a search, he might feel more secure in exercising
his own right, despite the possible delay in the bus departure. Unfortunately, the police are not likely to provide such a warning. Indeed, it is unrealistic to think members of a profession that
generally operate free of meaningful oversight 390 and whose very
role within society depends upon the use of coercion 3 9 ' will convey
388
389
390

Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2385.
See id at 2393 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also LaFave, supra note 15, at 752.
See SKOLNICK, supra note 340, at 14 ("Police work constitutes the most secluded

part of an already secluded system and therefore offers the greatest opportunity for
arbitrary behavior.").
391

See BROWN, supra note 33, at

4:

[C]oercion both defines the role of the police and lies behind or is instrumental in the accomplishment of most police functions. It is the use of
coercion that unites the otherwise disparate activities of the police; it is
present in both the act of enforcing the law and in that of peacekeeping.
This is not to say that the police always rely upon coercion; only that their
role is defined by the necessity of mediating or controlling situations
which require, as Egon Bittner has put it, "remedies that are non-negotiably coercible."
See generally Egon Bittner, The Police Charge, in POLICE BEHAVIOR, supra note 112, at 34.
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a message that significantly undermines the mission society expects

them to perform.
That Bostick was advised he could refuse a search comes too
late in the encounter to make a difference. But why does the Court

accept a police tactic that the Florida Supreme Court, which is by no
means a court "soft" on criminals, compares with " 'Hider's Berlin,
. . . Stalin's Moscow, [and] white supremacist South Africa' ,?92
The Court's attitude reflects inherent trust in police procedures that
the Court itself deems reasonable and necessary. Therefore, the
source of the Court's conclusions is not the Fourth Amendment, but
393
its own values about law enforcement.
An example better illustrates this point. It was probably no accident that the police chose to accost Bostick after he was seated and
the bus was about to depart. The Court, however, casually asserts
that if the police confrontation "had taken place before Bostick
boarded the bus or in the lobby of the bus terminal, it would not rise
to the level of a seizure. ' ' 394 Though the Court does not view this
fact as important, it does seem significant that the police did not confront Bostick before he boarded the bus or in the bus lobby. One
plausible reason for their delay is that Bostick might have felt less
inhibited to leave in a relatively open space.
At the same time, the police decision to initiate their confrontation with Bostick in the back of the bus, rather than in the bus lobby,
enhances the coerciveness of the encounter. If police had accosted
Bostick in the lobby, they would have reduced the chances that the
encounter would disturb or inconvenience other travellers. However, by approaching Bostick inside the bus, the other passengers
would undoubtedly have noticed any refusal to cooperate with the
police, which could delay the departure of the bus. Surely the police
are aware of these nuances. The Court, however, chose to ignore
them and overlook the exploitation of Bostick's vulnerability once
inside the bus. This result stems from the Court's police-oriented
perspective.
Is this criticism too harsh? Have I substantiated the charge that
the Court gives too much weight to police interests and sharply cur392
Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1158 (Fla. 1989) (quoting State v. Kerwick, 512
So. 2d 347, 348-49 (Fla. 1987).
393
The idea that people feel free to ignore a police officer who has approached
them and requested identification is not empirically grounded. Rather, it is a "policy
decision that the police should be allowed to rely on the moral and instinctive pressure
to cooperate inherent in [police-citizen] encounters by not treating them as 'seizures' for
Fourth Amendment purposes." Yale Kamisar, Arrest, Search and Seizure, Prepared Remarks (Part I) at the U.S. Law Week's Tenth Annual Constitutional Law Conference, 16
(Sept. 10, 1988). See generally 3 LAFAvE., supra note 232, § 9.2(h), at 410-11.
394
Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991).
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tails Fourth Amendment rights to accomodate those interests? Consider the Court's construction of the constitutional standard
employed in Bostick. It ruled that the "free to leave" test, which had
been the controlling test for more than a decade, was not applicable
because it was fortuitous that Bostick was found in the cramped confines of a bus. Although, in my view, such confines would inevitably
lead one to feel that their freedom was restricted, particularly when
confronted by gun-toting drug agents, the Court instead stated that
any sense of confinement was "the natural result of [Bostick's] decision to take the bus."3 95 Thus, in the Court's view, Bostick had only
himself to blame for the police encounter that made him feel
confined.
This type of analysis, which I have previously called a "blame
the victim" approach to Fourth Amendment questions, 3 9 6 focuses
attention on a strawman. If the question of seizure ultimately turns
on whether the police displayed a show of authority that leads one
to believe that their freedom of action is restrained, why should it
matter that Bostick had voluntarily placed himself in confining
quarters? Suppose an individual enters an express elevator in the
lobby of a 100-floor building, and three police officers, hands inside
pouches containing loaded weapons, also enter the elevator just as
the doors close. Imagine also that as the elevator ascends uninterrupted to the 100th floor, the officers ask the individual to provide
identification and to account for his presence in the building. The
individual's feelings of restraint are not only reasonable, but also
justified. Nor is it likely that the individual would feel free to ignore
the officers or to terminate the encounter, at least not until the elevator stopped and the doors opened. If a court were to employ Bostick's "blame the victim" model to this incident, it would find that
any feelings of restraint that the individual experienced were "the
natural result of his decision to take the [elevator]" 3 9 7 rather than
walk the 100 flights to the top floor.
If a "blame the victim" analysis seems inappropriate and troublesome in the elevator hypothetical,3 9 8 it is equally so in Bostick. A
Court genuinely interested in assessing the coercive effects of a poid at 2387.
See Maclin, supra note 105, at 1305; Tracey Maclin, New York v. Class: A LittleNoticed Case With DisturbingImplications, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 34-38 (1987).
397 Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
398 1 thought of the elevator hypothetical described above before I learned that Justice Scalia would have no trouble finding a non-seizure in such an encounter. See Official
Transcript Proceedings Before The Supreme Court of the United States at 47-48, Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (1991); "Arguments Before the Court," 59 U.S.L.W. 3625,
3626-27 (Mar. 19, 1991) ("Scalia protested that counsel had already appeared to concede that there can be no seizure without official force or a threat of such force. What if
395
396
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lice encounter would not discuss relevant 99 points in a manner that
ignores the realities of police-citizen confrontations.
An example illustrates the rule's extreme results. Suppose that
an individual purchases a ticket on a crowded bus for a non-stop trip
from New York to Washington, D.C. As soon as the bus departs,
officers accost the individual and request permission to search his
bags for drugs. After he refuses, rather than leave him alone, the
officers sit down in the adjoining seats and stare at him for the remainder of the trip. Has he been seized? I think so. Not only
would the individual not feel free to leave, he would have nowhere
to go on a crowded bus. 40 0 Why should such police conduct implicate the Fourth Amendment? This sort of police presence jeoparthe encounter was on an elevator, he asked. I don't think you would say this is necessarily a seizure.").
IfJustice Scalia thinks no seizure would occur in this situation, if he believes that a
person is free to ignore the presence of armed law enforcement officials in the cramped
and confined space of an elevator, and if he interprets "the right to be let alone," Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting), which is guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment, as not to cover this encounter, then, indeed, all
persons
will suffer a coarsening of our national manners that ultimately give the
Fourth Amendment its content, and [all of us will be] subject to the administration of [government] officials whose respect for our privacy can
hardly be greater than the small respect they have been taught to have for
their own.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). I thank Professor Yale Kamisar for calling my attention to Justice Scalia's
remarks at oral argument.
399
It would be inaccurate to characterize Bostick's choice of travel as totally irrelevant in determining whether drugs agents "working the buses" jeopardize Fourth
Amendment principles. Indeed, Bostick's choice of travel had a direct correlation with
both the likelihood of his being seized, as well as the motivation behind this type of
police tactic.
Regarding the former point, the fact that Bostick chose to travel by inner-city bus or
train, rather than a commercial airplane had a direct bearing on the probability he would
be subject to this type of dragnet police procedure. While drug agents certainly employ
similar tactics inside and outside airport lobbies, see Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1
(1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), I have yet to read or hear about drug
agents accosting airplane passengers while they are seated and waiting for their plane to
depart. I suspect the potential "political backlash" from the middle and upper income
persons that normally patronize commercial airplanes prevents law enforcement officials
from undertaking these raids.
Concerning the latter point, Bostick's mode of travel probably also influenced the
police decision-making process.
By consciously deciding to single out persons who have undertaken interstate or intrastate travel, officers who conduct suspicionless, dragnet-style
sweeps put passengers- to the choice of cooperating or of exiting their
buses and possibly being stranded in unfamilar locations. It is exactly
because this 'choice' is no 'choice' at all that police engage this technique.
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2394 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
400 The Bush Administration, however, might disagree. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae 20, Florida v. Bostick, I11 S.Ct. 2382 (1991):
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dizes "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men." 4 0 ' If Bostick's analysis
is applied, however, his feeling of confinement is "the natural result
of his decision to take the bus; it says nothing about whether or not
the police conduct at issue was coercive." 40 2 A Court seriously interested in protecting liberty would not utilize an analysis so disdainful of Fourth Amendment values.
Although the "blame the victim" rule is only one component of
the Court's overall analysis, the standard ultimately adopted in Bostick is equally troublesome for Fourth Amendment rights. After
more than a decade of reliance on the "free to leave" test, first articulated in United States v. Mendmenhall,40 3 the Court explains that that
test is no longer applicable. Currently, the appropriate standard "is
whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers'
40 4
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."
One can understand Bostick's frustration when he learned that
the Court had suddenly adopted a new standard-a standard conveAs an initial matter, the fact that respondent could have moved from his
seat showed that he was 'free to leave.' He could have told the officers
that he did not want to talk to them and walked down the aisle or into the
bathroom on the bus if he wished to distance himself from the officers[;]
(emphasis added). When narcotics officers accost a traveller and tell him that they are
looking for illegal drugs, the last place he would go in order to avoid the officers' inquiries and dispel their suspicions would be the bathroom of a bus. The officers would think
that the traveller's flight is an avoidance tactic, and his escape to the bathroom is an
effort to "get rid of" illegal drugs.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
401
402 Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2387. Presumably even Justice Scalia-who likes to quote
Justice Brandeis' famous Olmstead dissent, see Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 227
U.S. at 479 )-would not be bothered by this incursion on "the right to be let alone."
446 U.S. 544, 553-55 (1980).
403
404 Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2387. Although the Bostick Court backs away from the "free
to leave" test in the context of bus raids, it does not repudiate many of the assumptions
underlying that test, as articulated by a majority of the Court over the past decade. For
example, Bostick continues the fiction that police questioning about possible criminal
conduct, "by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation." INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). This notion, explained in 3 LAFAvE, supra note 232,
§ 9.2(h), is really a policy decision of the Court to allow law enforcement officials to stop
and question persons, despite the inevitable coercive effects.
This value judgment by a conservative Court undermines the Fourth Amendment.
See Maclin, supra note 105. Even assuming that the Court is correct in stating that the
Fourth Amendment permits official pressure to induce persons to cooperate with police
officers who accost and question them on the street or in other public places, the Court
is wrong to conclude that police questioning in a bus aisle does not go beyond the inherent pressures accepted in social intercourse. See LaFave, supra note 15, at 746-47, 75152 (Bus raids are "dramatically different in terms of the character of the police activity
involved and its impact upon the reasonable traveler." The difference involves the "police dominance" of the situation, and the "uniquely heavy impact upon bus travelers
precisely because they do not, as a practical matter, have available the range of avoidance options which pedestrians and airport travelers might utilize.").
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niently designed to overrule his constitutional claims. For over ten
years, the Court had repeatedly said that a police encounter violates
the Fourth Amendment when it leaves a reasonable person with the
belief that he or she was not free to leave. Bostick was one of the
few litigants to come before the Court and satisfy that test. Apparently, the Court could not bring itself to allow this result.40 5
Even assuming the appropriateness of this change in standard,
the new test-and the assumptions upon which it rests-remains a
standard at odds with Fourth Amendment values. The Court assumes that a reasonable person in Bostick's position will "feel free
to decline the officers' request," or even know of his right to "terminate the encounter." 40 6 These assumptions are not well-founded.
Although the Court never acknowledges the fact, reality forces
us to concede that law enforcement officers engaged in "working in
the buses" or other aggressive patrol tactics are engaged in serious
business. These are not casual encounters; officers are armed and
have a mission. Confiscation of illegal drugs is one of the ends they
seek, but they also have other goals in mind. One such goal is to
"keep would-be felons off balance, and to establish a reputation for
tough, decisive action. This belief in the deterrent effect of aggres' 40 7 includsive patrol often takes precedence over other objectives,"
ing respecting the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals. 40 8
Moreover, officers often initiate these encounters "by asserting
their authority by 'taking charge.'"409 This, in turn, causes (or
should cause) most passengers to submit to the officers. The attitude of the officers usually is not friendly. Their approach is no410
nonsense and they do not tolerate interference with their tasks.
People who challenge an officer's authority or respond in a manner
405 It was as if Bostick were a football player who, on the last play of the game, had
managed to break into the open-field and was heading for an apparent touchdown with a
lone defender chasing behind him. Just as Bostick is finally about to cross the goal-line,
the Court decides to move the goal-post back an additional ten yards. This then allows
the defender to tackle Bostick before he reaches the goal-line with no time left for another try at a touchdown. The reader will have to pardon my cynicism, but it is too
much for this critic of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to believe that this
new standard fortuitiously appeared in a case where it was clear that the old standard
would compel the upholding of a Fourth Amendment claim.
406

Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.

supra note 33, at 161.
Professor LaFave observes that "everything about the entry of a police team onto
a bus and the commencement of a sweep is a rather clear indication to the passengers
that the police have 'in effect "seized" the bus.' " LaFave, supra note 15, at 748 (quoting
United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204, 208 (D.D.C. 1990)).
407
408

BROWN,

409

ALBERTJ. REISS,JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 180 (1971) ("Since police real-

ize they cannot count on citizen support of their authority they commonly enter encounters with citizens by asserting their authority by 'taking charge.' Having asserted
authority, they must seek to maintain it, if necessary, by force.").
410
See, e.g., UVILLER, supra note 6,at 16.
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deemed out-of-line by the police are "more likely to be treated in a
hostile, authoritarian or belittling manner by the police than citizens
who behave with civility or who extend deference." 41 ' In fact, an
officer may label one who challenges his control over an encounter
4 12
difficult and deal with the uncooperative individual appropriately.
When faced with this reality, the Court's confidence in the bus
passengers' ability to "just say no" to armed drug agents and its
trust in police officers seems a bit strained. 418 Someone seated in
the back of a bus and confronted by two armed'police officers is in
Police officers relish respect and, in many small ways,'insist on a show of
deference from the ordinary folk among whom they work.... Manifest
confidence begets submission, and the cops learn the firm tone and hand
that informs even the normally aggressive customer of the futility of
resistance. It's effective. In virtually every encounter I have witnessed,
the response of the person approached was docile, compliant, and
iespectful.
411 REIss, supra note 409, at 53; see also CHRISTOPHER CoMMISSION, supra note 110, at
21-33 (noting citizen complaints of brutal and aggressive police responses when citizens
question police authority and practices).
412. Clearly, overt and covert challenges to police authority will not go unnoticed. In fact, they can be seen to push the encounter to a new level
wherein any further slight to an officer, however subtle, provides sufficient evidence to a patrolman that he may indeed be dealing with a certifiable asshole and that the situation is in need of rapid clarification. From
this standpoint, an affront can be. seen, therefore, as disrupting the
smooth flow of the police performance.
Van Maanen, supra note 112, at 299.
It seems that police officers in Los Angeles, California, the nation's second largest
city, have developed a reputation for dealing with persons who strike officers as "uncooperative" or possess a "bad attitude." The Christopher Commission, which was established in the wake of the Rodney King police brutality case in Los Angeles, recently
found that a "significant number of [police] officers tended to use force excessively, that
these problem officers were well known in their divisions, and that the [Police] Department did not do enough to control or discipline these officers." CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION, supra note 110, at 34. In support of this finding, the Commission relied upon a
May 1991 written survey of 960 randomly selected police officers conducted by the Los
Angeles Police Department. That survey found that 4.6% "of officers in the survey
agreed with the statement that an officer [was] justified in administering physical punishment 'to a suspect with a bad or uncooperativeattitude."' Id. (emphasis added). The Commission, quite understandably, remarked:
That nearly 5% of LAPD officers would acknowledge in a written survey
sponsored by the Department that an officer would be entitled to use
"street justice" against suspects with a "bad or uncooperative attitude,"
and that 11% would have "no opinion," are evidence of a serious problem in attitude toward the use of force among a significant group of
LAPD officers.
Id.; see id. at 49-50 (transcripts of computer messages sent between Los Angeles police
officers, where officers talked about beating suspects and other members of the public).
413 Or, as Robert L. Andrews, a Florida circuit judge, bluntly stated:
What the cops are doing here.., is engaging innocent people in such a
coercive, intimidating manner that this 'right to say no' stuff is a crock of
crap. You're sitting on a bus, in a cramped space, when an officer with a
gun sticking out of his belt asks if he can look through your luggage.
Maybe you've got something to hide, maybe you don't. But do you really
think the average person believes he can say no? Or get up and walk off
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no position to dictate the actions of the officers. It is unrealistic to
suggest that Bostick had any control over the encounter. He did not
initiate it, he did not feel free to leave, and he had no reason to
believe that he could control the officers conduct toward him. Indeed, the fact that Bostick did not feel free to leave says a great deal
about whether he felt free to terminate the encounter or to decline
the officers' requests. If a person cannot walk away from police officers, he is probably not in a position to ignore those same
4 14
officers.
The Court's fallback position is that "an individual may decline
an officer's request without fearing prosecution. '4 15 This does
nothing to offset its insensitivity to Fourth Amendment principles.
As Justice Marshall noted, the average passenger who is "unadvised
of his rights and otherwise unversed in constitutional law has no reason to know that the police cannot hold his refusal to cooperate
against him." 41 6 More important, fear of a subsequent criminal trial

is probably one of the last things on the minds of those contemplating refusing a police officer's request. It is well-known that the police have various informal and extra-legal means available for
situations where their authority is questioned. Officers, for exam4 17
ple, may decide to "teach a lesson" to an uncooperative person.
Because of the violent nature of these "lessons" and the resulting
denigration of the individual, the Court misses the mark when it
speculates that a person considering refusal may do so "without
fearing prosecution." In the forefront of a person's mind is the fear

that bus? Don't be ridiculous. It's a total violation of the basic right of
any citizen to be left alone.
Kahn, supra note 151, at 18, 30.
414 Cf. LaFave, supra note 15, at 749
Though the Bostick majority correctly asserts that [the "free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter"] test, rather than
the Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" standard, is to be preferred, certainly
whether a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave remains
relevant under the broader test, for such departure is the most obvious
way to "otherwise terminate the encounter." (third emphasis added).
415 Florida v. Bostick, III S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991).
416 Id. at 2393.
417 "[Teaching" occupies a particularly prominent position in the police
repertoire of possible responses. Thus, the uncooperative and surly motorist finds his sobriety rudely questioned, or the smug and haughty college student discovers himself stretched over the hood of a patrol car and
the target of a mortifying and brusque body search. The object of such
degradation ceremonies is simply to reassert police control and demonstrate to the citizen that his behavior is considered inappropriate. Teaching techniques are numerous, with threat, ridicule, and harassment
among the more widely practiced.
Van Maanen, supra note 112, at 304.
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that a lack of cooperation may cause the police to arrest him, 418 to

approach him again later in the trip,4 19 or even worse, to respond
421
violently 4 20 and physically.
The Court never addresses or even acknowledges these realities
in Bostick. Instead, the Court advances a theory that forces citizens
to challenge or resist police authority in contexts where the Court
has conceded that people are justifiably inhibited. Is this a model of
the Fourth Amendment that affirmatively protects the right to be
left alone? I think not. Rather, it is a model that allows coercive
police tactics and permits violations of personal dignity. The Court
apparently believes that this sort police practice is necessary, and
therefore, reasonable. Most individuals will have little to worry
about; only the guilty need fear. 42 2 Evidently the Court trusts the
police not to search the bags of too many "innocent" persons that a
political backlash occurs. Alternatively, the Court believes that
those "innocent" persons affected by the police tactics will tolerate
them in order to avoid trouble with the authorities. 4 23 Either way,
418 Cf DonaldJ. Black, The Soial Organizationof Arrest, 23 STAN. L. REv. 1087, 1109
(1971) (noting that "police arrest blacks atoa comparatively high rate, but the difference
between the races appears to result primarily from the greater rate at which blacks show
disrespect for the police.").
419 See United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204, 205 (D.D.C. 1990) (officer testified
that "when passengers who appear nervous refuse to consent to an interview, certain
members of his unit then take it upon themselves to notify authorities at the next stop");
United States v. Cothran, 729 F. Supp. 153, 156 (D.D.C. 1990) (officer testified that,
when passengers refused to permit a search of their luggage, he would sometimes notify
authorities at the next stop to subject the passengers to further scrutiny).
420 Police do not arrest everyone that they subject to force. One study documenting
cases of police brutality noted that in 37 cases, 44 citizens had been assaulted over a
seven-week period. "In 15 of these cases, no one was arrested. Of these, 8 [cases involved] no verbal or physical resistance [to the police) whatsoever, while 7 had." Reiss,
supra note 338, at 280.
This same study noted that
police are very likely to use force in settings that they control.... When a
policeman uses undue force, then, he usually does not risk a complaint
against himself or testimony from witnesses who favor the complainant
against the policeman. This, as much as anything, probably accounts for
the low rate of formal complaints against policemen who use force
unnecessarily.
Id at 291-92.
421
As California State Assemblyman Curtis Tucker noted in the aftermath of the
Rodney King police brutality incident, when black people in Los Angeles see a police car
approaching, "They don't know whetherjustice will be meted out or whether judge, jury
and executioner is pulling up behind them." Stevensen, supra note 110, at A16.
422 This is because the "reasonable" person that the Court has in mind when it constructs Fourth Amendment principles "presupposes an innocent person." Florida v. Bostick, I11 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991).
423
Cf LaFave, supra note 15, at 751
[I]n light of the show of authority involved in undertaking a bus sweep,
the dynamics of the situation make a nonconforming refusal to cooperate
an especially unlikely choice. That this is so is ineluctably apparent when
it is considered that "such means of transportation are utilized largely by
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the Court's analysis shows contempt for individual liberty and the
Fourth Amendment. In the final analysis, the present Court's confidence in the police is abundant. One is tempted to say that if the
Framers had this much confidence in executive branch officials, they
probably would not have written the Fourth Amendment at all.
CONCLUSION

As a young attorney, Thurgood Marshall once told the Court:
"Equal protection and due process under the law are the pillars
upon which our democracy rests. A denial of these to the humblest
of our citizens is a threat to the.liberties of all."424 These words,

written about objectionable police interrogation methods, apply as
well to Justice Marshall's conception of Fourth Amendment values.
It is an extreme understatement to note that Fourth Amendment claims which reach the High Court are often raised in cases
"involving not very nice people." 425 Justice Marshall was well aware
of that, but he also knew that the Fourth Amendment rules fashioned by the Court in criminal cases "apply to the innocent and the
guilty alike." 426 He understood that police encounters occur under
various circumstances, ranging from the confrontation of a suspect
in a dark alley to an encounter with a young lawyer at a isolated
railroad station. Whatever the setting, Justice Marshall strove to
construct a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that preserved the
right of all to be secure in our "persons, houses, papers, and effects."'4 2 7 His life experiences, his contact with the police in a
rough-and-ready world, his insights, and his generous reading of
the Fourth Amendment will be sorely missed.

the underclass of this nation who, because of greater concerns (such as
being able to survive), do not often complain about such deprivations."
(quoting United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.D.C. 1990).
424
Brief in Support of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 32; Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940).
425
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(noting that "the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people").
426
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
427
U.S. CONST, amend. IV.

